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Dollars, Dialogue and Development
Does Swedish debt relief contribute to economic growth? Does econo-
mic growth reach the poor? Does Sweden influence policies in partner
countries? Have donors supported the “right” reforms? These are some
of the questions discussed in this evaluation of programme aid, with an
emphasis on the Swedish experience. 
Programme aid – that is, import support, debt relief and budget sup-
port – has constituted a considerable part of Swedish aid in the
1990’s. However, the volumes of programme aid have fallen both in
relative and absolute terms during this same period. Few evaluations
have assessed how different modalities of programme aid further eco-
nomic growth and sustainable development. Sida therefore commissio-
ned an evaluation of programme aid with a twofold purpose. Firstly, to
assess the impact of aid on the policy dialogue, as well as on the out-
come of the policies. Secondly, to assess the impact of aid transfers
on economic growth including the distributional effects. Thirteen wor-
king papers have been synthesised into this one final report “Dollars,
Dialogue and Development”. The working papers comprise field studies
of three countries; Nicaragua, Uganda and Vietnam and desk studies of
five countries; Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Tanzania, and
Zambia. Furthermore, three thematic studies have been carried out on
conditionality, impact of adjustment policies and modalities of program-
me aid respectively. Finally, there is a study of the management of
Swedish programme aid. 
The evaluation was commissioned by Sida’s Department for Evaluation
and Internal Audit which is an independent department reporting direct-
ly to Sida’s Board of Directors. The evaluation has been carried out by
the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Netherlands. 
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Evaluation of Swedish
Programme Aid
Thirteen working papers, constituting the evaluation of Swedish programme
aid, have been synthesised into this one final report  “Dollars, Dialogue and
Development. An evaluation of Swedish programme aid”, Sida Evaluation
99/17.
In 1998 Sida, the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit, commis-
sioned an evaluation of Swedish programme aid.1 The evaluation has been
carried out by the Institute of Social Studies (ISS). The evaluation comprises
field studies in three countries; Uganda, Nicaragua and Vietnam and desk
studies of five countries; Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Tanzania
and Zambia. There are three thematic studies on conditionality, impact of
adjustment policies and modalities of programme aid respectively. Finally,
there is a study of the management of Swedish programme aid and a paper
commenting on the World Bank report  “Assessing Aid”.
The synthesis report and the 13 working papers constituting the evaluation
of Swedish programme aid are listed below.
99/17 Dollars, Dialogue and Development. An evaluation of
Swedish programme aid.
99/17:1 Development by Default. Programme aid to Bangladesh.
99/17:2 Supporting Success. Programme aid to Cape Verde.
99/17:3 Reform, Rehabilitation and Recovery. Programme aid to
Mozambique.
99/17:4 Debt, Dependence and Fragile Development. Programme aid to
Nicaragua.
99/17:5 Counting the Donors’ Blessings. Programme aid to Tanzania.
99/17:6 What Does the Showcase Show? Programme aid to Uganda.
99/17:7 Fostering High Growth in a Low Income Country. Programme
aid to Vietnam.
99/17:8 A Black Sheep Among the Reformers. Programme aid to Zambia.
99/17:9 Trends and Turns in the 1990s. Programme aid and the Swedish
experience.
99/17:10 Programme Aid, Policies and Politics. Programme aid and
conditionality.
99/17:11 The Impact of Adjustment Policies. Programme aid and reforms.
99/17:12 From Commodity Aid to Budget Support. Programme aid and
its modalities.
99/17:13 Assessing Aid: a Manifesto for the 21st Century?
1 See appendix 1 Terms of reference.iv
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Executive summary
1. Background to the evaluation
1.1 During the 1990s Sweden has disbursed over SEK 7 billion of Swedish
programme aid, comprising nearly 12 per cent of total aid.
1.2 Over the past ten years there have been evaluations of Swedish pro-
gramme aid to a number of countries. But these have been on a coun-
try-by-country basis, lacked a common framework and have typically
not addressed the central question of how programme aid supports pol-
icy change.
1.3 In order to obtain a comprehensive picture, Government decision dated
1996-11-18 charged Sida with the task of evaluating Swedish balance
of payments support, which has been more broadly construed by the
Evaluation Department to mean programme aid (PA).
1.4 According to the TOR “the purpose of the study is to evaluate
the impact of the resources transfer on economic growth”
(Sida’s other objectives are mentioned in passing, but, as demonstrated
below, PA is linked mainly to the growth objective). The key questions
identified in the TOR are: (1) what is the rationale for Swedish PA and
how has it changed over time? (2) how has PA evolved over time? and (3)
the three questions of PA impact: (i) how aid affects policy; (ii) how pol-
icy affects performance; and (iii) the impact of the funds.
1.5 The evaluation has produced 13 Working Papers. Eight of
these are country studies: three field studies (Nicaragua, Uganda and
Vietnam) and five desk studies (Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Mozambique,
Tanzania, and Zambia). In addition there is a study of the management
of Swedish PA (“the Swedish report”), and thematic reports on condi-
tionality, impact of adjustment and modalities of PA. A final paper is a
critique of the World Bank’s report Assessing Aid.
1.6 This note summarises the findings from the evaluation around four
main areas: (1) management and modalities; (2) aid and reform; (3) im-
pact of adjustment; and (4) the impact of the funds.ix
2. Management and modalities
Definition of Programme Aid (PA)
2.1 Programme aid (PA) is aid that is not intended to finance a
specific project. This defining characteristic is spelt out in the defini-
tion given by DAC’s Principles for Programme Assistance:
Programme assistance consists of all contributions made available to a
recipient country for general development purposes i.e. balance-of-pay-
ments support, general budget support and commodity assistance, not
linked to specific project activities.
 (OECD, 1991: 5
2.2 A common characteristic is that it is linked to economic reform, i.e.
that it is policy-based aid. World Bank and IMF policy-based lending is
PA and most bilaterals link their PA to IFI conditionality. This link is
present for most Swedish PA, although two countries – Cape Verde and
Vietnam – received PA in the absence of IFI programmes (although
they were implementing home-grown reform at the time). The link with
IFI conditionality may be either very close, disbursing when conditional
IFI funds are disbursed, or more general, such as observance of a PFP.
2.3 The different modalities of PA are shown in Figure 2.1. The main
points to note are: (1) this evaluation is concerned only with financial
PA; (2) the main distinction is between balance of payments support
and budget support; and (3) budget support need not necessarily be PA,
but much of it is – this last point is particularly pertinent with respect to
sector programmes (discussed below).
Trends in Swedish PA
2.4 Swedish PA has seen three big changes in the 1990s: (1) a fall in
both absolute and relative terms; (2) a shift in the relative importance of
modalities as import support has virtually disappeared, debt relief in-
creased in absolute terms and the relative importance of budget support
increased (Figure 2.2); and (3) scaling down of PA disbursed through the
country frame in favour of the fund Support for Economic Reform and
Debt Relief (ERDR) created in the mid-eighties (Figure 2.3).
2.5 From 1990/91–1997 SEK 6.7 billion of programme aid was disbursed
(and a further SEK 0.6 billion in 1998), amounting to just under 12 per
cent of total Swedish aid over the period as a whole. However, there
has been a secular decline in PA in the 1990s, in both abso-
lute and relative terms. Annual disbursements peaked at SEK 1.7
billion in 1990, falling to just SEK 0.4 billion in 1997, corresponding to
a reduction from 20 per cent to just 5 per cent of total aid.x
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Figure 2.1  Schematic representation of programme aid


























Figure 2.2  PA modalities
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2.6 Total Swedish aid also fell in the first part of the 1990s, and the falling
share of PA over this period shows that PA is vulnerable, meaning
that it suffers a larger than proportionate fall when aid is
cut. The nature of PA, and the fact that it is largely outside the country
frame, makes it easier to impose cuts and large year-to-year fluctuations
in the budget on the part of the donor, and it is this fact which explains
the fall rather than a deliberate move out of PA as a matter of policy.
But such actions undermine the credibility of PA as an important part
of the aid programme, and can be damaging to recipients (and are
more likely to be so as the sector approach is developed).
2.7 Modalities have changed as import support all but disap-
peared by 1997. By contrast, debt relief has been on a fluctu-
ating upward trend, accounting for over half of all Swedish PA in
1997 and 1998. Budget support has fluctuated (quite widely) in nom-
inal terms, but its share has risen as import support has vanished.
2.8 The cut in PA has been entirely at the expense of that dis-
bursed through the country frame, with an increasing
amount disbursed through the ERDR window. The ERDR
window was created to allow MFA more say over the use of these
funds and to increase the flexibility of PA to act as an incentive for
reform. In 1994/95 it was decided to remove PA from the CF alto-
gether, although its declining share had already been evident for some
time. This decision was subsequently reversed so that reservations
could be utilised as PA, though the decline continued.
2.9 There is some debate as to whether PA should be put back into
the country frame. Such a move may be expected to be resisted by
some parts of MFA and the Ministry of Finance, partly as they will
lose control over the funds as a result, though they will use the incen-
tive argument (that a separate fund is needed to reward “good per-
formers”) to defend their position. Whilst it is true that putting PA
into the CF gives the impression that the country has the funds (so
that behaviour does not matter), various options might be examined
for including PA in the CF. The most obvious of these is an applica-
tion of the partnership concept, so that a larger CF, part of which is
PA, goes to “good performers” and so is ex post conditionality (rather
than the current ex ante conditionality of conditioning aid on future
performance). A related move could be multi-year programming of
the CF, although the arguments for that are rather different.
Management of Swedish PA
2.10 In line with the Swedish tradition, Sida is an autonomous agency op-
erating within guidelines set by its parent ministry, Foreign Affairs.
However, MFA has more direct control over PA than other
parts of the aid programme for three reasons: (1) there is a close
day-to-day relationship between Sida and MFA on many aspects re-xiii
lating to PA, including detailed consultations on Sida’s recommenda-
tions to MFA for the allocation of PA; (2) MFA has direct control over
a part of the ERDR, i.e. it authorises the disbursements; and (3) any
reallocation within the CF in excess of SEK 35 million must be ap-
proved by MFA – such amounts are most likely to be involved in the
case of PA. The control of MFA appears to have increased over time,
both as ERDR has replaced the country frame as the main window
for PA disbursements, and since MFA rejects an increasing percentage
of Sida’s recommendations on allocation of PA.
2.11 However, the part of PA over which MFA has direct control is only
around 10 per cent of total Swedish PA. MFA is responsible only for
some debt relief, whereas Sida disburses all three modalities.
2.12 A further distinctive feature of the management of PA is the involve-
ment of the Ministry of Finance. Finance is responsible for Sweden’s
board representation at the IFIs and heads Sweden’s delegation to the
Paris Club, and so is an actor in one of the main channels for influence
on policy dialogue. It is also involved in discussing the proposed PA al-
locations. Many officials in Sida and MFA mentioned that Sida and
MFA are of a like mind, but that disagreements can arise with Finance,
which is seen as more strongly “towing the IMF line”.
2.13 The allocation profile of PA is more progressive than that
for Swedish aid as a whole, although it is difficult to find an allo-
cation rule which would explain this pattern. The eligibility criteria
appear to be (1) low income, (2) heavily indebted, and (3) undergoing
reform, but exceptions can be found in all cases, as can apparently
eligible countries who do not receive PA.
Modalities
2.14 Import support underwent a transformation from allocative systems
in accordance with the control regime to market-based systems mak-
ing forex available through a variety of flexible mechanisms. Two
sets of criticisms may be levelled at import support: (1) systems were
prone to corruption and supported inefficiency; and (2) excessive bu-
reaucratic procedures acted as a constraint on both utilisation of
funds and market liberalisation. There is truth in both these com-
plaints: but they are made with the benefit of hindsight, and both sets
of problems were reduced as import support schemes became more
liberalised. And, as explained below, import support had positive sys-
temic effects at various stages. Nonetheless, the problems caused
by the excessive bureaucratic burden associated with im-
port support holds important lessons for sector pro-
grammes today. The key lessons are the importance of donor har-
monisation and the dangers of donors trying to micro-manage gov-
ernment processes by requiring detailed reporting that may detract
from the real objective of systems development.xiv
2.15 Debt relief does not have these disbursement problems, and has
much to be said for it as a form of PA.
2.16 Not all budget support is PA, but its importance may increase with a
move by the donor community to sector programmes. There are,
however, important unresolved issues with respect to sector pro-
grammes: (1) the extent to which it is intended to finance additional
expenditures (and the implications for government expenditure plan-
ning), (2) identification of individual donors with programme com-
ponents, (3) whether or not it is quick disbursing assistance (QDA).
Underlying these issues is a division between those who see the sector
approach as the latest manifestation of PA (so the policy dialogue fo-
cuses on the sector and the funds are PA), and those who see it as an
evolution of project aid (so the sector is a project list plus policy dia-
logue). Current proposals for an overall expenditure plan met by gov-
ernment revenue and donors adopting either of these two approach-
es do not resolve all these problems and leave sector planning donor-
driven (and create problems if some donors finance the recurrent
component of another donor’s project).
Objectives and rationale
2.17 PA is linked to Sida’s growth objective, although this is
most commonly stated as being support to economic re-
form. Analysis of documentation for seven of Sweden’s programme
countries shows that support for reform was given as the objective 25
times, improving economic performance 19 times and other objec-
tives six times. However, Sida documentation rarely explains either
how PA supports reform or how this will promote growth.
2.18 Despite suspension of PA for violations of good governance, political
reform is not mentioned as an objective in any of the agreements
(nor amongst the conditions). Social sector reform was mentioned
three times in the objectives, which is the closest the agreements get
to a poverty-related objective. However the 1998 Budget Bill stated
that “economic reform is a precondition for long term economic and
social development and efficient poverty reduction” and so may her-
ald a change in this respect. But to date the objective for PA is domi-
nated by growth/reform and there has been no change over time.
2.19 The rationale most often given for Swedish PA is an external gap,
couched in various ways such as a shortage of forex, or possibly with
reference to the debt burden. In recent years the external gap has
been referred to less frequently, which reflects the demise of import
support. Budget support is more likely to be given the rationale of an
internal gap. But there is no economic logic in rationalising
import support with reference to an external gap and
budget support with reference to an internal gap (see be-
low).xv
2.20 There is, however, a rationale for evolving PA modalities. This ra-
tionale is the systemic effects of different modalities. For example,
changing systems of managing import support played an important
part in several countries in liberalising forex markets. Budget support
can potentially play the same role with respect to government budg-
etary systems. But Sida documentation rarely mentions these bene-
fits. This fact is a manifestation of a more general shortcoming in the
documentation, whereby the links between programme aid funds
and their intended outcomes is not made. This gap reflects an ap-
parent weak understanding of the workings of PA on the
part of many Sida officials.
3. The role of donor agencies in policy change
3.1 Domestic political considerations are the prime factor in
determining economic and political reform. All but two of
the countries studied (Uganda and Zambia) initiated reform without
donors. Several have carried out some measures not required by do-
nors (e.g. the cash budget in Uganda) and all have not implemented
other policies that have been required. In each case domestic factors
can be identified which are important in understanding the timing
and pace of reform, although some roles can be ascribed to donors.
However, donors over-state their own importance at the ex-
pense of understanding the political dynamic. IFI docu-
ments often date reform from their own involvement rather than
when the first changes were initiated and in general pay scant atten-
tion to possible implementation constraints; a corollary is that trans-
parency is often measured by government sharing information with
donors rather than civil society.
3.2 Analysis of policy dialogue has been excessively focused on the for-
mal trappings of conditionality and the associated negotiations (from
which bilateral donors are excluded). In fact, policy dialogue is a
set of processes: conditionality is only the formal, directive end of
policy dialogue, other parts of the policy dialogue have often been
more effective, and the formal and informal channels complement
one another. Indeed, Formal conditionality has a mixed record.
There is ample evidence from the evaluation for the view
that conditionality has failed, and of the reasons for this failure;
but there are also cases where conditionality has influ-
enced policies and reasons to believe why this may have been so.
3.3 Bilateral donors have played an increasingly important
role in policy dialogue: in the 1980s bilaterals signed up to the
conditionalities of the IFIs, although they still do this formally, their
role has increased partly with the development of political condition-
ality and partly as the policy dialogue processes have deepened.
Whilst bilateral agencies have moved forward the agenda of politicalxvi
conditionality and supported the implementation of economic re-
forms, they have had little influence on the content of IFI pro-
grammes. Formal channels for influencing the IFIs appear not to
work, and the informal ones are also weak. Rather, bilateral influ-
ence is most likely to operate through semiformal and informal chan-
nels, including co-ordination bodies such as like-minded groups.
3.4 Sweden subscribes to the notion of promoting policy change, and is
broadly supportive of IFI policies, although reserving the right to
make independent judgements. However, there does not appear to
be a “Swedish position”: Sweden’s role in policy dialogue at
the country level does not reflect what may have been ex-
pected from a “progressive donor”. Unique aspects of Swe-
den’s involvement in policy dialogue have usually revolved around
political conditionality (on the economic front the use of Matching
Funds in Tanzania is the only exception), and there is no evidence of
trying to put poverty more strongly on to the conditionality agenda at
the country-level. PA has both direct and indirect links to
poverty reduction of which Sweden has by and large only
paid attention to the indirect channels.
3.5 The relative lack of Swedish influence in general is not the result of
inability to have an influence, as such influence can be seen in a few
cases, most notably those countries in which Sweden has a “pres-
ence” established through years of good relations (which appear not
to sour if governments change). Indeed, the rationale for Swedish PA
in countries where there is no presence is far less strong. In some
countries Sweden has played a non-directive role in policy dialogue.
This is most obvious in the case of Vietnam, but also applies to Nica-
ragua. There are good reasons to oppose the current hegemony of
the IFIs in setting the policy agenda, and the most useful way that
this can be done is through facilitating policy debate. Sweden’s repu-
tation for independence means that it is well placed to play this role.
However, it is not clear that Sida has the capacity (in terms of either
or both staff time and training) to properly carry out this part.
4. The impact of adjustment
4.1 There has been a dramatic change in the policy stance of
virtually all developing countries over the last twenty
years. Swedish aid was to some extent focused on those which had
gone furthest toward a planned economy – such as Guinea-Bissau,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Vietnam. But today all
these countries have introduced very substantial amounts of market
1980s (Figure 4.1). There is no doubt that a change has taken place:
the question is, what has been its impact?xvii

































4.2 Table 4.1 reports the median score of some economic aggregates for
Sida programme countries grouped according to policy stance (the
data are from 1981–96 so a country will appear in a different group
at different points in time). This analysis is thus a control group ap-
proach, which has well-known shortcomings. Nonetheless, the results
are at least suggestive of a pattern that needs to be explained. First,
unreformed economies perform worse in all but one area
(agricultural growth) than those that have initiated re-
form. Second, other than for export growth (and to a far lesser ex-
tent for overall growth), more intensive reform does not yield
additional benefits over those with a lesser extent of liber-
alisation. A before versus after analysis confirms these findings and
delivers the additional insight that reform has restored growth in
some countries (e.g. Uganda) but not in others (e.g. Zambia), which
gives the third result that reform appears to be necessary but
not sufficient for restoring growth.
Table 4.1 Economic performance for Swedish programme
countries classified by policy index (group medians)
012
Growth 1.7 3.8 4.9
Inflation 30.2 13.0 11.8
Investment rate 15.3 21.8 21.4
Export growth –1.1 4.9 7.8
Agricultural growth 3.4 3.1 2.9
Manufacturing growth 0.0 4.5 4.7xviii
4.3 Confirmation of these findings from a firmer analytical base requires
examination of the determinants of the different variables and how
these have been affected by reform. In the case of growth these de-
terminants include inflation, investment and human capital. There is
no doubt that taming the hyperinflation that threatened or actually
occurred in many countries was an important pre-condition for
growth. But empirical studies suggest that the growth-inflation link is
non-linear: so that at a certain point further reductions in inflation
are bad for growth. This is a policy issue of great relevance in many
countries in which Sida is supporting anti-inflationary poli-
cies which may be detrimental for long-run growth by un-
dermining investment in physical and human capital.
4.4 Investment can spur growth and affect the pattern of growth. Invest-
ment in infrastructure facilitates the agricultural supply response and
promotes the geographical dispersion of growth. But a key indicator
of infrastructure – road kilometres per person – has been stagnant in
Africa since the early 1980s and road quality has deteriorated greatly
over this period. This is one reason why the agricultural supply
response has been mixed – despite agricultural liberalisation be-
ing the first measure undertaken in most countries – and defies easy
generalisation. However, with the exception of Vietnam, what re-
sponse there has been has not been uniform across crops
or geographically. Examination of constraints on the supply re-
sponse support the view that market liberalisation is unlikely to be
sufficient for sustained sectoral growth.
4.5 The story is also mixed with respect to manufacturing performance,
but there is no evidence for widespread de-industrialisa-
tion as a result of liberalisation. Several countries, mainly in
Asia, have made rapid gains in producing for export, but Uganda has
shown that growth can also occur in import-substituting sectors.
However, many commentators would argue that in other countries
adjustment has been unnecessarily severe by allowing inadequate
time for firms to adjust, and point to the East Asian model which re-
lied upon a measure of state intervention.
4.6 The picture with respect to poverty is not encouraging in
all but the most rapidly growing countries. Not only is
growth insufficiently high to reduce the number of poor but all avail-
able evidence suggests that contrary to early claims by the World
Bank, liberalisation has increased inequality. Relying on
market-led growth will not be sufficient to reduce poverty in the fore-
seeable future. However, despite talk of supporting pro-poor growth,
policies proposed by donors focus on influencing growth rather than
the pattern of growth.xix
4.7 There has been political reform although this has typically started later
than economic reform. Some Sida programme countries have done
little in this direction and others have suffered reversals. The evaluation
results support the view that there is no straightforward relationship
between economic and political liberalisation in either direction.
5. The impact of PA funds
5.1 PA is forex the sale of which raises local currency (counter-value).
That is, a single PA transaction provides both forex and local curren-
cy (“the circular flow of PA”). Since any restrictions apply to the des-
ignated modality, import support provides tied forex and
free local currency, and budget support provides free fo-
rex and tied local currency. The circular flow of PA means that
it makes no sense to say that import support fills an external gap and
budget support an internal one. Indeed, inappropriate conditions
may mean that import support is better at filling the internal gap
than the external one and vice versa for budget support.
5.2 Moreover, the concept of gaps has dubious economic validity. Ex post
gaps can be observed, and these are created by the aid flow, rather
than ex ante gaps existing which need aid to fill them. It is more useful
to focus on the marginal impact of aid, rather than notions of “gap
filling”. This approach implies that there are no bottlenecks, aid’s
impact coming from a variety of channels rather than relaxing a crit-
ical constaint.
5.3 In examining the marginal impact of aid an important distinction is
that between fungibility and free resources. Fungibility describes a
situation in which a donor provides funds for an activity that would
have been carried out anyway, thus freeing up the government’s own
resources to be used as it wishes. Although the donor’s funds are ac-
counted against its chosen activity it is in effect making possible the
marginal activity to which the government diverts the resources freed
up by the aid. If the donor does not specify the use of the funds then
there can be no fungibility. Rather the aid should be called free re-
sources. Much programme aid, such as retroactive finance and some
debt relief, is recognised by donors as being free resources.
5.4 The academic literature has proved how difficult it is to establish
methodologically sound and robust conclusions about aid and
growth, though many recent studies do find a significant positive re-
lationship. The approach in this study is to examine how aid affects a
range of variables. The main findings are:
• Aid in general has supported both imports and debt payments; with-
out aid imports would have been between 20 to 50 per cent less in
most years for most of the countries studied, and even then they
would have been unable to meet external debt obligations.xx
• Aid, in particular counter-value, has not resulted in equivalent in-
creases in expenditure, and so had an anti-inflationary effect by off-
setting deficit financing.
• The anti-inflationary impact also works through increasing the supply
of goods with higher imports and by providing the reserves which give
credibility to an exchange rate anchor (or, more generally, avoiding the
necessity for inflationary devaluation when liberalising forex markets).
The second of these effects is particularly associated with PA.
• The anti-inflationary impact of aid, combined with conditionality
and systemic effects of PA, mean that it has been associated with de-
preciation of the real exchange rate rather than appreciation.
• Private investment response is weak in most countries, so the poten-
tial positive links from aid (through both policy and impact of funds)
remain to be realised.
• The story with respect to government expenditure is mixed, but in
most countries restructuring of public spending to social sectors re-
mains limited, suggesting that aid may not have played much of a role.
• Effective conditionality will determine aid’s macroeco-
nomic impact by influencing the use of funds. The extent to
which aid is used to reduce deficit financing or increase expenditure,
rather than offset taxes (and the sort of expenditure), can be influ-
enced by the conditions attached to aid, in particular the spending
limits associated with IMF credits. However, the conditions are not
always effective and may not have been the right ones – in several
cases a more liberal attitude to spending may have been appropriate.
• There can be no doubt that aid has improved welfare through sup-
porting expenditure and imports. But the evidence adds up to sug-
gest that aid will have had some impact on growth, but that the im-
pact is neither particularly strong, nor sustainable – which requires
more focus on the fundamentals.
6. Conclusions and recommendations
Main messages
6.1 The main messages to emerge from the evaluation in the five areas of
study are:
• Modality: different modalities make sense for their systemic effects,
rather than reference to an internal or external gap. However restric-
tions and reporting requirements have sometimes been excessive and
lagged behind changes in the recipient country – a fact which holds
lessons for donors in the move to budget support, emphasising the
importance of donor harmonisation and the dangers of attempting
to micro-manage domestic processes.xxi
• Management: the divorce of PA from the main body of the aid pro-
gramme by the greater role accorded MFA may undermine PA in
various ways, of which the most notable element is the vulnerability
of PA to cuts following its removal from the country frame. But the
common characterisation of programme aid as “political” is a relat-
ed issue. Finally, understanding of the workings of PA is often weak,
or at last not well articulated in official documentation.
• Impact of reform: substantial liberalisation has taken place; however
the evidence does not support the view that further liberalisation is
either necessary or sufficient for sustained growth, but rather sug-
gests that some measure of complementary policies are required to
correct for market failures (e.g. state support for credit and extension,
labour-intensive public works, and investment in infrastructure and
basic services).
• The role of donor agencies in policy change: policy dialogue is often
narrowly conceived as the formal negotiations over a PFP or, more
specifically, a particular adjustment credit. In fact policy dialogue
should be seen as a wider set of processes taking place through both
formal and informal channels. Donors have had a more limited role
in policy change than they imagine, mainly as domestic politics are
the prime factor in shaping the reform effort. However various roles
for bilateral influence do exist which have perhaps been under-uti-
lised, partly to question the Washington consensus and partly to facil-
itate a broader debate. It is not clear if Sweden wishes to exert an in-
dependent influence, though several actions lead us to conclude that
it does; however there is no clear “Swedish position” and it is not, as
may have been expected, associated with a more “human face”.
• The impact of aid funds: it is notoriously difficult to reach firm con-
clusions with respect to the impact of aid funds, however, data analy-
sis suggests that aid (in general) has supported imports and debt serv-
ice, and that programme aid has both supported government ex-
penditure and played a role in stabilisation. There is support for the
view that effective policy dialogue can enhance aid impact.
Recommendations
6.2 Following from above the following recommendations can be made:
• Modality: Sweden should use available channels to pursue harmo-
nised, stream-lined sector programmes, but retain a substantial share
of debt relief (whose share may rise above its current 50 per cent
whilst sector programmes are sorted out) to act as quick disbursing
assistance. Sectoral and intra-sectoral expenditure patterns should be
influenced through policy dialogue, rather than restrictions on the
use of funds.xxii
• Management: PA should be put back in the country frame, exploring
ways of doing this which utilise ex post conditionality. Whilst the de-
tails of this new form of conditionality remain to be worked out,
there is a widespread feeling that ex ante conditionality has not
worked. A better understanding of how PA inputs are intended to
achieve their intended outcomes of growth and poverty reduction is
desirable.
• Impact of reform: Sweden should support the pursuit of comple-
mentary policies (listed in the previous paragraph) to enhance pros-
pects for growth and to improve the distribution of growth.
• Role of donor agencies in policy change: Sweden should actively de-
velop its image as an independent agency that will support initiatives
to facilitate domestic debate on policy issues. This does not require a
break with formal policy conditionality, but recognises the limited
role that this aspect plays. A more active involvement on policy issues
is implied by this stance, which support the view that PA should be
focused on a smaller number of countries.
• Impact of funds: pay due attention to conditionality to promote the
right macroeconomic impact of funds, without becoming involved in
micro-management of the use of funds.
In conclusion, there is a future for PA. Indeed, there are good grounds
for reversing the declining trend in PA. But expanding the PA budget
should be done in the context of a new strategy for enhancing PA effective-





Programme aid (PA) is aid not linked to any specific project, but which is
conditional upon policy changes by the recipient. PA thus has two inputs: funds
and policy dialogue. How are these inputs intended to achieve growth and
poverty reduction? To answer these questions requires an examination of both
the management of PA and channels for impact. Three areas of impact are
identified: effect on policy outcomes, impact of policy changes and impact of PA
funds. A logical framework can be applied which links these inputs to specific
activities and, so, to outcomes which relate to Sida’s development objectives.
1.1 The three research questions
How does programme aid (PA) work?1 How does the provision of import
support, debt relief or budget support bring about poverty reduction?
As will be documented in Chapter 2, PA is most closely related to the growth
objective: PA is meant to reduce poverty through the promotion of economic
growth. Understanding how this is so involves first the recognition that each
PA agreement has two inputs: funds and policy dialogue. On the one hand a
PA flow consists of actual dollars or SEKs (or in the case of some import
support and food PA, commodities). But, on the other hand, linked to the PA
of most donors, including Sweden, are associated policy conditions. PA is
intended to act as a lever for economic and political reform and, hence, bring
about economic growth.
The two channels of PA raise two sets of questions. The first relate to the
management of PA, the selection of PA modality (import support, debt relief
or budget support) and the application of policy conditions. The second set
consists of three questions on PA impact. These three are:
1 The definition of PA is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.2
• how has donor policy dialogue affected the pattern and pace of reform, i.e.
policy outcomes (and what has been the contribution of PA to this process)?
• what has been the socio-economic impact of reform programmes?
• what has been the impact of the PA funds (on imports, government
expenditure, investment etc.)?
This chapter first lays out the conceptual framework to be used to address
these questions (section 1.2), and provides a brief overview of the remainder
of the report (section 1.3).3
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Social and economic equality
Political and economic independence
Democratic development and human rights
Ecologically sustainable development
Overall goal Poverty reduction
Figure 1.1  Logical framework for the analysis of programme aid
Note: * the objective of gender equality was added only recently and so is not shown amongst
the objectives for the purposes of this evaluation. Nonetheless, gender-differentiated impacts are

















1.2 A conceptual framework
The overall conceptual framework is the logical framework (log frame), shown
in Figure 1.1. The motivation for the log frame is that one can trace back
from objectives to output indicators, and so to the activities needed to get
those outputs and, finally, the inputs required to carry out those activities.
Theory based evaluation (TBE) can be viewed as a restatement of the log
frame which examines how the various links (from inputs to activities etc.) are
meant to work and the assumptions underlying these links, and how they
work in practice.
As explained above, PA has two inputs: funds and policy dialogue, and these
are shown at the top of the figure. Both of these inputs relate to the three
activities shown: changes in aggregates on external and internal account, and
the changing policy environment.2 For the former two activities there are
both levels and composition effects: PA can affect, inter alia, the level of
government spending and its distribution across sectors, and both the level
and composition of imports. Disentangling the effect of PA from other factors
is the common problem of the counterfactual, which needs to be taken into
account in analysing each of the three questions.
These activities should deliver outputs (or impact) in terms of improved
economic, social and political indicators. We include the last of these as
governance concerns have entered the donor agenda in the nineties, and
political conditionality with PA is often the chosen instrument to achieve this
objective. A distinction is made between governance and politics, the former
relating to the workings of the government system, such as budget transparency,
and the latter to the political process, such as a free press and the electoral
system. The three sets of outputs shown are not of course independent; the
extent to which one is achieved may well depend on the others. The evaluation
also considers evidence relating to these links, in particular that between
political and economic liberalisation. These output indicators show the extent
to which the objectives have been realised, and so contributed to the overall
goal of poverty reduction.
The framework lists five of Sida’s six objectives (that of gender equality was
added too late to be included in the evaluation). The growth objective is
separated out as that most relevant for PA (see Chapter 2) and is the main
focus of attention in this report. The other objectives are mentioned mainly
insofar as they matter for growth and its relationship to poverty reduction.
Figure 1.2 presents a more detailed framework for the links between PA and
growth. As in Figure 1.1, both funds and policy dialogue may be expected to
affect both policy and economic aggregates. Beyond that some specific channels
to be investigated are identified, such as how stabilisation and the reduction
2 There is no significance in the relative placing of the inputs and activities. It is not intended to suggest





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of debt overhang can increase growth. The figure also picks out those
components of government expenditure – infrastructure and social spending
– considered most important for growth and poverty reduction.
1.3 The purpose and scope of this
evaluation
During the 1990s over SEK 7 billion of programme aid (PA) have been
disbursed, corresponding to 12 per cent of total Swedish aid in this period.3
There have been many separate evaluations of Swedish programme aid since
the late 1980s (reviewed in de Vylder, 1996). But various shortcomings may
be identified in each of these, and there has been no attempt to present a
synthesis which abstracts from specific country circumstances to draw general
conclusions on Swedish programme aid.4 This report attempts to fill that
gap.
The Evaluation of Swedish programme aid has taken place during 1998 and
early 1999. Thirteen working papers have been produced. The core of these
papers have been eight country studies – three field studies (Nicaragua, Uganda
and Vietnam) and five desk studies (Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Mozambique,
Tanzania and Zambia) – supplemented by literature reviews and conceptual
papers.
This paper summarises the findings of the evaluation. The second chapter
deals with the first set of questions related to the management of PA, opening
with a discussion of its workings. Chapters 3 to 5 deal with the three questions
of PA impact: how donors have affected policy outcomes, the impact of policy
changes, and the impact of the PA funds. The final chapter concludes and
presents recommendations.
3 PA’s share of Swedish aid for 1990/91-1997 was 11.9 per cent (reporting switched from a financial to a
calendar year in 1997).
4 De Vylder (1993) synthesised evaluations from four countries, and Aguilar (1997) discusses support to
reform, rather than PA more generally, in three countries.7
Chapter 2
What is programme aid?
Over SEK 7 billion of programme aid (PA) has been disbursed during the 1990s,
corresponding to 12 per cent of Swedish aid. But PA has fallen in both relative
and absolute terms, accounting for only 5 per cent of total aid in 1997,
compared to 20 per cent at the start of the decade. There is no developmental
rationale for this decline, indeed current trends in donor policy and rhetoric
suggest that the opposite trend may have been expected. Within this decline
there have been major changes in Swedish programme aid: from import support
to budget support (with a continuing role for debt relief), and from the Sida-
administered country frame to the Economic Reform and Debt Relief window,
over which the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has a much greater say. The role of
the Ministry of Finance has also increased. One constant has been that PA has
been most strongly associated with achievement of the growth objective, often
through the intermediate objective of supporting reform. But Swedish
documentation gives little insight into how PA is intended to achieve these
objectives, nor how the various rationales for PA (mainly the presence of an
internal or external “gap”) are linked to these objectives. Greater familiarity with
“how PA works” by Sida officials is likely to increase the effectiveness of this
aid, minimising the negative systemic effects that have been present, promoting
positive ones and enhancing Sweden’s role in the policy process.
2.1 The meaning and purpose of
programme aid
Programme aid (PA) is aid that is not intended to finance a specific
project. This defining characteristic is spelt out in the definition given by
DAC’s Principles for Programme Assistance:
Programme assistance consists of all contributions made available to a recipient
country for general development purposes i.e. balance-of-payments support, general
budget support and commodity assistance, not linked to specific project activities.
 (OECD, 1991: 5)8
The DAC definition distinguishes several forms – called here modalities – of
programme aid, which are shown schematically in Figure 2.1. The first
distinction is between financial programme aid, where the donor gives cash,
and commodity aid, where actual commodities are given (most often food).
This evaluation is concerned with financial programme aid. Financial PA
may be further sub-divided into balance of payments support, in which the
donor gives foreign exchange (forex), and budget support, in which the donor
“gives local currency”. All three of import support, debt relief and budget
support are broken down yet further, in ways which are elaborated upon below.1
1  Under SPA bilateral debt relief (i.e. on own debt) is called Fourth dimension. The first three dimensions
are IDA adjustment credits, IMF ESAF and bilateral import/budget support respectively.9
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Figure 2.1  Schematic representation of programme aid
Note: * some items under this heading may not be classified as programme aid.
Of course the donor does not have local currency to give in the case of budget
support, so that it gives forex which is converted to local currency. This latter
transaction is part of “the circular flow of programme aid” (i.e. that every PA
flow has both a forex and a local currency component) which underpins the
equivalence of different forms of PA. The order in which the typology has
been presented here also largely corresponds to the historical evolution of PA
through different modalities.
The defining characteristic of programme aid is that it is not intended for a
specific project. A common characteristic is that PA is linked to the10
implementation of policy reform in the recipient, that is it is policy
based aid or subject to conditionality. The rise of financial PA in the 1980s
was linked to the rise of structural adjustment. The money the World Bank
and IMF lend linked to their adjustment and stabilisation programme is almost
entirely programme aid.2 Most, though not all, bilateral donors link their PA
disbursements to the conditions of the World Bank and IMF (called collectively
the International Financial Institutions, IFIs). Sweden is an example of this.
Except in Cape Verde and Vietnam which have not had IFI approved
programmes in much of the 1990s, Swedish PA has usually been conditional
upon fulfillment of conditions agreed with one or both of the IFIs. The fact
that PA is not linked to particular projects makes it easier to “turn on and off”
so that it can be used in this way. By contrast non-PA flows are only halted in
more extreme circumstances.3
The objectives and rationales for programme aid
There are six objectives for Swedish aid: economic growth, social and economic
equality, political and economic independence, democratic development and
human rights, ecologically sustainable development and gender equality; all
of which relate to the overall goal of poverty reduction.4 An analysis of various
official documents shows that Swedish PA is mostly linked to the growth
objective, although this fact is not always stated explicitly since many official
statements, including programme aid agreements, couch the objective in terms
of support to reform rather than the output of higher growth.
Although programme aid had been part of Swedish aid since the 1970s, SIDA’s
1985 Guidelines for Import Support (SIDA, 1985) were the first time import support
was characterised as being to facilitate economic and political reforms. The
1989 Guidelines for Commodity Assistance gave “support ongoing reforms in the
recipient country” as the sole rationale for import support, and the 1993
Guideline for Swedish Import Support stated this as “the prime aim of import support
is to support a programme of economic reform in the recipient country”
(SIDA, 1993: 19).
These sentiments are echoed in general statements such as the budget bills
and specific programme aid agreements. Hence the Budget Bill for 1997 states
that “balance of payments support is the most important instrument for
supporting economic reform programmes” (Government of Sweden, 1996:
2 In a World Bank adjustment credit perhaps 5 per cent will be for technical assistance. Other donors
may classify technical assistance related to the administration of PA under the PA budget, but it is
typically around 2 per cent of the total.
3 Sweden suspended aid to India and Pakistan in 1997 when both countries resumed nuclear testing.
Neither country was in receipt of PA, so that suspending only PA was not an option.
4 There is however often little or no explicit link to poverty reduction in Sida’s activities. A recent review
concluded that: “a large number of projects and programs supported by Sida do not specify poverty
reduction as an explicit objective... Swedish development co-operation is largely driven by objectives
other than (direct) poverty reduction” (Tobisson and de Vylder, 1997: 21-2).11
84). An analysis of the agreements for seven of Sweden’s programme aid
countries over the 1990s show that support to reform is mentioned 25 times,
economic performance (growth, restructuring and stabilisation) 19 times and
other objectives (typically longer term development or something similar) six
times (Danielson and Nilsson, 1999). Hence a typical statement would be to give
the objective as “to support the economic reform process” (Vietnam 1989/90) or
“to support the ongoing economic reform programme” (Tanzania, 1991/92).
In three cases the social sector is also mentioned amongst the objectives. The
first such case was in 1993/94 (Tanzania), but so few occurrences do not
justify calling this a trend. Despite the fact that political conditionality has
been applied on several occasions in the 1990s, political reform is not explicitly
mentioned in any of the agreement. However, in the case of Vietnam, where
budget transparency is seen as a governance issue, the budget process is.5
The link between support for reform and growth is sometimes made, but this
is far from always the case. The 1998 Budget Bill stated, for the first time, that
“economic reform is a precondition for long term economic and social
development and efficient poverty reduction” (Government of Sweden, 1998:
49). Of the 25 mentions of reform in the programme aid agreements
mentioned above, four of these are linked to economic performance, and in a
further three cases improved economic performance is also mentioned as an
objective. The agreement with Uganda in 1992/93 is an example of the
former: to support the country’s economic recovery by support for the
economic reform policy.
Somewhat similar conclusions may be made with respect to other agencies
(see Appendix 2 for a summary). In general PA is seen as being linked to the
growth objective, although, as in the case of Germany, this is implicit by saying
that PA supports reform. There is an increasing tendency to link PA to other
objectives – notably that of poverty. In the cases of the Netherlands and UK
this link has been made with the move to budget support.
To summarise on objectives. Of Sida’s six objectives, PA is most clearly
identified with the growth objective. However, in many documents, the link is
not made directly with growth but rather with support to reform, which is
thus implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, assumed to result in growth. Indeed
since the mid-eighties support for reform has been identified as the objective
of programme aid in successive Guidelines, the annual budget bill and a majority
of programme aid agreements. From the agreements analysed for the 1990s
there is no discernible change across time in the objectives for Swedish PA.
The 1998 Budget Bill is the first to link PA to poverty reduction, though this
change was not reflected in any of the agreements analysed for this evaluation.6
5 This practice contrasts with that of the UK. A study of Zambia found that in the early 1990s, when
political conditionality started to be applied, it was absent from agreements but was the subject of official
correspondence. However, by the middle of the decade “satisfactory progress on governance” had
become an explicit condition in UK PA agreements (see Seshamani and White, 1998).
6 The cut-off date for the evaluation is formally 1997, though one agreement for 1998 (Uganda) was
included in the analysis.12
A number of reasons can be advanced in favour of programme aid:7
• A main rationale for PA is a shortage of foreign exchange, which may be
called a forex gap.8 Although project aid also provides foreign exchange,
the argument is that, being more flexible, programme aid allows the
importation of items to support intermediate, recurrent and maintenance
expenditures to enhance capacity utilisation (there is little point in investment
projects to create additional capacity if existing capacity is under-utilised).
The forex gap may also be caused, or exacerbated, by large debt obligations.
• PA can be quickly disbursed.9 This fact is an advantage either if the recipient
has an immediate need for funds (for essential imports or debt service), or if
the donor has surplus funds to utilise before the end of the budget year.
Some donors, especially those who do not allow unallocated funds to be
carried from one year to the next, disburse such amounts as PA.
• The link between PA and reform means that the aid may be justified in terms
of general economic problems. PA is seen as particularly suitable for policy-
based aid as it is easier to turn on and off than is project aid. PA may also be
given as “a reward” for countries that have already performed well.
• Given that PA also makes available local currency, the rationale may be an
internal gap (government budget deficit) rather than an external one.
Moreover, non-project aid gives greater power to the recipient in the use of
funds and can avoid the institutionally destructive effects from the
proliferation of donor projects, such ideas being part of the motivation
behind the rise of the sector approach.
Swedish agreements usually often contain little that may be called rationale
for the provision of PA, so for this we turn to the various memos pertaining to
PA. Table 2.1 summarises these, showing that an external gap (general forex
shortage, need for imports or debt burden) is the most common rationale
offered. However, an analysis of the rationale across time (Danielson and
Nilsson, 1999) shows that the external gap has been replaced by the internal
gap as the most common rationale in the last two years. As will be seen below,
this shift corresponds to that from import support to budget support – that is
import support has been rationalised with reference to an external gap and
budget support by an internal one. There is no particular pattern in relation
to the other rationales.
Responses from staff in other bilateral agencies suggests similar rationales for
programme aid (Table 2.2). The presence of reform (and support for reform)
emerge as the most important reasons, along with that of a financing constraint.
7 The list is an update of that in White (1995) (which is itself based on Winpenny (1989) and de
Vylder,1993), modified to reflect the analysis of Swedish rationales by Danielson and Nilsson (1999).
8 The notion of gaps is discussed in Chapter 5.
9 Indeed, PA is sometimes called Quick Disbursing Assistance (QDA).13
Table 2.1  Rationales for Swedish programme aid
Rationale Share Examples
of cases
External gap 58 Supply the country with necessary foreign exchange (Tanzania
1992/93). “The country will need untied foreign exchange to
support its people” (Cape Verde, 1991/92). “Severe debt situation”
(Zambia, 1995/96).
Internal gap 14 Finance the budget deficit that would otherwise have to be financed
by increased taxes (Uganda, 1997). Counter-value important for
government current account (Mozambique, 1994/95).
General 14 “Through this [PA] the possibilities for self-sufficiency will increase in
economic problems the long-run” (Cape Verde, 1993/94).
Surplus donor 9 Reallocation to Fifth Dimension in Zambia of slow disbursing import
funds support funds.
Reward 5 Appreciation of Zambia’s commitment to economic recovery
programme (Zambia, 1990/91).
Note: paraphrase of agreement unless in quotation marks. Source: Danielson and Nilsson (1999).
Table 2.2  Motivating factors behind programme aid for selected donors (1 is not at all important
and 4 very important)
Germany Japan Netherlands1 Norway2 UK
Rapidly disburse funds to country
with binding forex/budget constraint 4 4 4 2/1 4
Easily disbursed funds for country
programmes with unutilised balance 1 1 – 2/2 2
Recipient country faces absorptive
capacity constraint for project aid 2 1 – 1/3 4
Recipient country is undertaking
economic reform 4 4 4 3/3 4
Recipient country is undertaking
political reform 3 – – 3/3 3
Government requires external support
to sustain reform programme 4 4 4 3/4 23
Note: 1/ These are formal criteria; in practice quick disbursement has also been a factor; 2/.
Response from NORAD and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, respectively; 3/ Except in extreme cases,
and some bits (e.g. civil service reform) may need financing. Source: questionnaires returned by
agency staff.14
2.2 Trends and patterns in Swedish
programme aid
Trends in Swedish programme aid
There are two notable features of Swedish programme aid in the 1990s:
• it is a significant component of the aid programme; disbursements totalled
close to SEK 7 billion from 1990/91 to 1997, accounting for close to 12 per
cent of total aid
• there has been a secular decline in Swedish PA in the 1990s, both in absolute
terms and as a share of total Swedish aid.
Figure 2.2  Total Swedish aid and programme aid
Figure 2.2 shows these trends. From a peak of SEK 1.7 billion, PA
disbursements fell to under SEK 0.5 billion in 1997, corresponding to a
reduction from 20 per cent of total aid to only five per cent. Looking at the
trend for total aid supports the view, expressed by a number of officials in
both Sida and the Foreign Affairs, that PA has been squeezed as the aid budget
has fallen. Analysis of these trends shows that programme aid is
vulnerable, meaning that it experiences a larger percentage cut
than that in the aid budget as a whole. Indeed, in 1991/92 the fall in
PA compared to the previous year exceeded that in the total aid budget, and
it continued to fall the next year although total aid recovered. In the three
subsequent years in which total aid fell the percentage reduction in PA was
two to four times greater than that in total aid. This trend is contrary to what























































Programme aid Total aid PA share of total15
Programme and Sida’s support for the Special Programme of Assistance for
Africa (SPA), which would suggest an increased role for PA.
Figure 2.3 Programme aid modalities
Underlying this overall decline has been a marked shift in the composition of
PA, as import support has taken the whole of the cut, having dwindled to
virtually nothing in the last two years (see Figure 2.3). Debt relief has increased
slightly and budget support has been quite constant.10
The management of Swedish programme aid
The Swedish tradition is for an autonomous agency operating within guidelines
set by a parent ministry. This situation accurately describes the relationship
between Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), with two caveats.
First, there is a close day-to-day relationship between MFA and Sida on many
matters, and MFA has a direct control over disbursement of some PA funds.
Second, the Ministry of Finance is also a player with respect to PA, with
responsibility for the World Bank (but not IDA which is under MFA), IMF
and export credits, though the central bank, Sveriges Riksbank, assumes main
responsibility for relations with the IMF. Sida is in the first instance responsible
for preparing its budget proposal, indicating the main budget headings, which
is discussed with government. Once approved by parliament, Sida and MFA
discuss the details of how the aid shall be allocated, which is in the end approved
by government.
10 The vagaries of Sida’s data system mean that what is classified as budget support may have changed
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Figure 2. 4 Programme aid windows
PA channels have changed greatly in the 1990s. At the start of the decade the
bulk of PA, of any modality, was disbursed by Sida from the country frame.
The alternative window, created in 1985/86, is Support for Economic Reform
and Debt Relief, from which the funds are disbursed either by Sida, again for
any modality, or debt relief disbursed by MFA, the latter accounting for just
under 10 per cent of total PA in the 1990s.11, 12 However, whoever disburses
the funds, the allocation of aid by recipient and modality from Economic
Reform and Debt Relief is made by MFA, who have to approve any subsequent
reallocation (e.g. as occurred from import support to debt relief in Zambia).13
There is more flexibility in the MFA part of the account, which indeed is the
point – the incentive effect from PA (i.e. rewarding “good performers”, and
punishing“bad ones”) is potentially far less if the amount is built into the
country frame. The fall in PA has been fully absorbed by the country frame
window, which by 1997 accounted for only a small share of the total (see
Figure 2.4). This fall in part reflects a decision in FY 1994/95 to remove all
PA from country frames, however this decision was reversed in order to allow
reservations (i.e. unutilised balances) to be utilised as PA.
There are different views on the importance of the apparent shift in control
to MFA during the 1990s. Some officials describe programme aid as
“political”, a description which refers to this shift for one of three reasons:
(1) MFA gives greater weight to governance issues than does Sida – for
example, on the advice of the economist in the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka,
11 The debt relief from Sida is solely Fifth dimension, as 4th and 6th are the exclusive preserves of MFA.
12 Small amounts of PA are also disbursed by Sida from other windows.
13 MFA also has to approve reallocations from the country frame in excess of SEK 35 million, which is
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Sweden’s Ambassador to Zambia wrote to MFA in Stockholm suggesting
that the PA suspension from 1997 on governance grounds was becoming
detrimental to the country’s economic performance. In the light of point
(3) below, it is interesting to observe the view of Ministry of Finance officials
that they share common ground with Sida in resisting MFA’s political
orientation.
(2) the on/off nature of PA, combined with its allocation outside of the country
frame, means that it may be used for Sweden’s own political advantage –
one case of this use, but only one, has been mentioned by several officials;
and
(3) the rise of Economic Reform and Debt Relief gives greater weight to
MFA, and some to the Ministry of Finance, in the use of aid funds – a
trend reinforced by the reorganisation in mid-1996 under which aid
programming is treated as an integral part of Sweden’s overall political
and commercial dealings with the recipient (Danielson and Nilsson, 1999:
21). Although Sida proposes the allocation of programme aid, a high
proportion of these proposals (around half) are rejected or modified by
MFA. The decision to suspend programme aid to Nicaragua during the
constitutional crisis (see Chapter 3) was taken by the Ambassador and a
visiting MFA official without any consultation with Sida. However, officials
on both sides (particularly in MFA) dispute this view, claiming that there
are no disagreements of note between Sida and MFA; this is much
consultation on issues of substance, so that there has been no real change
in the relationship in the 1990s. Rather, officials from both Sida and MFA,
suggest any real disagreement is with the Ministry of Finance which is
seen as taking a too pro-IFI line (but see the view of Finance officials
mentioned under point 1).14
The issues just raised underlie ongoing discussions as to whether programme
aid should be put back into the country frame. The arguments against doing
this are the flexibility accorded to a separate fund. A counter-argument against
a separate PA fund is that aid can thus be spent in countries in which Sweden
has no track record and so will do little for Sweden as a donor, and may
anyhow be an ill-informed decision. Perhaps more central to this debate is a
turf struggle between the agencies involved, which will become particularly
acute if sector support becomes equivalent to PA. The incentive argument
means that PA should not be reinstated in the country frame in the traditional
manner. But it is increasingly recognised that the traditional conditionality
associated with PA has not been a good tool for achieving deep-rooted policy
change (see Chapter 3), so that ex post forms of evaluating performance need
be found. There are alternatives, including multi-year and regional budgeting,
which should be explored.
14 A senior ranking MFA official said that Finance regards most of the aid budget as “lost money”, and so
is eager to use its position to ensure that PA, at least, is well spent.18
About 90 per cent of Swedish programme aid goes to a group of countries
which receive PA on a regular basis; these countries are Bolivia, Cape Verde,
Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Uganda,
Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Rather more countries have received PA
only once or twice. In all, of the 100 countries receiving Swedish aid, 35 have
received PA during the 1990s. What are the criteria by which they have been
selected?
Since the mid-eighties PA has been intended to support growth in the context
of economic reform, and it is indeed the case that many such countries do
receive PA. But there are others with no formally-approved IFI programme
(e.g. Cape Verde and Vietnam) which have also received PA. Both the creation
of Support for Economic Reform and Debt Relief and Sweden’s support for
HIPC make a link between PA and debt burden. Many, but not all, of Sweden’s
PA recipients are highly indebted, and there are of course many countries
which are highly indebted that are not recipients. The point being made here
is that it is clearly not the case that recipients of Swedish PA are identified by
the systematic application of a set of eligibility criteria to all developing
countries. This is not so for two reasons. First, there are no firmly established
eligibility or allocation criteria. Second, the pool of eligible countries is not all
developing countries, but mostly draws on a smaller sub-set of countries with
an established aid relationship.
However, PA is more progressively allocated than total Swedish aid. In 1990/
91 the bottom 20 per cent of the world’s population received nearly 70 per
cent of the Swedish PA, compared to about 40 per cent of total Swedish aid.
In 1997 these figures were 80 per cent and just over 30 per cent respectively –
but the greater progressivity does not reflect a trend. Analysis of the year-to-
year pattern reveals no trend, but annual fluctuations sensitive to large changes
(for example the 1997 results are affected by the temporary PA suspensions to
Vietnam and Zambia for political reasons).
A close link to reform can be made by co-financing of World Bank operations.
Co-financing can be either joint, in which case the funds are given to the
Bank to disburse, or parallel, so that the donor disburses the funds direct to
the recipient but in the context of a World Bank agreement. Parallel co-
financing is the norm for Sweden, though there have been exceptions. One
of these was Uganda until 1991, where the low level of Swedish representation
has led to a reliance on co-financing also in project aid (indeed joint co-
financing is sometimes called “the Uganda model”). Joint co-financing has
also been used in Vietnam, in which case the rationale offered was to signal
how seriously the agreement with the IFIs was taken. There is a view that
joint co-financing is cost effective and allows a greater role in policy dialogue.
The latter is a somewhat untested proposition, and was found not to be so in
an evaluation of Dutch co-financing of World Bank operations in Ghana (see
Sowa and White, 1996).19
2.3 Programme aid modalities
The fact that PA is not linked to a specific project does not mean that the
funds are necessarily “free resources”. Aid is free resources if the recipient
may do as they wish with the money. But each of the different modalities of
programme aid involves restrictions on the use of funds, as well as reporting
requirements as to how the funds have been used. But, as is explained below,
these restrictions and requirements do not always actually affect the use of
funds. The restrictions may however have either adverse effects from the
administrative burden or positive ones through attention to improving
allocation or budgeting mechanisms (what are called in this report systemic
effects).
Each of the various modalities has changed over time. In most countries
there has been a shift between modalities over time, away from
import support towards debt relief and budget support. However,
the pace of this evolution has varied according to both domestic circumstances
and the make up of the donor community. In Cape Verde Sweden has moved
to providing all its PA as budget support, whereas in most other countries it
has relied heavily on debt relief in recent years. In general Sweden has made
these changes along with other donors – sometimes it has lagged but at others
led. In Tanzania Sida entered the Open General Licence (OGL) system for
import support slowly and somewhat reluctantly two years after it had started,
but in Nicaragua Sweden moved to import support via retroactive finance
whilst many donors inappropriately retained administrative import support
after the foreign exchange market had been liberalised.
Import support
Much early import support was commodity import support (CIS),15 meaning
that either specific commodities were given, or the money given to purchase
imports of a specific commodity or small list of commodities. These
commodities were often intermediate goods (e.g. paper or fertiliser) and the
specification of the commodities usually dictated the sector that would benefit.
The selection of commodities may even dictate the specific enterprise to benefit
(if only one enterprise used that commodity), or the agreement may specify
the sectors or enterprises to benefit, such as Sweden’s support for the Fund for
Imports for Manufacturing Industry (FAIM) project in Nicaragua. Beneficiary
enterprises or sectors are often those with which the donor already had some
association. Under CIS there was not usually any question of the recipient
enterprise paying for the goods received, so that the recipient effectively
received a subsidy.
The next stage in the development of import support (also called CIS) was to
provide foreign exchange which could be used to purchase any of a range of
15 Terminology in this area is not precisely established. This report labels as CIS import support schemes
in which the donor exercises control by specifying either the commodities or the sector.20
items from a list, called a positive list. Allocation of the funds was made by a
committee, which may be specially constituted for that purpose, such as GCPI
in Mozambique, (and usually involving the Ministry of Finance, other
ministries and a donor representative), or by an already existing committee
for allocating forex, such as FEMAC in Zambia in the late 1980s, and Vietnam
until 1989 where the funds were allocated by ministries in accordance with
the Plan. Recipient enterprises were sometimes required to pay the government
local currency (called counter-value) for the foreign exchange at the official
exchange rate.16 Since official rates in recipient countries were at that time
considerably over-valued, companies received an implicit subsidy compared
to if they had to buy imports using forex purchased on the parallel market. In
fact it was a triple subsidy since there was no penalty or interest for late payment
and many enterprises paid counter-value only in part if at all. Donors required
evidence that the imports had taken place, some checking value for money
through pre-shipment inspection (PSI) or independent audit, but were not
vigorous in chasing up counter-value payments.
Inefficiency could arise by virtue of the allocation system or as a matter of
deliberate policy. Proponents of the market would argue such systems to be
inherently inefficient, since the best allocation will result from letting price
signals (a market-based exchange rate) determine the allocation of the forex.
16 The local currency payment for import support goods or forex is also sometimes called counterpart
funds. Since this expression is also used to apply to government contributions to project budgets it is not
used here to avoid possible ambiguity.
Too cheap forex, combined with import regulations, could result in inappropriate usage:
clear examples being the importation of vehicles to Zambia rather than only the tyres
which needed replacing. Photo Charlotte Thege/Phoenix.21
Too cheap forex, combined with import regulations, could result in
inappropriate usage: clear examples being the purchase of new agricultural
equipment in Nicaragua rather than the parts to repair it, and the importation
of vehicles in Zambia rather than only the tyres which needed replacing.
Against this view it may be argued that government has to take into account
strategic considerations, or areas in which private and social returns may differ
– a commonly-cited example is that of medical drugs. However in practice
the majority of CIS went to parastatals who were frequently poor-performers,
and the CIS was seen as a way of subsidising them.17 Where funds were also
allocated to the private sector then the system was clearly prone to corruption.
In Tanzania about one quarter of Swedish CIS was allocated to the private
sector and the press frequently contained stories of corrupt practices. The
expert brought in to help run the accounting system for the EU’s import scheme
confirmed the prevalence of over-invoicing, false pro forma invoices and similar
practices.18 The Japanese have persisted with allocative systems long after
other donors have abandoned them, for example in Zambia, where stories of
corruption and misuse of the funds continue.
Inefficiencies also arose out of donor procedures. Slow disbursement as a
result of restrictions on the use of funds is a common theme in evaluation
reports.19 A World Bank report stated that ìone of the key obstacles to the
effective implementation of SNAAD [Mozambique’s first attempt to liberalise
the forex market] was certainly the restrictive conditions attached to donor
assistance... donor conditionality (particularly the tying of aid to particular
products or particular product sources and particular procurement rules)
provided a major blockage (World Bank, 1995:20). A later Swedish report
argued that ìthe attempt [to liberalise the forex market in 1992] foundered
because of most donors’ unwillingness to untie and de-bureaucratize their
balance of payments support (Gustafsson, 1996:10). Discussing import support
to Cape Verde the same author remarked that various bureaucratic factors
had “conspired to slow down the utilisation of the Swedish support” (Bartling
and Gustafsson, 1993:4), citing as an example the delay of more than three
years in purchasing patrol boats as Sweden required an external consultant to
be involved who did not approve the purchase.
17 Donors were aware of this problem and sometimes specified that a certain proportion should go to
private enterprises – e.g. Swedish PA agreements with Vietnam – though donors also condoned the
practice, especially if they were enterprises with which they had a historical association.
18 If the supplier over-invoices then the donor funds a payment in excess of the value of the goods,
leaving a surplus to be shared by the individuals involved in the deal on the side of both the purchaser
and the supplier. To ensure a competitive price donors typically required between three and six pro forma
invoices (i.e. price estimates from different companies); in some instances the three came from three
different companies which had the same fax number (or VAT code).
19 An illustration of slow disbursement is that one of three addenda for PA to Mozambique signed in
February 1996 referred to funds from an agreement signed in 1993. In both Uganda and Zambia import
support funds were converted to debt relief and in Tanzania into support for the electricity sector in
order to spend unutilised balances.22
For these reasons of corruption and inefficiency donors favoured a change
toward a market-based window for the purchase of foreign exchange.20 These
windows, which operated from the late 1980s and for the first years of the
1990s, usually went under the Open General Licence (OGL)21 heading and
may have existed as a government scheme prior to donor involvement (or
government may have joined them once started). The donor paid the funds
to a government account at the central bank sold the funds to commercial
banks who then on-sold the forex to the importers who met the necessary
requirements.22 The central bank thus collected the counter-value direct from
commercial banks, which more or less put an end to problems in the collection
of these funds from the government’s perspective.
These schemes spanned several years in which countries moved from fixed
exchange rates to quite liberalised market-based systems. OGL schemes
adapted to these changes, and in some countries can be argued to have led
the way up to a point. In the presence of import licensing obtaining a licence
was a requirement for accessing OGL funds, though as markets were liberalised
licences were intended to be automatic for eligible transactions. The range of
permissible transactions was also expanded over time, with positive lists of
eligible goods being replaced by negative lists of prohibited ones (usually
consisting of items which were prohibited for import anyway such as dangerous
items – arms and drugs – and those over which government retained an import
monopoly such as oil, plus some luxury items).
The requirements on importers under the OGL window were thus quite
onerous. Although they lessened over time, as they did so other windows
became available (forex bureaux) which required rather less administration.
Donors and government had their own accounting requirements, and despite
some attempts at harmonisation under the auspices of the SPA, these
requirements differed by donor for much of the time.23 In cases where the
donor required dollar-by-dollar accounting of the use of their funds (although
this could not be done in a meaningful way as there was a pool of funds) then
the resources required to manage OGL were considerable. In many cases
donors were involved in what was seen as an ex ante approval of the use of
funds, which complicated matters considerably. These restrictions slowed the
use of funds from this window for two reasons. First, it simply took time to get
funds through. Second, demand diminished once alternative sources became
available, notably forex bureaux. A study in Zambia in the early 1990s
20 Nicaragua is a notable exception in this regard, with administrative import support continuing to be
prevalent in the mid-90s.
21 Or, alternatively, Open General Import Licence (OGIL), as in Zimbabwe.
22 Some donors, including Sweden, would not disburse the funds until the allocation to the importer had
been made, after which Norbanken would pay the supplier directly. The rationale for this stance was that
Sweden, rather than the recipient government, should enjoy the interest on undisbursed balances.
23 SPA agreements of course covered only Africa. The Nicaragua evaluation found several practices
relating to PA, such as the continuation of tied import support and double-tying, that would be
considered somewhat “backward” in the African context (the same has not been true of Vietnam, but it
has not had PA for several years).23
estimated the transaction costs of using the OGL window at 15 per cent: if
the margin between the official and bureaux rates was less than 15 per cent
importers would prefer the latter (Aron and Elbadawi, 1992). Although
reporting requirements lessened over time so did the gap between the market
and official rates. Once the rates were unified there would be no demand for
OGL funds, as forex could be had at the same price on the open market with
none of the additional restrictions. Exchange rate unification thus heralded
the end of OGL schemes.
It is easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to be critical of OGL
schemes for the excessive administrative burden they imposed
on both government (who often did not have the capacity) and
donors (who also lacked capacity in cases). To an extent this criticism
is justified and should be seen as holding important lessons for donors as they
get more closely involved in the government budgeting process as more PA
goes to budget support and sector programmes are increasingly fashionable.
But when they started, OGL schemes often played an important systemic role
in introducing a market-based forex window where none had previously
existed. Indeed an evaluation of Vietnam, where there was no formal
programme with the IMF and World Bank until 1993, and Sweden took the
initiative in 1989 to switch from a system allocated by ministries to one involving
the commercial banks, found these systemic effects to be key feature of Swedish
PA:
it is not an exaggeration to describe Sweden as being at the cutting edge of the policy
dialogue mainly through the negotiations it conducts around the modalities for operating
the CISP [Commodity Import Support Programme].
(Faber, 1992: 50).
It was only toward the end of their lives that OGL schemes had become
anachronistic and were a drag on the development of a market based system,
rather than promoting it.
Post-OGL, import support has become very flexible with retroactive finance
providing funds to be sold through auction or onto the intra-bank market.24
Even before the demise of OGL some donors switched to retroactive finance,
which means that donors pay for imports which have already taken place.25
That is, the government gives the donor the receipt it has obtained against
imports for which the government has already paid and the donor reimburses
the government this expense.26 The donor accounts its aid against these imports
and the recipient may do as it wishes with the forex it has received.
24 This transition has not always eased the situation. When Uganda introduced a Dutch auction for forex
in 1992 donors set different conditions on the use of funds thus slowing down disbursements (and some
required funds to be sold at the parallel rate, which the government refused to do).
25 In fact OGL was being operated retroactively in many cases toward the end of such schemes.
26 Retroactive finance was used against large items, usually oil or maize.24
Box 2.1  What is fungibility?
Fungibility is the idea that aid pays not for the items against which it is accounted but for
the marginal expenditure it makes possible.
Consider the simple example of a government with $100 million to spend. There are two
projects to choose between: rehabilitating rural health clinics or buying a new fleet of
tanks. Both cost $100 million. After much deliberation the government decides to
rehabilitate the clinics. But before it does so a donor comes along offering $100 million for
some suitably worthy project. The government cannot ask the donor to buy the tanks so it
says to the donor “our rural health clinics are in desperate need of rehabilitation, but we
cannot afford to do it”. So the donor pays for the health clinics. The government can now
use its own money to buy the tanks after all.
There is no corruption or misuse of funds here. The donors funds are indeed spent on the
health clinics as intended and accounted against this expenditure. But, as the donor is
paying for something the government would have done anyway, the government’s own
resources are freed up for something else, in this case the tanks. This is fungibility.
Government expenditure with and without aid
No aid Health clinics
Aid Health clinics and tanks
Compare government expenditure with and without the aid it can clearly be seen how the
aid has in effect paid for the tanks even though it is accounted against the health clinics.
It is very clear in the case of retroactive finance that the donor funds are not
actually paying for the goods which they are accounted against: it is an
accounting fiction to say that the aid paid for the, say, oil. This is not the same
as saying the funds are fungible (see Box 2.1), they are clearly free resources.27
The same is true for the import support systems that followed whereby money
was given to the central bank and then sold at auction or via the intra bank
market. In such cases there is no economic argument, nor one on grounds of
aid efficiency, for requiring any reporting from the recipient on the use of the
funds. Finally there have been cases in which PA has been explicitly free
resources. The World Bank dropped the requirement to account for the money
against particular imports in 1997, as has always been the case for IMF
programme assistance. Sweden has not disbursed PA without requiring some
documentation to account for the use of funds (e.g. import invoices) – although
this accounting is not always closely followed up.
27 The inception report (White, 1998) drew this distinction between fungibility and free resources.
Fungibility can only occur when the donor attaches a condition to the use of the funds. Where there are
no such conditions then the funds are free resources.25
Debt relief
A donor may give debt relief on debt to its own agencies (export credits or
previous loan aid) or debts to a third party. Debt rescheduling or forgiveness
on own debt is carried out through the Paris club in which official creditors
deal with debtors on a case-by-case basis.28 Under the Special Programme
for Assistance to Africa (SPA), two windows have been created for donors to
relieve third party debt: the Fifth dimension for World Bank debt and Sixth
dimension for that to private creditors. Further relief has become available
from the Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative (HIPC), from which both
Mozambique and Uganda have benefited. HIPC has been criticised for
providing insufficient relief – debt service ratios can remain high after
completion: Nicaragua is the only country to have realised a substantial
reduction in its debt stock.29
Debt relief is also conditional. A country needs an agreement with the IMF
to be in place in order to go to the Paris Club. Sweden treats contributions to
the Fifth and Sixth dimensions as other balance of payments support,
conditioning them upon progress on reforms.
Debt relief is very likely to be fungible. This is especially so in the case of Fifth
dimension, as a recipient will try to meet IFI debt if at all possible. Hence, as
the government would have paid the debt anyway, a donor paying these
obligations frees up the equivalent amount of resources for the governments’
own use.30 Relief on multilateral debt is thus very likely to be de facto free
resources. The cases of bilateral debt relief and Sixth dimension are less clear,
since many countries are regularly in arrears on such payments.
In general, debt relief will be rapidly disbursing – exceptions can occur
if it is tranched and difficulties occur in implementing conditions. This contrasts
with the experience of import support and the likely experience of budget
support under Sector Programmes, and thus constitutes a case for retaining
at least some portion of debt relief in total PA. Ease of disbursement has
been one reason for favouring this modality – in both Uganda and Zambia
import support funds have been converted to debt relief so that they can be
disbursed. Both the reporting and market conditions for debt relief are less
onerous, although since – if the debt would have been paid anyway – it is
equivalent to free resources there are arguments for restricting its use to good
policy environments. Hence Uganda has enjoyed debt relief as the sole form
of PA since 1992, whereas other countries have continued to receive other
modalities for some years after that. All countries covered by the evaluation
28 Debt rescheduling allows the debtor longer to pay but may increase, rather than reduce, the debt
burden; see the background paper on Modalities for a longer discussion. The London Club, which plays
an equivalent role for private debt, is not of concern here.
29 At the time of writing HIPC II is being discussed following additional relief announced in Cologne in
June 1999.
30 The amount freed up may be thought of as “shadow countervalue“. Donor attempts to link aid to
poverty reduction have focused on tying the shadow countervalue to approved spending. This trend is
discussed in the next section.26
have, however, received Swedish debt relief with the exception of Cape Verde
which does not have an external debt problem.
Counter-value
Counter-value is the local currency raised by the sale of the forex. In the case
of budget support the matter is straight-forward, the government should receive
the local currency equivalent of the goods or forex sold, either direct from the
importer or from the financial intermediary who sells the forex (under OGL,
commercial banks pay the central bank, which deposits the funds in a
government account). For debt relief there is “shadow counter-value”
equivalent to the money the government saves by not having to pay the debt
itself. This shadow counter-value may not be equivalent to the full amount of
the debt relief, since the government may not have met its full debt service
obligation had relief not been forthcoming. In the case of budget support
there is no counter-value as such, since the donor provides forex to sell to
provide local currency for the government budget (which could equally well
be stated as “the counter-value is the PA”). Three issues related to counter-
value are discussed here: (1) the exchange rate used to calculate the amount
owed; (2) collection performance; and (3) the use of counter-value.
In the words of Sida’s Principles of Import Support, the aid “is a grant to the
country, but not to the importing agent” (1993: 12): that is, the user of the
funds should pay for these in local currency, called counter-value or counterpart
funds. In practice the counter-value has had to be paid for at the official rate,
so that as long as this rate was overvalued there was an official subsidy. Donor
attempts to require forex to be sold at the parallel rate (as in Uganda) were
resisted by government. But this issue mattered less as margins declined and
disappeared altogether once rates were unified.
The implicit subsidy was reinforced by low payment rates. All evaluations of
CIS find a poor record: Sharpley (1991) suggested about two-thirds counter-
value was paid in Mozambique, and a Sida memo noted that funds were
being allocated to firms who could not afford to pay. A Norwegian evaluation
in Nicaragua in the early 1990s found that 70 per cent of counterpart funds
were collected, in Cape Verde in 1993 only 45 per cent of those due over the
period 1987–93 had been paid and in Tanzania the rate was only 22 per cent
in 1990/91, though it rose to 62 per cent the following year when the relative
importance of OGL increased. This last example illustrates that problems of
counter-value collection should have been resolved through the introduction
of the market element involving commercial banks, and this indeed appears
to have been the case.
A second finding is that Sweden has not usually paid much attention
to the collection of counter-value – reflecting the more general finding
that many of the conditions attached to PA are not that closely monitored
(though there are important exceptions). A report by the Swedish audit office
(RRV) commented on this phenomenon with respect to Mozambique, and27
an evaluation of PA to Cape Verde commented on the “very cavalier attitude
towards the payment of counterpart funds” (Bartling and Gustafsson, 1993).
There have been exceptions when counter-value has become an issue for the
donor community as whole, as in the case of Tanzania in 1993.
Since donors restrict the use of the forex in the case of import support, to also
place restrictions on the use of the counter-value is called “double-tying”.
Although condemned by the OECD (DAC) guidelines, double-tying remains
quite common. This is particularly the case in Nicaragua,31 where the Nordic
donors (and Dutch) are the main exceptions – for example Canada requires
that the counter-value be passed to NGOs. In Mozambique double tying is
also common practice, even being used by the EC who chaired the SPA
Working Group that produced the guidelines on counter-value which condemn
the practice. In accordance with its own Guidelines Sweden does not double
tie.32
Debt relief is an exception. To the extent that government would have paid
the debt in the absence of the relief then the savings may be called “shadow
counter-value”. In a manner reminiscent of debt swaps, it is increasingly
fashionable to tie the shadow counter-value – as Sweden did in Mozambique
with the funds accruing to Foreign Debt Alleviation Fund – with the intention
that the savings be used for social expenditure. Experience with these funds is
limited as yet. An argument in their favour is that they can provide protection
to social expenditure from internal pressures. However, there is a danger that
donors may devise procedures and accounting requirements that impose a
heavy burden on recipient governments. Harmonised procedures are a
minimum requirement, but better still is to finance the budget through Sector
Programmes.
Budget support and sector programmes
Two reasons may be given for providing budget support rather than balance
of payments:
• With a flexible exchange rate regime there is no forex constraint
• Donors should pay closer attention to budget allocations and procedures.
In macroeconomic terms the first argument does not make sense; this argument
is dealt with in Chapter 5 below. The far more persuasive reason for shifting
to budget support is that, despite formal equivalence in macroeconomic terms,
there are systemic effects from donors focusing on one side (forex) or on the
other (local currency). This rationale is captured in the Dutch guidelines on
budget support, which state that sectoral budget support is a specific form of
programme aid in which, in contrast to regular programme aid, poverty
alleviation is the main policy aim (Foreign Affairs, 1996).
31 A donor conference in 1995 condemned the practice, but this appears to have had little effect.
32 Nicaragua and Vietnam carry out ex post accounting of use the countervalue even though they are not
required to!28
Budget support can operate in a very similar way to the simplest form of
import support schemes. For example, UK programme aid, starting in Zambia
in 1995, now retroactively finances items from the budget such as teachers’
salaries or releases to district health bodies. However, there is an increased
emphasis on sector programmes, which might be viewed as the latest
incarnation of programme aid. Whether this is a correct view of sector
programmes depends on how they are managed.
Sector programmes go under a variety of names – Sector Investment
Programmes (SIPs), Sector Expenditure Programmes (SEPs), Sector Wide
Approaches (SWAPs) and simply Sector Programmes (SPs) – though it is not
clear that any difference in approach is intended by these different labels. The
important difference relates to the way in which the sector approach is seen.
We may characterise two broad extreme views of sector support (recognising
that practice falls between these two). One extreme sees sector support as the
next generation of programme aid (rather like a World Bank Sectoral
Adjustment Loan, SECAL, but which is called here the envelope finance
approach). It is sector budget support as the dialogue relates to a particular
sector, but the funds are simply programme aid – budget support is thus a
better approach to programme aid. At the other extreme, sector support is
little more than a project list, with a bit of policy dialogue thrown in. The
rationale for the latter approach is that traditional projects have failed as the
approach has been uncoordinated, fragmented and, thereby, unsustainable.
This view has been stated as follows:
Traditionally, donors have provided assistance primarily through free standing
investment projects. Unfortunately the development of these projects has often been
disappointing [as] the underlying conditions constraining the effectiveness of
development assistance – sector policy distortions, institutional weaknesses, the
affordability of the public expenditure programme, conflicting implementation
arrangements of different donors, and inadequate institutional capacity – are rarely
addressed through conventional projects the programme-based approach can better
address the constraints to development and can therefore be more effective in fostering
development.
(Okidegbe, 1997: ix).
Related to these two differences in approach are four important, and
unresolved, questions on the nature of sector support:
• First, there is some ambivalence as to the extent to which budget support is
intended to finance incremental expenditures. Is it intended to finance items
already in the budget (so the aid is 100 per cent fungible, unless the
government made the plan assuming the aid would be forthcoming), or
should the receipt of the funds allow additional expenditure?
• Second, if government expenditure planning is supposed to be based on
aid flows, then there needs to be some assurance in the stability of those
flows – which conflicts with both donor reluctance to lock themselves into
multi-year expenditure planning and more specifically with the intended29
on-off nature of PA, which may by turned off on account of “unrelated
developments”.
• Third, the extent to which a donor is identified with particular components
of the programme. As with flexible forms of import support, envelope
financing will not allow identification of the donor with specific expenditures.
• Fourth, whether or not such aid is quick disbursing assistance (QDA). It is
accepted that there are preconditions for budget support, both in terms of
macroeconomic environment and the budget process. But ensuring that
such conditions are satisfied will delay disbursements, so what to do if a
country needs funds quickly?
There is an alternative view which disputes the sharp dichotomy made here
between the two approaches to budget support, which is claimed to address
some of these issues.33 In this view the important thing is that government
makes an expenditure plan which clearly identifies capital and recurrent
expenditures (including the recurrent implications of all capital expenditures),
and thus calculates the amount required for the sector. Following this approach
it does not matter if some donors adopt a project-based approach to sector
support, provided others use envelope financing or are willing to disburse
against recurrent costs to ensure that both capital and recurrent expenditures
are fully covered. Implicit here is the view that sector support is mostly, if not
entirely, expected to lead to additional expenditures and that some donors, at
least, will still fund projects with “their name on” under the sectoral umbrella.
However, there are at least two difficulties with this conception. First, to the
extent that donors do retain their projects then the expenditure programmes
remain donor-driven, with all the problems it brings. Second, one can easily
foresee political difficulties in a system whereby some donors fund the recurrent
costs for other donors’ projects. A more general problem is the extent and
nature of donor involvement in budgeting processes, which brings us to the
question of the choice of modality.
Sweden’s involvement in budget support has been somewhat tentative, and
amongst the countries covered by the evaluation it is only present in Cape
Verde as the dominant form of PA.34 Sweden is, however, an active supporter
of Sector Programmes. Amongst the case studies, the Zambian Health SIP is
the most prominent, but only a very small part of support of this programme
is in fact PA (it remains dominated by the project approach).
Are there links between objective, rationale and modality?
Do different modalities correspond to different objectives or rationales? It
was shown above that the objective of programme aid is dominated by growth,
33 Under the approach being adopted by the SPA a donor may contribute to a sector programme in up to
four ways: sector budget support, project assistance, technical assistance, and disbursement to third
parties (e.g. NGOs).
34 Some other countries have received smaller quantities of budget support, whilst receiving the bulk of
PA as import support of debt relief.30
and the related objective of support to economic reform, and that this focus
has not changed over time. Hence we should not expect to observe any
relationship between the objective and either modality or rationale. A more
formal statistical test bears this out (Danielson and Nilsson, 1999: Appendix
C). The conclusion here is thus quite striking. Sida documentation does
not make the link (or where it does so, does so only weakly)
between the provision of PA and the attainment of Sida’s
objectives. Rationales are rarely offered in the PA agreements, and in the
documentation where they are provided are not linked to the intended
objective. Put bluntly, Sida officials seem to have a poor understanding of
how PA works.35 Specifically, there is no articulation of how the main rationale
of gap filling can contribute to either economic reform or growth, or less still
the overarching goal of poverty reduction.
On the other hand, and unsurprisingly, there is a link between rationale and
modality, with the external gap rationale occurring most frequently with respect
to import support and debt relief, and that of an internal gap being more
common for budget support.36 However, the dual nature of programme aid
means that aid must simultaneously fill both internal and external gaps by the
same amount (see Chapter 5), so that the distinction between the two gaps –
and certainly as a basis for rationalising the choice of modality – is artificial.
That is, there is no good macroeconomic argument for linking the rationale
and modality in this way. However, as argued above, systemic effects would
provide such a rationale. For example, it would have been right to argue that
Sida should give import support as this will assist development of a liberalised
forex regime. Unfortunately such a rationale is rarely given, indicating a general
lack of awareness of the importance of such effects.
Does modality matter?
A USAID review of support to economic reform in Africa stated that the first lesson
learned was:
AID should put its time and energy into the development of analytically sound
reform programmes and worry less about the type or form of assistance it provides.
(USAID, 1991: ix)
In a similar vein a recent ODA document argues that “the macroeconomic
impact of providing balance of payments support is identical to that of
providing budgetary support” (ODA, 1995: para. 2.4). Is it so that the label
given to programme aid is merely a matter of administrative, and perhaps
political, convenience?
35 As with all generalisations, there are at least partial exceptions. Documentation for PA for Tanzania in
1997 (Memos 5/12/96 and 27/11/97) come closest to linking objective to rationale, though not in the
same document and with some ìlogical gaps“ remaining.
36 The statistical test for an association yields a higher test statistic, although it is still not significant.
There are a relatively small number of observations, which may explain why the test statistic is
insignificant.31
In a very important sense, balance of payments support and budget support
are equivalent. In the case of balance of payments support the government
receives forex, with some limitations on the use of that forex, which is sold
thus raising local currency which the government may use as it wishes (unless
there is double-tying or earmarking of counterpart funds). In the case of
budget support, the government receives forex which it sells (with no restrictions
from the donor) to get the local currency, which is designated as the budget
support. In the cases of both balance of payments support and budget support
the same set of transactions takes place (receipt and sale of forex, and
expenditure of local currency): these transactions are designated as one form
of programme aid or another depending upon which transaction the donor
restrictions relate to – the forex side or the local currency side.37 Indeed, in
the absence of double tying, import support provides free budgetary resources,
and budget support provides free forex.
This equivalence may suggest that the label attached to the programme aid
does not matter. But, in fact, from the donor’s point of view the label
attached to the aid does matter as it directs attention to a
particular sphere – toward the foreign exchange sphere for balance of
payments support and to fiscal behaviour and budgetary mechanisms for
budget aid. The design of agreements and the content of evaluation reports
will vary according to what the aid is called. There are both advantages and
disadvantages to this link.
The advantages are the systemic effects discussed above in relation to import
support. Donor attention can both help rationalise procedures, and can help
develop allocation and management systems. These same benefits may be
felt with budget support, as donors provide TA to clean up wage bills
(eliminating ghost workers etc.) and improve the openness and efficiency of
budget processes. But associated with this donor attention is an administrative
burden on both donor and government. In the case of import support up to
and including OGL this burden was far greater than had been anticipated
and frequently resulted in slow disbursement of funds. By contrast, debt relief
is free of such complications and can be rapidly disbursed. As a result Sweden
in some instances converted import support to debt relief in order to utilise
undisbursed balances. Systems for budget support are currently being
developed. The experience of the excessive administrative burden imposed
by donor import support programmes holds important lessons for the design
of budget support today.
It is of great importance that donors harmonise their approach
to budget support, as they only partially managed to do with import support.
Donor attempts to trace their funds resulted in complicated systems which
yielded results which were anyhow most likely to be an accounting fiction.
These attempts also led to systems trying to micro-manage the recipient’s
foreign exchange allocation system which may be inappropriate and eventually
37 Complications in this story arise in the case of debt relief (though the government may then “pay itself
countervalue”) or when countervalue is used to offset deficit financing.32
became a drag on the development of the market. Some agencies may have
been forced to adopt such procedures for domestic political reasons, though a
better response would be to educate decision-makers on how programme aid
works.
2.4 Concluding comment
Programme aid covers various modalities, of which the main three have been
import support, debt relief and budget support. There has been a shift over
time from the first to the last of these, which is seen as related to the
“disappearance” of the external gap with the liberalisation of the foreign
exchange market. The fact that this rationale for changing PA modalities does
not make sense in macroeconomic terms provides a basis for the two
conclusions from this chapter deserving emphasis.
First, the way in which PA is to achieve its intended objective of growth, let
alone poverty reduction, is poorly articulated in Sida documentation. Why is
this so? Perhaps there is a hidden agenda for PA, so that the stated objective is
unimportant. Or perhaps Sida staff do not have either the time or training to
specify these links. Either way, the absence of such arguments may be
unimportant, if PA can anyhow achieve the desired objective without Sida
staff being aware of how it is being done.
But, unfortunately, the second point is that there are good reasons to expect
PA effectiveness to be linked to PA design. One aspect of this is the importance
of systemic effects. PA modality can have either positive or negative systemic
effects depending on both design and timing, the latter requiring good
knowledge of the working of local markets and budgetary systems. But PA is
also expected to have effects through supporting reform, so that some idea of
how Sida is to engage in the reform process and which reforms are necessary
for growth and poverty reduction are also important. Traditionally Sida has
relied on the IFIs to provide this expertise, but it will be argued in the following
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The role of donor
agencies in policy change
Donors believe the policy environment matters, both for achieving development
and for the effectiveness of their own aid. Programme aid is thus linked to
economic and political reform and donors seek to influence policy outcomes
through a variety of channels. However, little thought has been paid to explicit
influence strategies and less still to evaluating influence. The framework
adopted here places donor influence firmly in the context of domestic political
economy. Within that setting, policy dialogue is seen as a set of processes by
which donors seek to affect policy outcomes. The eight country studies provide
support for the view that domestic politics plays a dominant role in driving policy
change. Donors do have a role in this process – though their contribution is just
one factor amongst many. This contribution is best understood by broadening
the focus from negotiating conditionality to the broader range of ways in which
donor influence can be felt. This broadening allows an appreciation for the role
of individual bilateral donors. Instances can be found in which Sweden has
played a central role in supporting policy change. The cases where Sweden’s
influence has been greatest are those where there has been a strong historical
association with the recipient country. But more generally, Sweden does not
have a thought out influence strategy, nor often the capacity to support one at
the country level.
3.1 Evaluating influence
Programme aid is linked to policy change. Whilst it is undoubtedly the case
that there has been widespread economic and political liberalisation in
developing countries during the last two decades (documented in the next
chapter), what has been the role of international donors in this process? Has
donor conditionality been the driving force behind the changing policy
environment? Or have donor efforts merely been pushing on an open door,
requiring changes that would have happened anyway?
Negotiations with the World Bank and IMF for structural adjustment and
stabilisation loans have been the focus of donor efforts at changing policies.35
What role has there been for a bilateral donor, such as Sweden, in this process?
Has Sweden managed to influence the course or content of policy dialogue
or played any significant part in affecting policy outcomes?
Conceptual framework
Despite the importance placed by donors on the policy environment, and the
emphasis they have placed on bringing about policy changes, there has been
very little attention paid to the role of donors in policy processes
– still less the appropriate methodology by which this influence
may be evaluated. Most PA evaluations focus on the impact of policy
changes which have taken place: implicitly assuming that such changes are
the result of donor intervention (otherwise why discuss their impact in an
evaluation of PA?).
Some academic studies (e.g. Mosley et al., 1991) have assessed the effectiveness
of conditionality. But they typically do this by examining the percentage of
conditions implemented, which ignores the possibility that the relevant policies
may have been put in place without donor intervention (i.e. the counterfactual).
Besides which, such an approach does not allow analysis of the role of different
donors. Recent work by the World Bank on aid and economic reform in Africa
has addressed such issues (though focusing on the IFIs), but with no explicit
conceptual framework.
The study of donor influence for this evaluation is thus something of uncharted
territory, for which a new conceptual framework has had to be developed.
There are two elements to this framework. The first is to locate donors’ role
firmly in the wider political context. The second is to map the wide array of
mechanisms through which policy influence may operate.
It is unlikely to be possible to establish a convincing policy counterfactual, i.e.
what policy outcomes would have been in the absence of donor involvement.1
This is not an area in which the word “proof” can be used. Rather the approach
has to be one of an argument which weighs up the balance of the evidence.
What were the forces supporting and opposing reform and how do donors fit
into this picture? The recent political economic history of the country is thus
the starting point for the analysis. Once this overall framework has been
established then the analysis can move to the role of donors. And it should be
only then that the donors are considered – conducting the whole analysis
from a donor perspective will almost inevitably over-state their role. This first
part of the analysis takes donors as a whole, rather than attempting to attribute
outcomes to the actions of any individual donor. The second part of the
framework considers the influence a single bilateral can have.
This second element of the conceptual framework revolves around defining
policy dialogue as a set of processes which seek to influence policy outcomes.
1 The modified control group approach to analysing the impact of adjustment proposed by Goldstein
and Montiel (1986) and used in some World Bank reports estimates “counterfactual policies” based by
economic variables. This is an unduly economistic approach to policy outcomes.36
The stress on a set of processes highlights the fact that negotiations with the
IFIs are only one part of policy dialogue, and not that in which bilateral
influence may be strongest. The inception report for the evaluation identified
two dimensions of donor influence. The first is the degree of formality.
Negotiations, annual bilateral aid talks and Consultative Group (CG) meetings
are all formal channels through which influence may occur.2 But there are
informal contacts – ranging from discussion in the corridors at CG meetings
to meeting on the golf course – through which influence may also occur.
Between the two are what may be called semi-formal channels, such as
communications from an Embassy to a Minister on a specific issue. The second
dimension of policy dialogue is the channel through which influence is exerted:
direct on government, on the IFIs, or on or with other bilateral donors. Table
3.1 combines these two dimensions, giving examples in each of the resulting
nine cells.
2  CG meetings are held, usually on an annual basis, between government and major donors to that
country. The first day consists of presentations on progress, at which donors can present their concerns,
and on the second day pledges are made for the coming year. Traditionally these meetings have taken
place at the World Bank office in Paris, though some have shifted to the recipient country. The meetings
are chaired by the World Bank, who produces the minutes from the meeting. An alternative forum has
been Round Table meetings organised by UNDP, which can play the role of CG meetings where there is
no World Bank programme.37
Table 3.1 Two dimensions of donor influence
Formal channels Semi-formal channels Informal channels
Direct Annual aid negotiations Direct communication Margins of CG meetings
influence on donor head of
government CG meetings state/development minister Impact of donor financed TC
to recipient head of state
Local consultative groups
Message from minister to
Collective donor head of state
representation to Head of
State/Minister Messages to/meetings
with recipient ambassador
Briefing sessions called by
Head of State/Minister Individual meetings of
donor ambassador with




Indirect Board Direct communication from Informal contacts IFI/own
influence Minister to IFI President agency staff
via IFIs SPA
Washington Delegation Margins CG/SPA meetings
CG meetings enquiries to IFI staff





Influence SPA Social/informal contacts of
on other agency staff in country
donor CG meetings
agencies Margins CG/SPA meetings
Local consultative




The framework being adopted implies a reliance on qualitative methods. The
political economy of the country can be studied through published academic
material and grey material from donors, government and other agencies. These
sources are supplemented through the information gained through interviews
with key informants and, for recent developments, analysis of local newspapers.38
Interviews were held with staff from a range of agencies, government officials
and members of civil society (academics, NGOs, business community, political
opposition and religious leaders).
Within government, interviews covered those with direct responsibility for PA
(Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank) and those with responsibility for
policy in main areas of interest (Finance, Agriculture, Industry etc.), and related
agencies (such as those for privatisation or social funds). The point of contact
is usually a senior civil servant such as Principal Secretary though in some
cases technical staff may be contacted and, in the case of Nicaragua, ministers
were also interviewed, as were personnel from the previous government (which
was not an issue in either Uganda or Vietnam); these interviews were carried
out for all three field studies. Interviews were also conducted with the main
donors in the country, including the World Bank and the IMF, the point of
contact usually being the economist.3 These interviews were carried out in all
three field studies, though to a more limited extent in Nicaragua owing to
unavailability of several officials (however the multilaterals were all covered
and phone interviews were later held with Dutch officials). Assessing Swedish
influence has involved a range of interviews with Swedish aid officials (either
face-to-face or by e-mail), recipient government officials and questions to key
informants in other agencies.
There are methodological problems related to the use of interviews, related
to how to interpret information and balance differing accounts. For example,
local expertise is essential in conducting such an evaluation. But it must be
remembered that local experts are situated in the domestic political scene,
and their contribution interpreted in this light. Differing accounts reflect
differing perspectives and can be understood in a framework which does not
rely on a single construction of reality. Such a stance brings us back to the
point that a single line of causation cannot be proved. Rather, contributory
factors can be identified. What, then, have been the main factors driving policy
changes?
The rest of this chapter begins to address this question with a discussion of
the domestic political economy of reform (section 3.2). The role of the
international community is then considered (section 3.3), followed by a closer
look at Sweden’s part in the process (section 3.4). Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The political economy of reform
The substantial body of literature on the political economy with reform –
notably Haggard and Kaufman (1992), Nelson (1990) and Rodrik (1996) –
pay little attention to the role of donors. The international community is the
subject of one chapter of seven in Haggard and Kaufman. Neither “donors”
nor “conditionality” appear in the index of Nelson’s collection, although there
are some entries for the IMF and the World Bank; and the review paper of
3 Interviews with IFI staff were also conducted in Washington.39
Rodrik discusses only the positive role aid funds may play in supporting reform
rather than policy dialogue.4
The role of donors is also put in perspective by the fact that in all but two
(Uganda and Zambia) of the eight countries covered by the
evaluation initiated reform prior to formal engagement in policy
dialogue (Table 3.2), and countries have introduced measures more far-
reaching than advised by the donors, such as the cash budget in Uganda.5 In
the two cases in which reform coincided with external support – Uganda and
Zambia – a case can be made that these changes were home-grown;
representing a conversion in the case of Uganda, and the coming to power of
the MMD on a pro-liberalisation manifesto in Zambia. It should be admitted,
and is discussed at greater length in the next section, that in some cases less
formal channels of policy dialogue were in place in the earlier periods.
However, these facts point to what really should be obvious: an
understanding of what has determined policy change rests, in
the first instance, on an analysis of domestic political economy.
Table 3.2  The timing of reform and policy-based lending
Country Date of reform Date of first IFI
policy-based lending
Bangladesh Initial steps toward reform in early eighties, IMF stabilisation from 1980,
intensified from 1986. adjustment from 1987
Cape Verde First steps to reform second half of 1980s, 1997
intensified by new government in 1991.
Mozambique Initial liberalisation in 1983, intensified from 1987 1987
Nicaragua Attempted stabilisation and price reform under 1990
Sandinistas 1988-89, more far-sweeping reform
with new government in 1990
Tanzania Structural Adjustment Plan 1982-85 designed with 1986
World Bank assistance but agreement not reached
so government initiated on its own; reforms from
1986 were continuation of this earlier effort
Uganda Government initiated reforms in 1987 (one year 1987
after assuming power)
Vietnam Three waves of reform, starting in 1979, 1986 1993
and 1993
Zambia Aborted reform 1985-87, re-initiated 1991. Both episodes supported by
policy-based aid
Source: country studies.
4 Curiously Rodrik does say in a footnote that the World Bank “shaped development policy in many
countries during the 1990s” (1996: 17 n.11), but if he really believed this to be so then one would expect
the fact to occupy pride of place in an article devoted to explaining reform, rather than being relegated
to a single footnote.
5 The Ugandan government introduced a cash budget in 1993 against the advice of the IMF who
believed it would not work. In Zambia the capital account was liberalised earlier than donors thought
should be the case.40
Analysis of why such substantial change in economic policy has occurred in
the last two decades may be carried out at three levels: the international
environment, the national economic context and the interests and alignment
of domestic political forces.
The renaissance of liberal economics that followed the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system in the early 1970s provides the backdrop for the spread of
liberal policies to developing countries. The global and developed country
interests that prompted these shifts have been widely debated. But the fact
that shifts in economic policy predated the coming to power of avowedly
market-oriented governments indicates that there was some material basis to
these changes.6 One consequence of the end of the Bretton Woods system
was that the rationale for the existence of the IMF, whose primary purpose
had been management of the fixed exchange rate system, was put in doubt.
By the mid-seventies the IMF was in danger of becoming a redundant
institution, a remnant from a defunct system of economic management. But
rather than retrench itself, as some commentators suggested, the IMF
reinvented itself as manager of external problems in developing countries,
assigning itself a key role in the debt crisis as it emerged in the 1980s.7
The debt crisis is an important part of understanding the changing
policy environment for three reasons: (1) why countries had to adjust; (2)
the interest of developed countries that they should do so; and (3) the nature
of adjustment supported by developed countries. A first point to make about
the debt crisis was that it was not a symptom of a deep-seated development
crisis. Other than some African countries (and indeed SSA in aggregate),
developing countries enjoyed respectable growth rates until at least the end
of the seventies. All regions enjoyed improving social indicators. Certainly in
Latin America, it was the cure applied for the debt crisis that caused the
growth slowdown, rather than the failure of the economic model followed in
the run-up to the debt crisis. Furthermore, Rodrik (1996) shows that debt
problems were associated with macro mismanagement (loose fiscal and
monetary policy) rather than price distortions such as high tariffs. Hence,
liberalisation was far from being the obvious response to the debt crisis.
Developing countries were faced with the option of defaulting or agreeing to
the terms on offer to reschedule their debt.8 The governments of the creditor
countries (much of the debt being to private creditors) were keen to avoid
default, as the reckless over-exposure of many banks meant that a single default
6 In the UK, for example, the change from social democracy to monetarism is most accurately dated as
1976, not when Margaret Thatcher assumed office in 1979. The Labour government went to the IMF in
1976, but this is widely regarded as case of scape-goating by the government rather than one of IMF
influence.
7 Until the 1970s the bulk of IMF lending was to developed countries, since 1980 it has lent only to
developing ones.
8 Why more countries, indeed any, did not default is a bit of a puzzle. The “divide and rule” tactics
adopted by the creditors are clearly part of the explanation.
9 Some banks had loans to a handful of countries equivalent to several times the bank’s capital base.41
could cause collapses and subsequent financial panic.9 Western governments
thus needed to provide sufficient inducement for developing countries not to
default, in terms of new money, whilst getting them to continue to repay. New
money was made available from donor governments, the IMF (and later the
World Bank) and forced lending from the commercial banks. Accessing these
funds required an agreement on rescheduling, the arrangements for which
have become formalised in the Paris Club, requiring an agreement with the
IMF, thus according the Fund a key role. Standard IMF conditions cover
fiscal and monetary policy to reduce inflation and exchange rate policy. Partly
through the latter, and partly through the substantial deflation which was
part of Fund programmes in the 1980s, current account deficits were reduced,
or even turned to surpluses, thus allowing debt to be repaid.
By the mid-eighties the developed world was taking more money out of
developing countries than it was putting in (though net transfers to Africa
always remained positive). Doing this required that developing countries run
current account surpluses, which is something import substitution policies
were unlikely to do. Debt repayment demanded a greater degree of outward
orientation to increase export earnings, providing developed countries with a
material interest in the ideological shift toward greater openness that took
place at the same time.
This international context is important, but is not to be read as overstating
the role of the international community. International management of the
debt crisis aimed in the first instance to avoid financial crisis in the creditor
countries and the risk of this passed by the late 1980s: the debt crisis was over
for the developed world but not the developing one. The main interest of the
international community thus focused on the most indebted countries and on
a subset of the policy menu being offered. How the rest was taken depended
on the other factors mentioned above: country economic context and domestic
political situation.
The eight countries covered by the evaluation had diverse economic
backgrounds as they embarked on reform. Table 3.3 shows four key features:
long-run economic decline, macro instability (high inflation), a heavy debt
burden and whether the country had been reliant on the Soviet Union for
economic support. The presence of these four factors varied from country to
country. In perhaps only one case, Nicaragua, were all four on a “crisis setting”.
In one case, Cape Verde, there was no apparent problem with respect to any
of them.10 Poor performance on these indicators alone need not imply market-
based reform: as Rodrik (1996) says, a first response to crisis may be to tighten
controls rather than relax them, as did NRM when it took power in Uganda
in 1985 (and as the PNDC did in Ghana during 1982). But in several cases
the controls were associated with poor living standards so that removing them
was seen as a way to re-vitalise the economy. However, whether, or the way in
10 A World Bank report claimed that Cape Verde was forced to reform as planning resulted in poor
performance. This statement was based on poor growth in a single year. Growth in the 1970s and
eighties was in fact rather higher than has been experienced in the 1990s.42
which, these possibilities were acted upon depended upon the country’s political
configuration.
Table 3.3  Economic conditions in the case study countries
Country Long-term Macroeconomic Debt Reliant on
economic decline instability problem Soviet Union
Bangladesh No Some No No
Cape Verde No Emerged in 1990s No No
Mozambique Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nicaragua Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tanzania Yes Yes Yes No
Uganda Yes Yes Yes No
Vietnam No (but emerging
problems) Yes No Yes
Zambia Yes Yes Yes No
Source: country studies.
Three cases may be identified (some countries provide examples of more
than one case): (1) where an active political opposition force favours reform;
(2) grassroots support for reform; and (3) reform from the top.
The first two cases are more widespread than is probably appreciated. Cape
Verde, Mozambique, and Nicaragua are all cases in which attempts to pre-
empt opposition prompted liberalisation by previously socialist governments.
In Mozambique Frelimo successfully stole Renamo’s platform first on economic
policy and later on political liberalisation. By contrast, the Sandanista
government failed to hold onto power by steps toward reform from 1988.
The PAICV similarly failed in its attempts to remain in government in Cape
Verde by pacifying the overseas Cape Verdean community through opening
up the economy to foreign investment and soft-pedalling on control measures.11
Political liberalisation has even more often been an attempt to forestall
opposition: Mozambique and Cape Verde are once again examples, but so is
Kaunda’s abandonment of a referendum on multi-party democracy in Zambia
in 1990 by announcing elections.
Other cases illustrate the less vocal or politically focused opposition to controls
from the grassroots. Vietnam is the most obvious example. Collectivisation
was never successful in the south, and much of the country’s reforms, in both
agriculture and state-owned enterprises, have been what is called “fence-
breaking”, that is legislation retroactively recognises changes that have already
taken place on the ground. But there are less well-known (and documented)
11 As many Cape Verdeans live off the islands as on them, and the community in the US (New England)
has been particularly concerned with domestic politics (indeed, Cape Verde’s independence was first
declared in Boston). Following the independence struggle against the Portuguese the importance of the
diaspora waned as politicians forged an African identity. But the break with Guinea-Bissau in 1980
resulted in a reorientation toward a European focus, and increased influence from a younger generation
of European educated politicians and the overseas community.43
cases of grassroots support for reform. In Mozambique peasants resisted
collectivisation, especially after Frelimo retreated into being a vanguard party
in 1977. Tanzanian peasants had also resisted ujamaa (collective villages) and
supported the liberalisation which would bring rationed goods back into the
countryside. Tripp (1997) argues that Tanzanians engaged in passive resistance
to controls and, in an African version of fence-breaking, diversified their
livelihoods into the informal economy which was not bound by government
regulations (i.e. informal liberalisation).
In other cases – notably Uganda and Zambia – reform has seemed to come
more from the top, though in both cases the extent of this should not be over-
stated: in Uganda considerable local ownership of the programme has
developed since 1992 and in Zambia the pro-market MMD has twice been
voted into office on this platform. In several cases reform has been initiated
by new governments: Uganda and Zambia are again examples.12 Or in others
a new government has intensified reform: Bangladesh, Cape Verde and
Nicaragua being cases from our sample of countries. But in several cases
reforms have been initiated by governments who previously oversaw state
control: Mozambique, Tanzania and Vietnam are the obvious cases, but we
can add the partial or reversed reforms in Cape Verde, Nicaragua and Zambia.
However in all cases, even where new governments have assumed power, there
is greater continuity in the political elite than there is change. There may be
cases in which a charismatic outsider with no roots in the rent-seeking class
can forge a populist alliance to force through reform – Museveni in Uganda
may be a case in point, though the more obvious example is that of Rawlings
in Ghana – but there are not many instances. In the majority of countries
reforms have been introduced by the class, or often the very same people (or
at least party), who presided over different policies for years.
There are two explanations for this apparent paradox. First, political support
for the control regime was based on the political economy of rent seeking,
what has been aptly named the vampire state in the case of Ghana (Frimpong-
Ansah, 1991). When economic decline is so severe there are no more rents to
seek then even the rent-seekers will seek change instead. This explanation
carries most weight in African countries such as Tanzania, Uganda and
Zambia. Second, economic liberalisation opens up new opportunities for
wealth which have proved to perhaps even exceed those from rent-seeking. It
is hard to measure corruption, but no one claims it has declined in recent
years, and several commentators argue that it has increased with liberalisation.
An obvious example is privatisation, where asset stripping, under-valuation
and kickbacks can combine to reap rich rewards for those controlling the
process. Where the press is free to broach such issues, as in Uganda, accusations
that privatisation has benefited the political elite are common. But import
liberalisation, and the relatively large margins in some of the new export
lines, can also bring large incomes.
12 There was a reform programme in Zambia from 1989–90 which was abandoned before the elections
(in the face of food riots in the copper belt). The then ruling party, UNIP, had a record of many failed
reform attempts, making Zambia a case in which the change in power made a difference.44
These arguments may make one wonder why reform did not happen sooner.
In fact, as Table 3.2 shows, all the countries in our sample have adopted a
gradualist approach. There have been no big bangs. These facts fit a model
advanced by Rodrik (1996) to explain why reforms may not take place even
though there will be net gains from them. The model rests on uncertainty
over who will benefit. Individuals who are not sure if they will gain or lose
will, depending on the balance of probabilities, oppose reform. Gradualism
is thus not just a case of “wearing down opposition to reform”, but of removing
uncertainty so that the winners are identified and support for reform mobilised.
The lifting of restrictions on market activity by party members in both
Mozambique and Vietnam should be seen in this context, since it builds support
for market reform amongst those in positions of power. As one Mozambican
cadre remarked, party officials become “born again entrepreneurs”.
3.3 External actors in domestic politics
A new consensus has emerged in the academic community regarding the
failure of conditionality, which is summed up in Killick’s statement that
“conditionality is not an effective means of improving economic policies in
recipient countries” (Killick et al., 1998: 165). To an extent the World Bank’s
new report, Assessing Aid, has embraced this position. The “to an extent” is
important as there are two caveats. The first is that the report in fact concludes
that “policy-based lending has a mixed record”, so that some successes (e.g.
Bolivia and Ghana) are identified. Second, there is a strong argument that
there is a role for donors, even in the absence of government commitment, in
building reform.
The evidence from this evaluation comes to somewhat similar conclusions to
Assessing Aid, but with important caveats. Considerable evidence is found in
support of the new consensus over the limited role of conditionality. However,
there are also versions of the two qualifications given in the World Bank report.
First, rather than talking of some successes and some failures, a role for donors
in policy change can be identified under certain circumstances, and these
include inducing reforms which would not have taken place in the absence of
donor pressure. However, such a situation should not be seen as donors forcing
unwanted policies on unwilling populations; rather it is often the case that
conditionality resolves the collective choice dilemma. There are widespread
gains to liberalisation, but a reluctance to take the radical steps – and bear the
costs – necessary to realise them. But once the change has been made they are
irreversible. Few people would suggest that African countries would readily
return to exchange control, with or without donor attentions. Second, policy
dialogue is a far broader process than the legal covenants attached to policy-
based lending; an assessment of donor influence on reform needs to take into
account this broader process. A corollary of this second point is that bilateral
donors have an important, under-recognised and hitherto un-researched role
in policy dialogue; this point is pursued in part 3.4.45
This study did not find evidence for the view, which was often heard in the
late-eighties and early nineties, that donors had helped delay reform continuing
to provide generous aid to non-reformers. Such arguments over-state the role
of donors. It may be that in some high aid recipients temporary postponement
was possible during the 1980s. But by the 1990s the weight of political forces
had shifted strongly toward reform, pushing governments down this road even
if donors were not doing so. There is, however, credibility in the view that
high overall aid levels allow governments to adopt a stronger
position with respect to donors in PA-related policy negotiations
– we argue that this has been the case in Bangladesh and Vietnam.
Policy dialogue is not just conditionality but a set of processes including both formal and
informal channels. Bill Clinton the President of the USA and Yoweri Museveni the
President of Uganda, 24 March 1998. Photo AFP/Pressens Bild.
Evidence in support of the new consensus on the failure of conditionality
The argument that conditionality has failed is based on evidence that many
conditions agreed to are not implemented, or implemented late and then
reversed, or countervailing actions taken. Various World Bank studies have
reported compliance rates of around 60 per cent; i.e. that around 60 per cent46
of agreed conditions are implemented (meaning that 40 per cent are not).
However, several authors (e.g. Mosley et al., 1991 and Killick et al., 1998) have
argued that such figures over-state the impact of conditionality for the following
reasons (illustrated with examples from the case studies for this evaluation):
(1) some measures would have been undertaken anyway, so that a record of
what has happened does not capture the effect of conditionality (the
problem of the counterfactual): each of our country studies with a home-
grown reform programme illustrates this point with the clearest examples
being Nicaragua from 1990–91 with the election to power of a government
with a strong liberalisation platform and Vietnam in which far-reaching
reforms considerably pre-dated IFI involvement.
(2) some so-called policy changes are very weak conditions, such as a study
being undertaken or statement of intent by government, and only these
may be done, whereas genuine reforms are in the 40 per cent that are not
undertaken: Vietnam has only had one World Bank adjustment credit; it
contained ten conditions, only two of which required actual policy changes;
(3) World Bank staff may collude to agree that a measure has been
implemented when in fact it has not: this is necessarily difficult to document,
though there is some doubt that Vietnam ever satisfied the condition to
reduce tariffs, and is more generally illustrated by the fact that the same
condition re-appears in several agreements – as happened with Zambia
Airways (and in Kenya where the same set of agricultural reforms were
agreed to five times, World Bank 1998), or where the goal posts are shifted,
as happened in Zambia in the early 1990s when IMF benchmarks were
continually revised to accommodate what had actually happened
(Mwanawina and White, 1995).
(4)  a measure may be undertaken on paper, but later reversed or
countervailing measures put in place: if Vietnamese tariffs were reduced
they were certainly shortly after increased, in the early 1990s Tanzania
laid off several thousand public sector workers in the run up to a CG
meeting only to re-employ most of them a week later;
(5) compliance is taken to mean carried out at any time, whereas Killick’s
analysis shows that at least half of all programs encounter serious delays:
only a quarter of second or third tranches from 100 World Bank adjustment
credits were paid as scheduled and only five of 25 ESAFs studies were
completed on schedule – all the country case studies include at least one
case of delayed tranche release, for example as a result of delays in
privatisation of Telcor in Nicaragua or the more severe dispute over Zambia
Airways. Delays have occurred most frequently in the case of privatisation
and public sector reform. Privatisation in both Nicaragua and Bangladesh
are examples of governments lacking domestic support for policies agreed
with the IFIs, resulting in delayed implementation. However, since the
mid-nineties there has been accelerated privatisation in all cases studied
(though still limited in Vietnam), with rather less progress on public sector
reform.47
Alternative perspectives can lead to rather less optimistic conclusions than
indicated by the World Bank’s 60 per cent figure. For example, Killick et al.
(1998) analyze the countries covered by the World Bank’s Adjustment in Africa
report: the 11 countries whose policies were deemed to have deteriorated
during the 1980s had had 19 adjustment credits (and the nine countries with
only a small improvement in policies 25 such credits). Similarly, using the
classification in a follow-up study by the World Bank, seven of the eight
countries whose policies deteriorated in 1992 had an adjustment program in
that year (and five had an IMF agreement covering that year). As Killick says:
“the analysis shows the ineffectiveness of the Bank’s (and the IMF’s) adjustment
conditionality” (ibid: 36).
If a country is deemed to be on track by the IFIs then there is a tendency to
not highlight difficulties in conditionality, so that an accurate record of slippage
is hard to compile. Whilst IFI staff may go to their Board to seek a waiver, so
that it is clear that a condition has not been complied with, there seem to be
rather many cases in which their is non-compliance and no waiver is sought.
These are cases of weak compliance, often fulfilling the letter but not the
spirit of the condition. Despite the difficulties in capturing these various aspects,
the evidence presented above illustrates that the country studies provide ample
evidence that all is not well with conditionality. Straightforward non-
compliance is observed in several cases, and in Bangladesh and Vietnam this
has led to the suspension of the IFI programmes. But more usually conditions
have been partially or selectively implemented.
The focus here has been on economic conditionality, but similar conclusions
can be reached with respect to political conditionality. The mixed nature of
the record is best shown by the case of Zambia, where donor pressure did
achieve something in 1993 and again in 1998, but failed to do so in another
episode despite a two year suspension of programme aid from 1996–98. The
precipitating factor in the latter case was changes to the constitution which
prevented Kaunda from running for president, though these were seen as the
final straw as there had been growing abuses, such as restrictions on the press.13
However, two years later donors were preparing to disburse PA although the
government had not shifted its position at all; Selbervik sums up this period
by saying: “what did the donors achieve? They achieved nothing” (1997: 70).
Some donor officials commented that the 1998 CG meeting for Vietnam was
particularly important as they finally managed to get human rights on the
agenda; but a senior Vietnamese official declared the meeting a success as the
donors hadn’t mentioned human rights! The main example of success, and
one involving Swedish leadership, was the constitutional crisis in Nicaragua.
Parliament proposed a change to the constitution which would reduce the
power of the executive in 1995, and for a while government could not function
with parallel constitutions, a situation which delayed a key privatisation. In
13 This statement is not necessarily to support the donors’ stand. The constitutional change made
required that presidential candidates be of Zambian parentage, which is not an absurd requirement.
Besides the changes were passed by parliament, so the donors were asking government to overturn a
decision by a body democratically elected in a process the donors had supported.48
order to put pressure on government to resolve the situation Sweden decided
not to sign a new PA agreement (the decision was taken by the MFA official
who had come to sign the agreement together with the Ambassador); other
donors followed suit. Subsequently the Support Group to Nicaragua, of which
Sweden was a member, mediated in negotiations which brought the episode
to a successful conclusion. In this case the role of the PA suspension was one
of the factors contributing to the resolution of the situation – the Swedish
action was certainly noticed as the Ambassador was invited to a lunch with
the Minister of the President and six other ministers at which they expressed
their dissatisfaction.14
More generally, Crawford (1997) examines 29 developing countries in which
at least one of the four donors in his study (Sweden, UK, US and the European
Union) have undertaken politically-motivated aid sanctions in the period 1990–
95.15 He finds that in under half of these cases there has been an improvement
in political and civil liberties. However, there are only two instances (Guatemala
and Malawi) in which aid may be deemed to have played a significant role in
this process, and a further three (Haiti, Kenya and Zambia) in which aid may
be said to have made a modest contribution.16 Crawford’s results are thus in
line with the mixed picture for political conditionality found in the evaluation
case studies: some successes but also failures.
The failure of conditionality has three main sources. First is the primacy of
domestic politics in policy processes. Second is the need of donors to disburse
funds, so that they may disburse even in the face of poor performance. Finally,
donors may pursue additional objectives with their aid which can cause them
to send confused signals.
The central role of domestic politics is stressed by some writers in the new
consensus: “domestic political calculations dominate decisions about economic
policy changes and donor agencies are relatively powerless in the face of this”
(Killick et al., 1998: 151–52), and, as Killick points out, is no surprise to anyone
familiar with the literature on the politics of adjustment. There is strong
evidence in support of this view from the evaluation. First, as noted above, six
of the eight countries initiated reform without formal IFI programmes.17
Second, even where IFI programmes are in place there are good reasons to
be sure that changes in government would have ensured the adoption of reform
anyway; Nicaragua from 1990, Cape Verde and Vietnam are all obvious
examples where this is clearly so, but the same case can be made to varying
degrees for all the case study countries – including Zambia. Third, which
reforms are carried out and which are not (particularly the slow pace of civil
service reform in most countries) is clearly linked to domestic factors rather
14 This incident is described more fully in Dijkstra (1999).
15 Crawford uses the Freedom House political indices reported in Chapter 4.
16 His analysis for Zambia refers only to the 1993 episode in which ministers implicated in drug
trafficking were replaced at donor insistence.
17 In many cases IFI documents incorrectly date the reform programme to the start of their own
involvement, say 1986 in Tanzania and 1987 in Mozambique. This mis-dating, aside from betraying a
lack of familarity with the country’s history, serves to over-state the importance of donor involvement.49
than any difference in emphasis from the donors. Fourth, as a generalisation
of the last point, the extent of reform is poorly correlated with donor efforts
to promote reform. Finally, each country study is able to identify a number of
factors leading to reform, so that donor pressures can be said to be, at most,
one factor amongst several. In some cases conditional aid can be argued to
have played little role in the direction of policy change – this statement clearly
applies to Cape Verde and Vietnam and to some extent to Nicaragua. More
generally it is just one of the factors. For example, the Mozambique country
study identifies the following five factors as being important in the initiation
of reforms in the early 1980s: (1) the failure of socialist policies, notably the
state farms; (2) rural resistance to both collectivisation and the usurpation of
traditional rural power; (3) the intensification of the war; (4) weakening support
from the Soviet Union; and (5) the availability of further support from Western
donors conditional upon a reorientation toward the private sector.
A further cause of the failure of conditionality, related to the primacy of
domestic politics, is the extent to which negotiators are in a position to carry
out the policy changes to which they agree. This point is argued most strongly
in the case of Vietnam, where the political process of consultation and
consensus building means that a system of formal agreements with the IFIs is
unlikely to yield results. This problem is evident more generally. A newly elected
government with a large majority will be able to carry through measures agreed
to, especially if these same measures were a part of their election platform, as
was the case in Cape Verde and Zambia – but need not necessarily be so,
which underlies the slippage that occurred in Nicaragua in 1991. Governments
in mid-term trying to implement policies which have not had some public
exposure will be in a more difficult situation; in Bangladesh promises made to
the donor community on privatisation were the opposite of what had been
promised to the electorate.
The pressure to disburse has two sources. First is an institutional imperative:
aid agencies exist to give away money, and there is an ample literature
documenting that individual and agency performance are assessed on the
quantity of aid rather than its quality. Second, it was argued above that the
origins of adjustment lending must be seen in the context of the need of the
creditor countries to get money to debtor governments so they could service
their debt to private banks. In the case of low-income highly-indebted countries
this argument has changed somewhat, since the bulk of the debt is owed to
official creditors, in several cases over half being to the IFIs. Donor
governments need to ensure an adequate flow of finance so that amounts to
themselves are repaid. Whilst bilateral donors have tended to reschedule or
forgive much of this debt, this has not been an option for the multilaterals.18
Empirical analysis has shown that slippage is greatest when there is a large
outstanding debt to the IFIs and many would see IFI tolerance of countries
such as Zambia in this light. Neither Bangladesh nor Vietnam, the two cases
18 The caveats needed here are that the IMF’s Rights Accumulation Programme (RAP) is rescheduling in
all but name, and that the World Bank has contributed “IDA reflows” (i.e. repayments) to the Fifth
Dimension.50
in which there has been a longer-term suspension of policy-based lending,
have an external debt problem. Pressure to disburse to help service debt is
one manifestation of the adverse selection problem, that is bad performers –
by reason of large deficits or debt obligations – require, and usually get, more
money than good performers.
This tolerance partly manifests itself as slippage which bilateral donors may
be reluctant to condone. There is a feeling amongst many bilaterals that the
IFIs “have been soft on Zambia” and attempts to enforce a harder line. But
other aspects of tolerating non-compliance require the complicity of the
bilaterals. An obvious way in which this can happen is where a programme
goes off-track but the IFIs ask bilaterals to continue disbursing, as happened
in Nicaragua in 1995. Of course such cases can also be construed as the
recognition of some adverse circumstances which bilaterals have greater
flexibility to take into account than do the IFIs. A less remarked on form of
condoning slippage is providing high levels of project aid resources to non-
performers. It has been said that the World Bank helped Zambia keep up
with external debt obligations during the bilateral PA freeze in 1996–98 by
accelerating its own project aid disbursements. In both Bangladesh and
Vietnam IMF programmes were not completed in the first part of the 1990s
and several years have followed with no IFI policy-based lending and the
majority of bilaterals also withholding PA. But both these countries enjoy
high levels of aid per capita, which must raise doubt as to the extent to which
PA would be additional, or even if it is, if the promise of marginal increments
of PA will have much impact on high aid recipients.
The dual role of the IFIs as the gate-keepers for conditional finance and as
major creditors clearly opens up the possibility of what economists call “moral
hazard”; that is, people lie. The results of this evaluation suggest that we should
question whether the IFIs should be assigned this role of sole
keepers of the knowledge of international development wisdom
on two grounds. First, it is not clear that the policy package recommended is the
right one – not that liberalisation has been wrong, but that the state/market
mix has been oriented to the latter at the expense of complementary policies
necessary for growth and poverty reduction. The policies being pursued on the
ground do not reflect the nuances and developments recognised in documents
produced by the IFIs for donor audiences. This argument is developed in the
next chapter. Second, the institutional culture of the IFIs is not one
which fosters debate within the donor community and may prove
ill-suited to do so in recipient countries: they are better suited to
policy monologue than policy dialogue. Both the World Bank and IMF
are eager to present a public persona which will not admit to the possibility of
current failings (past failings are admitted to), and this institutional stance carries
over to the conviction shown by the staff of these institutions. IFI documentation
nearly always presents issues and solutions in black and white and papers over
any cracks. One country study for this evaluation found that the “letter from
government” requesting an adjustment credit was worded identically to large
sections of the World Bank report to which the letter was an appendix. The51
report on Mozambique contrasts the disharmony in the donor community, and
even amongst World Bank staff, with the picture of togetherness suggested in
World Bank documentation. These facts raise serious questions about genuine
transparency and the reliability of such documentation for donor decision
making.19
The pressure to disburse is one reason why donors may send confused signals,
by disbursing when they should not and vice versa. The pursuit of other
objectives may also have this effect. This point is often raised in relation to aid
allocation, in particular double standards in the application of political
conditionality – so there is pressure over human rights issues on Kenya but
not China, on Surinam but not Indonesia. There are several cases – such as
Nicaragua in 1992 and 1995 and Zambia in 1994 and 1996–98 – when PA
was suspended for reasons of political conditions which some observers believed
could threaten economic reform.20 Donors of course refute this view by stating
that political liberalisation is necessary for sustained economic reform and
growth. Such a link is in fact far from clearly established, a point which is
returned to below. Confused signals may also result from lack of donor co-
ordination: cases where the bilaterals continue to disburse at the request of
the IFIs although the latter cannot do so are an example of this, as are the
instances when the bilaterals suspend and the IFIs do not.
Evidence in favour of conditionality
Although the evaluation produces evidence in favour of the failure of
conditionality, there are also signs that conditionality has had some effect.
There are two main arguments here. First that some policies have been
implemented that clearly would not have been in the absence of conditionality.
Second, that donor support may help solve the collective choice dilemma.
Whilst the evaluation shows that the general trend toward a more outward-
oriented and market-based strategy must be understood in the context of the
domestic political situation and the country’s past history, there are specific
policies which have been carried out only at the insistence of donors.
Privatisation is in many countries a case of this, although support for the
policy has grown as the process progressed. Closure of unprofitable enterprises,
and public sector reform (which has been limited in most cases), are clearly
instances, as best exemplified by the liquidation of Zambia Airways.21
19 The discussion by Uvin (1995) of the Rwanda case is a tragic example of the potential importance of
this issue.
20 In the case of Zambia the potentially damaging effect of the aid embargo was argued in a Sida
country economic study (Mugerwa, 1998) and communicated from the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka to
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm. The relative importance given to economic and political
conditions was identified in Chapter 2 as a difference between Sida and MFA.
21 The Zambian privatisation turned around from being declared by the World Bank to have been
seriously derailed in mid-1994 to the “best in Africa” by 1997. What happened? A likely explanation is
that the government offered up privatisation to the donors to reduce the pressure they were exerting on
political conditions. It seems that this strategy would have worked had it not been for the coup attempt.52
The previous chapter showed that in most cases economic performance has
improved with economic reform. Why then was reform resisted when these
benefits were waiting to be realised? One argument was suggested in the
last section: people are unsure of the benefits they will obtain, but an initial
partial liberalisation allows them to identify these and so build their support
for reform. A development of this argument is that the political economy of
countries has been fundamentally restructured from one based on rent
seeking to one based on the sources of wealth in a liberalised economy, so
that the nature of policies which enjoy political support has changed. The
collective choice dilemma is somewhat different: although it is recognised
that there will be widespread gains from liberalisation it is not possible to
mobilise the support to dismantle the current means of generating income.
Donor insistence on these policies provides the context in which this change
can be made.
But even where conditionality does work it can be a dangerous game. In trying
to make governments more accountable there is in fact a great danger that
donors are subverting accountability. Too often “open and transparent” means
telling the donors but not the affected population. Policy changes have been
discussed first with donors – or even agreed with them – without consulting
the affected population, or even where they run contrary to promises made to
the electorate, as was the case with privatisation in Bangladesh. The committee
which manages the common basket for the Zambia Health SIP has
representatives from government and donors, but not civil society (even through
the health reforms have created participatory management structures that
could be used for this purpose). The Ugandan experience is a fortunate partial
exception, with NGOs involved in the monitoring of the Poverty Action Fund.
For all their talk of the importance of ownership, donors are reluctant to let
go, and make the space necessary for domestic policy debate. Hence they
subvert accountability rather than build it.
3.4 How has Sweden affected policies?
Evidence in favour of the view that donors have played a part in supporting
reform is increased if the focus shifts from formal conditionality to the broader
process of policy dialogue. Making this step redirects attention from an almost
exclusive focus on the IFIs to the part played by bilateral donors.
The four dimensions of the policy dialogue process
Section 3.1 proposed a framework for analysing the ways in which bilateral
donors can affect policy outcomes. The work for this evaluation expanded
this typology to cover four dimensions. In each case policy-based lending is
just one end of a spectrum of possible interactions. The four dimensions
are:53
• degree of formality: conditionality is the most formal aspect of policy
dialogue, and there are other formal channels such as annual aid talks and
CG meetings; but there exist a number of semi-formal and informal
channels, such as more ad hoc meetings and social contacts – the evidence
suggests that these informal channels are of great importance, but that formal
channels provide the context for them, e.g. there is often a flurry of activity
in the run up to CG meetings which is more important than what happens
at the meeting itself.
• directive versus non-directive: conditionality is directive, in that it lays out
which policies should be followed, so that the word “dialogue” is something
of a misnomer; but donors may also engage in dialogue which is more
suggestive, or which facilitates dialogue – these latter strategies having been
pursued most obviously by Sweden in the cases of Nicaragua and Vietnam.
The evidence suggests that semi-formal and informal channels are of great importance in
the policy dialogue process. Technical assistance has been identified as one of five channels
of Swedish influence. Swedish technical assistant and colleagues, Kenya.
Photo Charlotte Thege/Phoenix.54
• channel: the IFIs are at the centre of formal, conditionality-based policy
dialogue, but bilaterals also have an important role to play in the policy
dialogue process, especially through less formal channels.
• choice of instrument: programme aid is used for conditionality, but policy
dialogue may also be carried out in the context of projects or technical
assistance, in both directive and non-directive forms though non-PA
instruments can be well-suited to non-directive dialogue.
Taking into account all the possible combinations of these four aspects of
policy dialogue opens up a wide range of possible channels for policy dialogue
which have not been considered in the literature on conditionality. An
evaluation of UK programme aid to Zambia found that these channels had
been important (see Box 3.1). It is argued here that they have also been in the
case of Swedish aid, though they have not been exploited as fully as they
might. By way of initial illustration, the country study for Vietnam, where
Swedish influence has perhaps been at its strongest, identifies five channels of
influence: (1) the systemic effects from import support (described in Chapter
2); (2) publication of regular economic studies; (3) related events, such as
seminars and training; (4) technical assistance (both experts and training) and
(5) projects.22
22 Vietnam has been home to Sweden’s largest aid project, the Bai Bang paper mill, which was argued in
a recent evaluation to have had substantial systemic effects on enterprise reform (Centre for International
Economics, 1999).55
Box 3.1   British influence on Zambian reform
The UK was one of the first bilateral donors to link its programme aid to IFI-sponsored
reforms and has retained this close link. Nonetheless, official documentation and agency
staff argue that their support allows for a unique British influence (“added value”). Zambia
represents an interesting case both on account of the sizeable British aid programme, over
half of which has been programme aid during the 1990s, and because of a belief
expressed in several British documents that other donors in Zambia look to Britain for
leadership, especially on issues of governance.
It is readily apparent, that despite believing programme aid to afford some specific UK
influence, the British have no explicitly thought out influence strategy (this statement is true
in general, not only with respect to Zambia). That being said, the full range of channels
have been utilised, and there is clearly an awareness of different channels being appropri-
ate under different circumstances. The decision to suspend PA in 1995 was not announced
at the Bilateral Aid Talks which followed soon after the decision was made, nor was
dissatisfaction with the pace of privatisation communicated to the responsible government
minister. In both cases the UK government waited until their views could be put directly to
the Zambian president. Semi-formal and informal channels seem to have been particularly
important (there is a remarkably high degree of communication within the donor commu-
nity in Zambia). Particularly in the case of the privatisation programme, technical
assistance has been used to get an insider position. But formal structures such as CG
meetings are important in providing both a framework and reference point for informal
channels. On several occasions, upcoming CG meetings in Paris have given a deadline
which has provoked heightened donor-government interactions. These attempts at specific
influence have occurred most often in relation to governance issues, though there were
also incidents during the privatisation experience.
Other donors do not in general seem to share the UK’s perception of itself as a lead donor,
though there have been instances in which it has been a prime mover on governance which
have, at the very least, reinforced tendencies in the donor community. Attempts to
influence the IFIs on specifically Zambian issues seem to have been rather less successful.
Source: Seshamani and White (1998).56
Swedish influence: an introductory overview
Does Sweden seek to influence the policies of the countries to which it gives
aid? There are two parts to this question. First, does Sweden seek to influence
policies at all? Surprisingly, some Swedish officials deny that this is the case.
This position seem strange, since Sweden does subscribe to IFI conditionality
and links its PA to these reform programmes. There can thus be no denying
that Sweden does seek to affect policy outcome in recipient
countries. Second, does Sweden seek to exert some specific Swedish
influence? This second question is harder to answer since, unlike the case of
the UK, it is not possible to find documentation providing an explicit answer.
However, it seems that it must be the case that there is this intention since
programme aid agreements include the possibility for Sweden to make an
independent assessment in order to give or withhold aid. But ambiguity remains
since this option is not exercised; cases of divergence from the IFIs are when
political conditionality is introduced in unison with other bilaterals (though
with a leading role in Nicaragua). There is only one case of separate economic
conditions, this being the short-lived Matching Funds experiment in Tanzania.
A partial case is the support of the Embassy in Maputo for the bilaterals’
stand against the IMF, though the Swedish Ambassador was prevented from
signing the letter of support for the government by the intervention of the
Ministry of Finance in Stockholm. However, ambiguity as to whether Sweden
intends to exert influence appears less once other policy dialogue channels
are considered, since Sweden has been active in many of these.23
If Sweden is attempting to exert influence, what is the “Swedish position?”. It
is difficult to talk of such a position for three reasons. First, there is no
explicit articulation of how Sweden intends to influence policies,
and certainly nothing amounting to an influence strategy at the
level of individual recipient countries. Second, the various agencies
responsible for aid in general and aid in particular may disagree over what
position to take. As discussed in Chapter 2, Sida and the Ministry of Finance
believe Ministry for Foreign Affairsto be “too political”. On the other hand,
Sida and Ministry for Foreign Affairsare less inclined to be as supportive of
the IMF as Finance and the Central Bank (as illustrated by the incident in
Mozambique just mentioned). Third, given the absence of any centrally
defined position, there appears a considerable degree of latitude
for desk officers and Embassy officials as to their position in policy
dialogue.24
Whilst there is no Swedish position as such, the areas in which Sweden has
been active have been in supporting the implementation of IFI conditionality,
23 The country studies evaluated programme aid rather than Swedish influence, so that some relevant
information may not have been collected on project activities.
24 There are presumably limits to this process, so that, for example, an Embassy economist advocating
widespread nationalisation would be censured from above. The processes for such censure, and the
networks to ensure some uniformity of position, appear to operate largely through informal and semi-
formal channels.57
plus attention to governance issues along with other bilateral donors. There is
nothing “uniquely Swedish” about the views taken, which are common at
least to those donors commonly falling under the like-minded label (Norway,
Denmark, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and sometimes Germany). Given
Sweden’s social democratic tradition and Sida’s historical focus on poverty
and distribution it may be thought that a “human face” would be promoted.
Whilst this has been so to some extent through SPA, there is very little evidence
of it at the country level. There are two reasons for this finding. First, it is to
some extent so that Sweden accepts the IFI position of getting stabilisation
first, then putting in place the pre-conditions for growth and only then turning
to poverty (and not worrying about distribution at all).25 But the second reason
is at least equally important. That is that Sweden has had little capacity to
develop alternatives. Even where desk officers and Embassy staff are of high
quality, they are burdened with an administrative load which allows little time
for engaging in debate on the content of policy dialogue.
However, this argument does not mean that there are not examples of
influence. Some are shown in Table 3.4, which fills in the cells from the
conceptual framework presented in Table 3.1. From the information presented
in the table, five issues are picked out for discussion: presence, influence on
the IFIs, the role of the SPA, like-minded groups and work to facilitate policy
dialogue, focussing on the country economic reports. Finally, other channels
are briefly discussed.
25 Although some IFI staff deny it, and their position does appear to be shifting, this is an accurate































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The importance of Swedish presence
In most of the countries covered by the evaluation Sweden has a long history
with the country, having supported it during an independence struggle (Cape
Verde, Mozambique and Vietnam) or been the largest (or only) Western donor
supporting socialist transformation (seven of the eight to a degree, but notably
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Vietnam – the exception is Uganda).
This historical association may be expected to give Sweden a “special
relationship” with the country, which can perhaps be called upon at difficult
points in the policy dialogue. Alternatively, it may be thought that being
identified with now rejected policies, often implemented by a party no longer
in power, would taint Swedish advice. The evaluations found considerable
support for the former view, and none for the latter. Both government and
other donors felt that Sweden occupied a special position, though some felt its
importance was waning and others that not enough was done to exploit it.
The clearest example of this relationship being exploited was the role Sweden
played in the constitutional crisis in Nicaragua in 1995,26 but it is also evident
in Mozambique, Tanzania and Vietnam, and even Zambia where the
ambassador in the early 1990s developed a particularly close relationship with
government. Vietnam is perhaps the clearest case, though Nicaragua can also
be used as an example. A common theme amongst Vietnamese respondents
was that Sweden was not seen as pursuing its own vested interests, which was
not so for other donors, and that its historical association implied a commitment
to Vietnam’s development. This position meant Sweden was well placed to
promote platforms for policy debate (described below).
Cape Verde and Uganda provide contrasting examples in which there is little
presence. The programme for Cape Verde is administered from Stockholm,
and that for Uganda was run from Nairobi until 1995 and the level of
representation remains low. Uganda is also the exception in that there is no
historical involvement with the country. It is thus unsurprising that examples
of Swedish influence are most difficult to find in these cases. Indeed, there
seems to be virtually none in Cape Verde. In Uganda, Sweden has been
amongst donors supporting initiatives on debt and poverty reduction, and is
also associated with the health sector. But its profile is lower than in other
countries where it has a more established presence.
The evidence presented above supports the view that Swedish influence
on policies will be more effective if focused on fewer countries,
where Sweden has a historical presence and where efforts are made to maintain
this presence by building up Swedish expertise on the country and developing
and maintaining a network of contacts.
26 One informant said that Nicaraguan officials asked “how can you do this to us as you are our friends”,
but also that relationship was not afterwards damaged by the incident – if anything it improved.61
Influence on the IFIs
During the 1970s Swedish aid went largely to countries pursuing a socialist
path to development. As we have seen, in the 1990s Sweden is a supporter of
the market-led development strategies promoted by the World Bank and the
IMF. It is thus clear that a change took place during the 1980s, though it is
surprisingly difficult to date with any precision. It began in the early 1980s,
but there was still some reluctance to join the SPA when it was formed in
1986, as this was seen as too close an association with the IFIs, the policies of
which many officials wished to distance themselves from. In the event Sweden
did join the SPA, and several senior officials identify this as a turning point in
Swedish policy. Although it is now thought of as a way for bilateral donors to
influence the IFIs, in the first instance the SPA had the effect of bringing
Sweden into line.27 Despite formally subscribing to adjustment policies Sweden
is one of those donors who is seen as having a somewhat critical perspective,
particularly in regard to poverty and gender issues.28 Hence it may be expected
that Sweden has attempted to influence the IFIs to change the content of
conditionality.
The first point to make with respect to assessing Swedish influence is that
attempts at influence are not as may be expected, and there seem to be
differences in stance between the country desks and embassies on the one
hand and the policy department on the other. In some countries, such as
Tanzania and Zambia, there is a feeling amongst bilaterals that the IFIs are
“being too soft”.29 Rather than try to mollify conditionality, bilaterals wish it
to be tighter and more strictly enforced; Sweden has been a part of these
moves. At the country level there is not, as may have been expected, evidence
of efforts to soften conditionality (Mozambique being the exception here) or
to put greater emphasis on social aspects. Sweden has not been active in
attempts to create a human face for adjustment at the country level.
The main finding with respect to influence on the IFIs is how limited it is. A
senior Sida official remarked that Sida had “not even marginal influence on
the Bank and the Fund”, and these feelings were echoed by other respondents.
The formal channel for this influence is the Board. From the point of view of
an embassy or Sida official influence through this channel is a remote possibility.
A position must first be communicated to MFA, who must then communicate
with Finance who is responsible for Sweden’s IFI Board members. MFA and
Finance may not agree (as the case of Mozambique already mentioned
illustrates), but even if they do, Sweden is one of several countries represented
by a single Board member so that those countries have also to agree. In
addition, many decisions (such as the content of a PFP) are effectively made
27 Three factors may be identified behind the move toward market-based development: (1) the change in
the international climate, (2) a corresponding shift in domestic political thinking, and (3) the influence of
the experience of living in planned economies on the thinking of Swedish officials (this last point was
made by an official who worked on Tanzania during the 1980s).
28 Staff from other agencies confirmed this perspective in a survey carried out for this evaluation.
29 A possible exception to this position are views on the continuation of the cash budget.62
before the document comes to the Board. The Executive Director’s (ED’s)
office is a less formal route for channels of official representation, but no
evidence was found of it being used to exert influence.30 Other channels,
such as CGs, are not seen as being ways of influencing the IFIs. The SPA is
something of a special case, which is discussed separately below. Informal
contacts with World Bank staff are often said to be good, although it is less
clear that these are believed to be a way in which influence can be exerted,
since IFI staff see their role as informing bilateral staff of the state of affairs,
rather than seeking their opinion.31
A related issue is that of capacity, raised above. It is clearly only sensible to
seek influence if Sweden can offer an informed opinion. The staffing of
embassies and the pressures on desk officers (and their frequent rotation) can
prevent the building up of the necessary expertise. This problem can be
addressed partly by stronger country focus and partly by building up expertise
as the country economic reports have sought to do.
Promoting policy debate: the role of studies
What passes as policy dialogue is better described as policy monologue, as
donors set down the policies to be implemented. Such an approach may be
called directive policy dialogue, whereas a less directive approach would be to
facilitate debates on key issues without dictating what the content of that
debate should be. Sweden has adopted such an approach in Nicaragua and
Vietnam: in both cases in the late 1980s when few other Western donors were
involved. In the former case, Sweden financed a number of expert studies on
macro policy issues, and created a group to design a debt strategy with a view
to strengthening the government’s negotiating position. In Vietnam, Sida
financed studies and related seminars in the 1980s, including Fforde and de
Vylder’s From Plan to Market which is the most prominent published work on
Vietnamese economic policy.32 Elsewhere Sweden has also promoted debates,
such as the lunches held for the business community at the Embassy in Lusaka
(Zambia) and financing studies on various issues – in Zambia the Economics
Department provides an annual commentary on the budget. The most
systematic and sustained initiative has been the studies commissioned by Sida’s
Policy Department.
Since the late 1980s the Sida Policy Department has commissioned a series
of macroeconomic studies from Swedish academic institutions on several of
the main recipients of Swedish aid. These reports, initially prepared on an
annual basis, are expected to follow the general economic situation and reflect
upon policy issues. Following an evaluation of the series in 1994 the
30  This finding contrasts to that from an evaluation of UK PA to Zambia, where memos mentioned
putting pressure on Bank staff via the ED’s office over perceived laxity on privatisation conditions.
31 This perception has frequently been confirmed implicitly in interviews with IFI staff, and sometimes
explicitly.
32 The book of this name was published in 1996, but was a revision of earlier Sida-financed work by the
two authors.63
management style has changed to give the Sida Regional Departments greater
say over the reports, with the requirement for an annual report replaced by a
more flexible relationship in which the consultant on each country responds
to specific requests (e.g. to comment on papers in the run up to a CG meeting).
These reports may have a role in Swedish influence in several ways:
• they may directly inform Swedish thinking in the country and thus impact
the policy dialogue with the government and the IFIs
• the report may directly influence government, or other influential opinion
leaders in the country
• the reports may provide a basis for discussion and influence amongst the
donor community
• at a systemic level, the reports may create a Swedish presence in policy
issues and a network for utilising this presence.
The general conclusion in relation to these points is that the macro studies
can and have had each of these roles. But the experience is extremely uneven
and more often they have not done so.
To elaborate upon this conclusion, several points may be made. First, the
change in the management of the reports since 1994 does appear to have
resulted in an improved possibility for impact. Although there are cases in
which reports exerted influence before this date, several officials who have
dealt with the reports in the earlier period found them too academic, with
both the timing and content insufficiently tuned to their needs.
The possibility for impact appears to depend crucially on how actively
dissemination is pursued and experience here appears extremely variable.
Whilst a seminar is commonly held, it is clear that in some countries this has
been a more active process involving the creation of a network for a continuing
dialogue. Several officials pointed to the work of Renato Aguiller in Angola
as an example of what can be achieved when serious attention is paid to these
issues.33 In the early 1990s in Vietnam widely publicised seminars were held
including international journalists (from, for example, Far Eastern Economic
Review) – and T-shirts were produced of the most recent report title! Of course
the possibilities for impact are to an extent determined by the relative
importance of Sweden as a donor. Hence less impact is expected from these
studies in countries such as Nicaragua and Zambia, where a wealth of material
is available, compared to say Guinea-Bissau (where the USAID office classifies
the Sida studies under BAD, meaning “best available document”).
The extent to which local networks are created depends also on the role played
by the consultant. If he or she tries to solicit and respond to a range of local
opinion then useful contacts can be built up on which the Embassy economist
can call on at other times. In the case of Guinea-Bissau the country officer
33 Of course the most important question is on the subsequent impact such dissemination had. This
cannot be judged from this study, but, given the setting in Angola, may have been unfortunately small.64
consulted with local economists on the terms of reference for upcoming studies.
But in some other countries little attention appears to have been paid to
developing such networks.
Whilst concluding that the reports can have some influence, this influence is
most usually in providing a platform for debate. Very few cases emerge of
specific policies which have come about as a result of issues raised in the
reports, although exceptions are the Debt Fund in Guinea-Bissau and
Matching Funds in Tanzania. Other channels for influence are limited since
although the reports are distributed to other Nordic donors, other mechanisms,
such as the SPA, are not used to promote the reports’ findings. Nor has there
been an attempt to synthesise the various reports to develop an overall Swedish
position on policy reform (at the same time the authors of the reports are not
constrained to adopt a “Swedish position”34). In some cases the reports pursue
the liberalisation agenda – three recent reports on Vietnam are examples
(and ones which are widely cited in both donor and Vietnamese circles) – but
this is not always the case.35
This discussion indicates that there remains something of a missed opportunity
from these reports in many countries, and that this opportunity is being missed
by insufficient attention to the processes surrounding report preparation and
dissemination, although there are many examples of best practice from various
countries. It is recommended that the Sida policy department undertake a
review of these processes and produce a guidance note for the Regions on
dissemination, which should include a recommendation that funds be explicitly
set aside for this purpose.36
The role of the SPA
The Special Programme of Assistance for Africa (SPA) was created in 1986 to
mobilise resources for adjustment in Africa and to provide a forum for
discussion of the relevant policy issues. Members are all donors providing
support for adjustment, i.e. PA, so that SPA is rightly seen as one of the channels
for PA impact. The SPA is a channel through which the donors may influence
the World Bank (and to a lesser extent the IMF, which is also a member but
not with the degree of active involvement of the Bank).37 It is not a channel
for direct influence on African governments since they are not represented.
There are differences in perception to how the SPA has operated, but it is
generally accepted that it has failed to make its identity widely known (which
is not necessarily the same as saying its presence was not felt). Agency officials
34 One official did suggest that the reports for Mozambique in the early 1990s were too far removed from
the IFI position to be useful for dialogue, although another official working on Mozambique at that time
said that these reports were generally well received.
35 It is the author’s view that it is unfortunate that the recent report on Cape Verde is uncritical of the IFI
prescription, which seems to ill suit a country clearly in need of some strategic thinking.
36 Apparently a single dissemination workshop is not even budgeted for on the assumption that
“workshops don’t cost anything”!65
not directly involved in the SPA often believe it to be a World Bank body,
rather than one in which the Bank is an equal member with other donors. By
the mid-90s some donors, with Sweden and the UK playing a lead role, felt
some dissatisfaction as to whether the SPA was an efficient channel for bilateral
influence and proposed an independent evaluation of the mechanism. There
was some resistance to this proposal from the Bank, who, once it accepted
that an evaluation would take place, offered to undertake the evaluation itself.38
Since the bilaterals wanted an independent opinion a compromise was reached
by which the Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED) would manage
the evaluation but the donors would be able to nominate team members.
Disagreement continued over the focus of the evaluation with pressure having
to be brought to bear for the study to address the issue of bilateral influence.
As a part of the evaluation field trips were made to several African countries.
These trips confirmed the view that SPA was not widely known, and that its
various guidelines had not had much of an impact. For example the consultant
visiting Mozambique reported that “all of the persons I met in the
Mozambican government had never heard of the SPA” (Anon. n.d.: 1). The
position was not much different amongst the donor community: “SPA is hardly
known amongst the donor community. SPA is apparently never discussed nor
even mentioned in the various co-ordination meetings taking place in
Maputo… its guidelines are even less known and no reference is ever made to
them in the course of the frequent co-ordination meetings and policy
discussions taking place in Maputo” (Anon. n.d.: 7) .
The bilaterals reacted to early drafts of the evaluation by saying that it did
not matter so much if the SPA did not leave visible footprints, since much of
its activity was “behind the scenes” and that it played a role in developing the
adjustment agenda, especially with respect to poverty and gender issues.
However, many members of the evaluation team felt the SPA had been just
one of several fora in which such issues were discussed so that it could be
accorded no special role, and that it was difficult to establish links between
decisions taken at the SPA and changes in Bank (or Fund) practice. A counter-
example cited by donors – the establishment of three pilot gender-sensitive
adjustment programmes – rather supports the critics’ case. One of the three
countries did not have a programme at the appropriate time so the idea of a
pilot was dropped and in the second nothing was attempted. Only in
Mozambique was a gender-sensitive adjustment programme attempted –
although the interviews during the course of the SPA evaluation revealed that
no one in government was aware of this fact (Anon. n.d.). The gender
component to the programme was a condition to monitor the impact on small
37 Although difficult to document, it seems clear that the Bank stressed the first objective of resource
mobilisation whereas bilateral donors were keener on discussing the policy agenda. It was originally
intended that support to adjustment would be largely cofinancing for the World Bank, but this did not
come about – illustrating the bilaterals’ desire to maintain some distance.
38 The report author was in regular contact with the relevant officials from several of the SPA donors
during this period and, subsequently, a member of the evaluation team.66
holders and women of liberalisation of prices and trade in the cashew sector.
The paper for the SPA evaluation notes that this may seem a rather negligible
incorporation of gender concerns, but in defence points out that the instruction
from the Vice-President to do this only came once credit design was mostly
complete, and that the conditions concerned privatisation and banking
restructuring, which are areas “where gender is not easily introduced”. The
World Bank’s Country Assistance Review (CAR) states that “attention to
gender issues has been sporadic” (World Bank, 1997: 33), and does not mention
that the Mozambican programme had been redesigned to be gender-sensitive
(the authors of the CAR appear unaware of this fact).
This rather negative picture certainly means that the role of SPA should not
be over-stated. But neither should it be under-estimated. The evaluation did
point out the useful role played by the various guidelines and the Joint
Evaluation Missions (JEMs) which helped harmonise import support
procedures, the importance of which should be clear from Chapter 2.39 This
evaluation adds weight to this finding in a way not possible from the SPA
evaluation: namely that in Nicaragua, which is of course not covered by the
SPA, there are “backward” PA modalities (see Chapter 2). Moreover, even if
it was just one voice speaking for greater attention to poverty and gender, the
more voices the better, and the fact that it represented the main donors must
have given it some importance.
Like-minded groups
In many of the countries studied Sweden is active in like-minded
groups, the core of which is usually the Nordic countries and often includes
the Netherlands and UK. These groups have played an active role in policy
dialogue, most usually on the political side, but sometimes venturing into
economics as in Mozambique. The advantages of such groups are that they
allow a co-ordinated stand on the part of the donors and allow the participating
agencies greater influence than they may have by virtue of their aid budgets
alone. In principle groups could co-ordinate many aspects of policy dialogue,
but this has not in general happened. An approach by Norway to share in
Sweden’s country economic studies met with a lukewarm response, and an
attempted joint evaluation of import support in Tanzania was not realised.
However, a joint review of macro support was recently undertaken in
Mozambique.
Some successes from these groups can be pointed to. The like-minded group
in Mozambique was behind the donors’ confrontation with the IMF in October
1995, in which a letter signed by several Ambassadors was sent to government
supporting it against IMF criticisms that it had gone off-track.40 In Nicaragua
a “non-paper” was prepared which was successful in having a condition
39 Guidelines were issued by the SPA on a number of topics, including import support procedures and
counterpart funds. JEMs were multi-donor missions, whose impetus came from the SPA, to review forex
and related procedures, largely for the purposes of the management of programme aid.67
removed from an ESAF loan that US citizens (Nicaraguans who had left in
the Sandanista period) be given priority in compensation land confiscated in
the 1980s – though this is more a case of one group of bilaterals counteracting
the influence of another bilateral; some softening on expenditure constraints
on the social sectors was also achieved.
Other channels for influence
Influence may also be exerted through other types of aid, such as project aid
and technical assistance (TA). There appears to be a difference between
Swedish and British aid as the latter explicitly use TA as a source of influence,
seeing it as an opportunity to “get someone on the inside” and so have access
to information and exert pressure (see Box 3.1). By contrast Sweden seems to
use this channel in a less conscious manner if at all – and several Sida officials
expressed the view that it would be wrong to do so. On the other hand,
influence can be exerted through projects. The Bai Bang paper mill project in
Vietnam is the best documented example of this, which introduced a
Scandinavian management model, which was emulated by managers from
other companies (Centre for International Economics, 1999). The rise of sector
programmes represent a new way and more explicit attempt to exert influence
outside of PA.41
40 As already mentioned, Sweden was active in this episode, although the Swedish Ambassador was
prevented from signing the letter by the intervention of the Ministry of Finance from Stockholm.
41 Budget support provided under sector programmes (SPs) is PA, but most support to SPs remains
project-specific (see Chapter 2).
The United Kingdom explicitly uses technical assistance as a source of influence, seeing it
as an opportunity to “get someone on the inside” and to have access to information and
exert pressure. British technical assistant and colleagues, Tanzania. Photo Charlotte
Thege/Phoenix68
3.5 Conclusions on policy dialogue
The following conclusions emerge from this chapter:
• Domestic political considerations are the prime factor in determining economic and political
reform: most countries initiated reform without donors, and have carried
out some measures not required by them whilst ignoring others that have
been required.
• Donors over-state their own importance at the expense of understanding the political
dynamic: IFI documents often date reform from their own involvement rather
than when the first changes were initiated and in general pay scant attention
to possible implementation constraints. A corollary is that transparency is
often measured by government sharing information with donors rather than
civil society, which can serve to subvert accountability rather than support
it.
• Policy dialogue is a set of processes: conditionality is only the formal, directive
end of policy dialogue, other parts of the policy dialogue have been at least
as important, partly as the formal and informal channels complement on
another.
• Formal conditionality has a mixed record: there is ample evidence from the
evaluation for the view that conditionality has failed, and of the reasons for
this failure; but there are also cases where conditionality has influenced
policies and reasons to believe why this may have been so.
• Bilateral donors have played an increasingly important role in policy dialogue: in the
1980s bilaterals signed up to the conditionalities of the IFIs, although they
still do this formally their role has increased partly with the development of
political conditionality and partly as the policy dialogue processes have
deepened. Although Sweden does not formally incorporate political
conditionality into its PA agreements, it has applied it in several cases
(Nicaragua and Zambia, and budget transparency linked to governance in
Vietnam).
• Bilateral donors have had little influence on the content of IFI programmes: formal
channels for influencing the IFIs appear not to work, and the informal ones
are also weak.
• The content of reform should not be entrusted to the IFIs alone: traditionally bilateral
donors have left the content of economic reform programmes to the IFIs.
But there are problems of moral hazard in entrusting major creditors with
the reform process, and evidence supports the idea that the IFIs can be
hard or soft depending on a country’s debt status. For these reasons, IFI
documentation should not be the sole source of information – the Sida
economic reports are a good example of an attempt to generate alternative
viewpoints, although they don’t always play this role. It is not being proposed
that every donor should have their own conditionality, but that (1) to the
extent that there is conditionality a broader process should be employed to69
determine these conditions, and (2) that areas of policy debate rather than
predetermining the outcome of the debate should be given more emphasis.
• There has been a learning process on all sides: bilaterals, the IFIs and governments
have an evolving understanding of what is possible with conditionality.
• Sweden’s role in policy dialogue at the country level does not reflect what may have been
expected from a “progressive donor”: Sweden’s involvement in policy dialogue
has revolved around political conditionality, and there is no evidence of
trying to put poverty more strongly on to the conditionality agenda at the
country level (though it has been one donor doing this through SPA).
• Sweden has no explicit “influence strategy”, that is, although programme aid and
other related activities are intended to affect policy outcomes, this is not
done in a clearly-articulated and systematic manner.
• Sweden’s influence is strongest where it has presence, and it seems well placed to assume a
facilitating rather than directive role.
• Sweden’s capacity for conducting the analysis required to support influence is often weak
The last set of points suggest a policy conclusion as to the role Sida can best
pursue in policy dialogue. The role of policy dialogue should be precisely
that, to have a dialogue – it is virtually unknown for donors to acknowledge
that government had a different, but ultimately legitimate, view. The most
useful role donors can play is to support a process in which options are put
forward and debated domestically. The “new consensus” on conditionality is
that force will not work: you can change people’s behaviour but you can’t
change their minds. Promoting debate is a way of changing minds and so
ensuring deeper-seated reform. There will still be a role for formal
conditionality, but it will not involve dozens of conditions each year. The focus
should be mainly on process and a small number of benchmarks. Sweden
can play an important role in transforming conditionality drawing
on its respected position in several countries and perceived
independence from the IFIs.70
Chapter 4
Have reforms worked?
Since the 1990s virtually all developing countries have engaged in substantial
reform towards market-led development. Analysis of the economic impact of
these changes suggests three main results. First, countries operating a control
regime performed significantly worse by most indicators than those with both
partial and more complete liberalisation. Second, for many indicators there were
no significant difference in performance between economies which were
partially liberalised and those with a firmer market orientation. Finally, whilst
some countries have experienced improved economic performance from
liberalisation, other countries have failed to do so. The last two of these points,
combined with the historical experience of East Asian countries (including
Vietnam), suggest that policies are needed to complement the market. The
1990s have also seen political liberalisation, although this has been somewhat
uneven. There is no straightforward relationship between opening up politically
and economic success.
4.1 Policy change in Swedish programme
countries
There has been a dramatic change in policy stance in virtually all developing
countries over the last twenty years. At the end of the 1970s nearly all had a
substantial degree of state intervention in the economy. Swedish aid was to
an extent focused on some countries – Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique,
Nicaragua, Tanzania and Vietnam – who had gone furthest in their attempts
to establish a centrally planned economy. Today all these countries have
introduced market-based economic reforms; the number of countries retaining
Marxist-inspired central planning can be counted on one hand (Cuba, Burma
and North Korea). What has been the nature of these policy changes and
what have been their effects?
A review of policies in Swedish programme countries shows how far-reaching
these reforms have been (see White and Leavy, 1999, a summary table from
which is reproduced as Appendix 2). Price controls on virtually all goods have
been abolished; exchange rates have been massively devalued and foreign
exchange markets liberalised to varying degrees; the state has ceased to allocate71
credit and interest rates are now market-determined; quotas have been
abolished and tariffs greatly reduced; there has been widespread privatisation,
although it has come at the tail-end of reform and there has been rather less
public sector reform; and most countries have introduced a substantial measure
of fiscal discipline, though some achieved stabilisation and then lost it. A simple
scoring system was applied to Sweden’s programme countries and an average
policy index calculated.1 The result, shown in Figure 4.1, demonstrates a
monotonic rise in the policy index, although a measure of state control remains
in some countries, notably Vietnam and also to an extent Bangladesh.
Figure 4.1 Average policy score of Sida programme countries
1 A score of 0 was accorded to heavily interventionist policies, 1 for some market-orientation (weak
reform) and 2 for strong market-orientation.
The index shows its strongest rise in the 1980s, the rate of increase slowing as
it neared its maximum possible value of two. But there have been some regional
variations. Many African countries only began to implement sustained reform
in the 1990s, although there have been a number of significant exceptions.
There is, then, no doubt that countries have undertaken major changes in
economic policy. What has been the impact of these changes on performance?
This debate has focused on aggregates such as growth and poverty, and the
analysis here starts with growth. Given the inconclusive nature of this discussion
it is necessary to go beyond that to look at regional and sectoral variations in
response. Part of the analysis is based upon a control-group analysis of Sida
programme aid countries, with annual values of performance indicators






































Growth 1.7 3.8 4.9
Inflation 30.2 13.0 11.8
Investment rate 15.3 21.8 21.4
Export growth –1.1 4.9 7.8
Agricultural growth 3.4 3.1 2.9
Manufacturing growth 0.0 4.5 4.7
Note: The table is based on the median scores calculated across the period 1981–96. Each Sida
country is awarded a score of 0 to 2 for each of the sixteen years (so that a country’s score
changes over time as it moves from one policy regime to another). Source: White and Leavy (1999).
The main result to emerge from Table 4.1 is the superior performance of
market-oriented economies over non-market oriented ones.2 But the degree
of market orientation does not matter so much (i.e. strongly market oriented
do not systematically perform better than relatively market oriented). For three
of the indicators – inflation, investment and manufacturing growth – there is
no significant difference in performance between partially and more fully
liberalised economies, and for agricultural growth no difference across all
three groups. Only in the case of export growth is there a marked difference
in outcome between partially liberalised and market-based economies, there
is also a smaller difference in aggregate growth performance.
4.2 Policy change and economic
performance
Macroeconomic indicators
There has been much debate on how market-based reform affects growth. As
for other aspects of policy analysis, there are four possible approaches: before
versus after, control group, modelling and case studies.3 The first two are the
most extensively applied, but are unable to adequately cater for other factors.
They do however describe what has happened and so can raise questions to
be answered. This report thus uses a control group analysis as the starting
point, before going into the story more deeply by drawing on material from
the eight country case studies.
2 Interpretation of these results cannot extract the role of external factors. World market conditions,
when more economies had a score of zero, were less beneficial for growth than in the 1990s, when more
countries had policies rating one and two.
3 The before versus after method compares a performance indicator after the policy change with that
before it, attributing the difference to the policy; the control group approach compares performance in
countries with the policy in those without it; and modelling attempts to identify the determinants of
performance. Case studies are detailed discussions of country experiences, often relying on narrative
argument rather than formal testing.73
The control group analysis for Swedish programme countries suggests that
growth performance is significantly better in countries with more market-
based systems: mean growth was 5 per cent in strong reformers compared to
around 2 in those with no reform, and a similar result is obtained for the
median.4 Such results have also been obtained in several studies (e.g. World
Bank, 1994), but a number of others (e.g. Eldawabi, 1992 and Mosley et al.
1995) find no significant difference – though there is no study which claims a
stronger performance in non-reforming economies than reforming ones. There
is thus some evidence that reforms improve performance, but it is far from
conclusive. This lack of conclusiveness means that some caveats must be
introduced to the view that reform is good for growth. The first is that reforms
appear to have restored growth in some countries but not in others. Most
notably, Zambia has not experienced GDP growth across the 1990s; but also
Nicaragua and South Africa are experiencing only modest growth, and growth
rates of Cape Verde and the South Asian countries are not appreciably higher
than those from pre-reform days (indeed lower in the case of Cape Verde).5
Since non-reformers mostly do less well, a safer general conclusion would be
that reform is necessary but by no means sufficient for improved growth.6
The second caveat is that the evidence supports reform away from heavily
interventionist policies, but is far less clear as to the extent to which substituting
state control with the market is the recipe for success. The problem is to identify
the appropriate policy set for particular countries for particular points in time,
rather than to label any given set of policies as “good” or “bad”.
The search for the impact of reform on growth thus requires some unpacking
of the story, by looking at the determinants of growth, and how these may be
affected by reform. Regression models have been extensively used for analysing
growth determinants, with policy measures frequently used as explanatory
variables. A recent World Bank study on aid effectiveness argues that “the
relationship between per capita growth and the economic management index
reconfirms that sound management – at both the macroeconomic level and
institutional levels – is important for growth” (World Bank, 1998: 33). But
such results can be questioned on a number of methodological grounds (see
Lensink and White, 1999), and the use of a policy index does not provide
insights into either which policies are effective or the channels through which
these effects may be felt. In particular, the evidence for macro stability seems
good, but that in favour of full scale market liberalisation much weaker. An
4 The median is used rather than the mean as the latter may be an unsatisfactory measure if the
distribution is badly skewed. One reason for a skew may be the effect of countries suffering natural
disasters or war. White and Leavy (1999) conduct the analysis for various sub-samples to exclude these
exceptional cases, but there is no substantive difference to the results shown here.
5 Such comparisons can be very sensitive to the periods chosen. A World Bank report demonstrated the
success of reform in Cape Verde by noting “annual growth has averaged 4 per cent during 1992–96,
compared to about 1 per cent between 1990–91”; but growth was close to 5 per cent for 1985–90. The
Bangaldeshi and Indian economies show a modest rise, although this can look stronger (or in the Indian
case also weaker) depending on the years chosen.
6 A substantial caveat to this caveat is that South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, and to
an extent Sri Lanka) enjoyed reasonable growth before reform and that it has not improved since.74
example is the much-cited Sachs-Warner openness index. There are several
different measures of openness, which are only loosely correlated with each
other and so yield different results, i.e. some show no link between openness
and growth. Besides, the Sachs-Warner index is a composite of many different
things, and a decomposition shows that it is not the trade policy part of the
index which is correlated with growth (Rodrik, 1999).
Indeed, it is a striking result that there is no strong evidence in favour of
liberalistion: that is not what is being measured there. The donor community
tends to endorse the World Bank’s view that “good policies” are required –
but there is little theoretical or empirical support for the view that good policies
should be equated with market-led development. At the theoretical level the
rationale for the market does not extend beyond the efficiency gains explained
in the basic model of perfect competition. But renewed attention is being
given to issues of market imperfections and market failure, which undermine
reliance on the price mechanism. At the empirical level, data to support these
efficiency gains has never been strong and appear absent from the growth
literature.
The regression results do support the view that the key determinants of growth
– primarily investment in human and physical capital – are important for
growth, as is macroeconomic stability (meaning reasonably low inflation). The
analysis of the link between reform and growth should thus examine how
these determinants have performed.
During the 1980s many countries experienced very high or hyperinflation:
reaching 33,000 per cent in Nicaragua in 1988. These high levels of inflation
have been brought under control, which is undoubtedly a prerequisite for
growth. The relevant policy question today is not whether stabilisation was
necessary but the extent to which it should be pursued. Regression analysis
shows that growth has a non-linear relationship with inflation:
whilst high inflation is bad for growth, it is likely that once it reaches a certain
level then further reductions in inflation may even be bad for growth. Empirical
support for this view depends on how “a certain level” is defined:7 Levine and
Zervos (1993) find this effect with a cut off at 40 per cent (but the opposite if
it is put at 80 per cent). The mechanisms by which excessive stabilisation
damages growth are quite clear: deflation drives down demand for domestic
output, and lack of investment in human and physical capital undermines
the supply response. Some countries that have enjoyed a good response (Ghana
and Sri Lanka) have done so by expanding spending at the same time as
liberalisation, whereas in several countries (Zambia and Mozambique in the
first part of the 1990s) it has been argued that spending limits have constrained
growth. Uganda has recently persuaded the IMF to relax its spending limits,
which many would agree is a necessary step to sustaining that country’s growth.
7 But the evidence for non-linearity is strong, Sala-i-Matin’s (1997) definitive “2 million regression” paper

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sustained growth requires investment in both physical and human capital, and
both of these can be adversely affected by spending restrictions. Having said
that, the picture with respect to social spending in adjusting countries is mixed
– and it is clear that the largest falls were experienced during prolonged economic
decline under the control regime. But many Sida programme countries, especially
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), have low levels of human development. Illiteracy
in SSA is over 40 per cent (over 50 per cent for women), no country has achieved
development or sustained growth with literacy at such levels.
Evidence shows that government capital expenditure is likely to suffer most
when spending is under pressure. Tanzania and Zambia are clear examples
of this fact: in the former the development budget’s share of expenditure fell
from over 20 to less than 5 per cent during the 1990s. In Zambia non-interest
expenditure has fallen as a per cent of GDP in response to application of the
cash budget and the out-goings of many ministries are almost wholly consumed
by wages and related payments. Non-wage recurrent costs are also being
squeezed. Such a tendency accentuates the decades of under-investment in
key productive capital, again especially in SSA where infrastructure remains
woefully underdeveloped. The slowness, or simple failure, of a private
investment response means that the bulk of any rise in investment will come
in the first instance from the public sector – as was the case in Sri Lanka
following liberalisation and has been so for Nicaragua and Uganda more
recently. The predominance of public investment can be justified since it can
stimulate private investment in several ways (known as “crowding in”), such
as creating demand and the provision of infrastructure. The importance of
improved infrastructure for the agricultural supply response is commonly
stressed, and confirmed in the country studies from countries with as diverse
experience as Vietnam and Zambia. But it also matters for manufacturing: a
survey of the private manufacturing sector in Uganda found that firms lost
on average 90 days a year owing to power cuts. It seems that many years of
reform are required to restore confidence for private investment to take place
on a substantial scale (particularly in activities with a long-term return),
especially foreign investment. Both Uganda and Vietnam have enjoyed
enlarged inflows, including from ex-residents who are re-investing. But these
two examples follow on from ten years of sustained reform (and had the
overseas communities to support such investments), so that other countries
cannot be expected to follow down this track so readily. (Cape Verde has
encouraged such investment, but lacks investment opportunities and Nicaragua
tried unsuccessfully to do so in the early 1990s).
A more positive picture emerges with respect to exports, for which Table 4.1
suggests that stronger reformers have markedly better export performance.8, 9
This is a finding in much of the literature, including studies in general
8 Rodrik’s point should be noted that exports are just a means to an end. It is imports that matter for
growth, not exports per se.
9 Good export performance has not necessarily been accompanied by reduced current accont deficits,
since high capital inflows (including aid) mean that such deficits persist. More worrying is that external
debt remains high in most countries, and has been reduced in the 1990s only in Nicaragua.77
somewhat critical of adjustment (e.g. Mosley et al., 1991). There is a strong
tradition of export-led growth in East Asia and considerable debate over what
is necessary for other countries to emulate this experience. The World Bank
(1993) has argued that macroeconomic stabilisation and an open economy
are the key messages from East Asia’s success. Many commentators, and Asian
governments, disagree (e.g. Amsden, 1989 and Rodrik, 1999), pointing to the
role that strategic intervention has played. It may be responded that the Asian
crisis has exposed the corruption and inefficiency which underpinned the
close-knit network of government and financial institutions – but the current
crisis will not reverse the decades of rapid growth and social improvements
which these countries have experienced. In various of the countries studied
there has been export growth in both manufacturing and agriculture. This
growth has undoubtedly come about from liberalisation, but this is not always
the whole story. One of the most remarkable successes, that in the Bangladeshi
garment sector, was achieved also with the help of subsidised credit, duty
drawback and bonded warehouses. In other cases, notably Mozambique and
Uganda, the response is a result of peace, and in most cases agricultural output
remains strongly wedded to fluctuations in the weather.
Finally, mention should be made of the debt burden which remains high. Of
the eight countries studies, total external debt has fallen only in Nicaragua –
which has received extremely substantial debt relief – in all other cases it has
risen. Much of this debt is to the IFIs, and the need to start servicing these
debts is one reason why debt service payments will not decline greatly, if at
all, even for those countries completing HIPC.
An examination of main determinants of growth thus throws some light on
the mixed picture that was found. A stable macroeconomic environment is
important, but excessive zeal in pursuing stabilisation may be detrimental
where lack of investment is a binding constraint on the supply response. There
is also, especially in Africa, a need to build up the stock of human capital for
sustained growth to be achieved, and this is not something which reforms can
achieve in the short-term (and in some cases may even harm).
In addition to the level of growth, the pattern of growth is also important,
especially in regard to growth’s impact on poverty. The pattern of growth can
be considered in various ways: across income groups, occupations, regions or
sectors. Unfortunately data are not available on many of these. Regarding
the first, distribution may be expected to worsen in liberalising economies,
and available data show greater inequality in Africa in the 1990s than 1980s.
Data not often available are economic activity at the regional level – Vietnam
is an exception in this regard, and probably also exceptional in that output
growth has been spread across all regions (although most rapid in Ho Chi
Minh City and neighbouring Van Tau province). More generally it is likely
that current centres of economic activity have grown fastest and that remote
communities remained least well placed to benefit from economic liberalisation.
In some cases, such as Uganda and Sri Lanka, these regional differences also
stem from localised conflicts.78
Data are available on sectoral patterns of growth, where the general pattern
has been a declining share for agriculture and a growing one for the service
sector.10 For example, of 27 per cent aggregate growth in Bangladesh in the
period 1991–97, 17 per cent came from the tertiary sector and only 4 per
cent from the primary and in Cape Verde services contributed over 100 per
cent of growth from 1991–97 as the agricultural sector declined; in Uganda
agriculture’s share of GDP fell from 40 to 26 per cent from 1985 to 1997,
whilst that of services rose from 33 to 43 per cent. This pattern of growth can
partly be explained by the suppression of the tertiary sector under the control
regime. But financial liberalisation also plays a role, as this policy tends to
increase the share of lending to commerce at the expense of the productive
sectors. For example, in Uganda agriculture’s share of commercial credit fell
from 26 to 16 per cent from 1988 to 1996, whilst that of commerce rose from
22 to 38 per cent. Such trends may be regretted as agriculture remains the
source of income for a large share of the population in developing countries.
Agricultural supply response
Agricultural price liberalisation has been the first stage of economic reform
in many countries. The evidence for a supply response is mixed, with no
apparent difference in performance according to a country’s policy stance
(Table 3.1). Some countries have seen little or no response from the agricultural
sector. More usually there has been a response from some crops but not others.
Few countries – of which the most notable is Vietnam, but also including
Uganda – have seen growth across the bulk of the agricultural sector. It is not
the case, as is sometimes claimed, that the response is only in export crops.
Although rice exports have grown at close to 50 per cent a year in Vietnam
(turning the country from a rice importer to the world’s second largest exporter),
this is also of course the main staple. In both Tanzania and Mozambique
food production has risen, with a corresponding sharp decline in the absolute
value of food imports. Where there has been a supply response this has been
helped by the cessation of conflict (particularly Mozambique and Uganda).
A summary of the experience of Swedish programme countries bears out
this general picture of a mixed, but generally uninspiring, response (Table
4.3).
10 Nicaragua is an exception to this general picture, with the primary sector growing fastest and the
secondary ranked next (the contributions to growth of the three sectors are not, however, greatly different
from one another).79




Botswana Weak: none in food crops but some in export crops (meat products, food and
tobacco)
Cape Verde Very weak
Eritrea Weak, some in food crops
Ethiopia Moderate to strong, with growth in coffee production
Guinea-Bissau Weak, uneven in export crops
Kenya Moderate to strong, notably tea and horticultural products
Mozambique Moderate to strong response across range of crops (especially since end of
war)
Namibia Weak: none in cereals and uneven in livestock
South Africa Weak, mainly in maize
Tanzania Strong in food and some export crops (but not others)
Uganda Strong, particularly in export crops (coffee, cotton, tobacco and horticultural)
and less so for food crops
Zambia None in main crop (maize), but some in tobacco and horticultural products
Asia
Bangladesh Moderate, becoming strong for some export crops in 1990s
India None
Laos Weak, none in main crop (rice), some in cotton and coffee
Sri Lanka Mostly weak though improved in tea in 1990s
Vietnam Strong across all regions and most crops
Latin America
Nicaragua Strong since 1993, particularly in export crops
Source: White and Leavy (1999).
These differences are due to the fact that it is changes in relative profitability
that matter to producers and that this may be little affected by price
liberalisation for a number of reasons. First, there may be a rise in the general
price level as price controls are relaxed and as a result of devaluation, so that
output price does not rise relative to that of consumption goods. This effect is
not likely to be that strong where rural residents have not benefited greatly
from price controls on consumer goods. Second, profitability may not improve
if input costs also rise, as they will if input subsidies are removed, and
devaluation raises the cost of imported items (such as fertiliser or its component
parts). Third, there may be constraints that the market is ill equipped to deliver,
or does so at a higher than optimal cost, such as credit or extension services
(or these services are available to men rather than women who are responsible
for the bulk of production). The failure of the private sector to take up maize
marketing in Zambia is an example of this. In Bangladesh and Vietnam the
state has played an important part in supporting rural finance, but there are
other countries in which, partly at the behest of donors, this support has not80
been provided. Fourth, increased margins may not be sufficient after
liberalisation if there are substantial transaction costs, so that the higher price
is absorbed by intermediaries. Finally, women do the bulk of agricultural work
in many countries (e.g. 80 per cent in Uganda on traditional export crops and
60 per cent on non-traditional ones; in Nicaragua the figure is 65 per cent for
the sector as a whole). Since they already work for 12–16 hours, or more, they
have little time for additional production. Women may also make production
decisions based on food security rather than marketable surplus – so that they
were resistant to vanilla in Uganda. Finally, world prices for many products
have been weak in the 1990s, off-setting gains which may otherwise have
been realised by liberalisation.
These arguments add up to a strong case that price liberalisation will not be
sufficient to ensure a substantial and widespread affect though it may enable
a more concentrated one in some high value crops. Evidence on the need for
complementary investments is particularly strong in Africa, where roads per
square kilometre are less than one-fifth those in India four decades earlier
(when India had comparable population density to SSA today). Irrigated
cropland in tropical Africa is one-tenth what it was in India in the 1950s
(Hayami, 1997: 94–95). Transport costs add 30 per cent to the price of coffee,
cotton and sugar exports from Uganda if they go by land and twice that if
they go by air, compared to an export tax of only 1.3 per cent. Improving
infrastructure, not further tariff reform, is the way to improve incentives to
Ugandan farmers (Milner et al., 1998). Africa has not experienced anything
like the yield increases achieved in Asia following the Green Revolution; some
commentators argue that such increases are achievable, but that the market
will not deliver the necessary inputs and credit (e.g. Mosley, 1999).
Agricultural price liberalisation has been the first stage of economic reform in many
countries. However, several arguments support the case that price liberalisation will not be
sufficient to ensure a substantial and widespread effect on agricultural production.
Photo Heldur Netocny/Phoenix.81
Manufacturing
There has been considerable concern that reform will cause de-
industrialisation. Clearly in some countries the manufacturing sector has been
unable to withstand liberalisation – the most notable example being the effect
of second hand clothing imports on domestic garment makers in Africa,11 so
that in some countries – Mozambique and Zambia – the sector as a whole
has declined. But it is not clear that these changes constitute de-
industrialisation; the point of adjustment, as the name suggests, is to move
resources from less efficient uses to more efficient ones. Closing down inefficient
enterprises is part of this process. The sector as a whole may decline if resources
are re-deployed to agriculture or services, or experience a J-curve if recovery
takes some time.
The data do in fact show stronger manufacturing performance in reforming
economies than non-reforming ones. There are some notable areas of success,
such as garments in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka – both of which had vigorous
export promotion policies. Vietnam has also enjoyed rapid manufacturing
growth, as has Botswana (an African country which has combined relative
openness with an industrial strategy). The Ugandan experience confounds
the notion that the import-substituting sector necessarily experiences decline,
though these have not been fully exposed to liberalisation of trade and
finance.12 Several other countries have experienced “growth spurts” in
manufacturing as capacity utilisation picks up from the extremely low levels
experienced under foreign exchange rationing. It can be questioned whether
growth will continue after these initial spurts. Vietnamese manufacturing has,
for example, enjoyed several years of high growth, but one well-informed
observer suggests it is entering a period of cyclical slowdown (Fforde, 1997:
64). The structural weaknesses in the sector are generally recognised with
disagreement as to whether the appropriate response is more state intervention
(the government’s view) or less (the donor’s view).
Against this positive picture must be set the record of low, or even negative,
growth in many countries, even after some years of reform. There has been
large-scale retrenchment where state enterprises have been restructured prior
to privatisation. In Vietnam over one million people were laid off from state
enterprises in the early 1990s, though total employment has risen. In Zambia
20 per cent of employees have been laid off from privatised enterprises, and
their employment prospects less rosy than those of their Vietnamese
counterparts.13 Some commentators, notably Lall (1995), have argued that
these adverse consequences are not necessary, as firms could compete in an
11 Which is not to say that such imports should be prohibited as the welfare effects of affordable clothing
are substantial.
12 Some import-substituting sectors have declined, notably textiles and garments, but large increases have
been recorded in chemicals, steel and steel products, plastic products and vehicle accessories.
13 Studies of retrenchees have suggested that most gain re-employment in a growing economy, whereas
this is far less likely in one with weak growth, such as Zambia. The skilled are more likely to find
employment that the unskilled (Sahn et al., 1997: 164–180).82
open economy if given the time to adjust in the context of a selective industrial
strategy. In a modern restatement of the infant industry argument, Lall argues
that firms need to develop their technological capability. The Zambian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry has been making similar arguments
since the early 1990s. Failure to allow such restructuring will condemn the
economy to collapse of the manufacturing sector to the detriment of overall
growth performance.
Poverty
The debate on the poverty impact of economic reform is complicated by the
frequent absence of comparable data for income-poverty measures. In
Uganda, where as thorough an analysis as the data will permit shows a fall in
the headcount from 56 to 46 per cent, poverty trends remain disputed. One
study for Tanzania showed a comparable decline from 65 to 51 per cent from
1983 to 1991, although this comparison is almost certainly problematic. An
alternative is to resort to social indicators, though these show a general upward
trend for factors largely unrelated to economic reform, although in some cases
a combination of conflict, HIV/AIDS and prolonged decline have brought
about stagnation or even reversal (e.g. Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). As
with growth, it is helpful to explore more closely the channels through which
reform may affect poverty.
There are several channels through which reforms can affect poverty. The
one most commonly highlighted is that of growth. There is no disagreement
that growth is necessary for sustained poverty reduction. Rather, debate focuses
on what, if anything, should be done to ensure that the poor benefit from
growth.
The poverty elasticity is an indicator of how responsive poverty is to growth.
Table 4.4 uses available estimates for Swedish programme countries to calculate
the growth required to reduce the absolute number of poor: in five of the
nine cases growth is insufficient. This result may understate the problem, since
the calculation assumes distribution to be constant, whereas the small amount
of available evidence suggests distribution to be worsening. In SSA as a whole
the Gini coefficient rose for 0.44 to 0.47.14 It is estimated that the Gini in
Vietnam rose from 0.30 to 0.34 in the decade from 1984 (Dollar and Litvak,
1998). At current growth rates, distribution needs to improve if poverty is to
fall. But instead distribution is worsening.
14 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality, ranging from zero for perfect equality to one for
extreme inequality.83
Table 4.4   Growth required to reduce the absolute number of poor
Elasticity Population Growth (1990–96)
growth
Required Actual
  Bangladesh –2.9 1.7 2.3 4.4
  Botswana –0.9 3.1 6.5 5.9
  India –0.8 1.8 4.1 5.7
  Kenya –0.9 2.7 5.7 2.7
  Sri Lanka –2.9 1.3 1.7 4.3
  Tanzania –0.6 3.0 8.0 ..
  Uganda –0.8 3.2 7.2 7.0
  Zambia –0.2 3.0 18.0 –0.4
  Zimbabwe –0.9 2.5 5.3 2.0
Source: elasticities from Jayarajah et al.(1996) and other data from World Development Indicators.
The original view from the World Bank was that reform would improve
distribution by eliminating urban bias by shifting the internal terms of trade
in favour of agriculture, reducing the explicit and implicit subsidies enjoyed
by the better off and putting an end to rent seeking. Models estimated for four
African countries by a team from Cornell seemed to bear out this view: the
urban non-poor gained least from reform, in fact experiencing large falls in
income in three of the four countries (Sahn et al., 1994). The reality is obviously
somewhat different, and even the most non-observant visitor to a liberalising
economy will see how it creates a class of “new rich” who are obviously
extremely wealthy by their country’s standards. At the same time, large parts
of the population, especially those living in off-road communities, and
vulnerable groups such as the sick and disabled, are in no position to benefit
and are, at best, by-passed by growth. Even in a country with such rapid
growth as Vietnam critics argue that the position of vulnerable groups is
actually worsening. It is clear that the benefits of growth are not being equitably
shared.
If poverty reduction is to be achieved there is a need for additional policies, to
both directly alleviate poverty reduction and to draw the poor into the growth
process. Investment in human capital and ensuring access for the poor to
these services is clearly one area of policies. Donors have paid attention to
protecting social spending in some countries – such as the condition in Zambia
that social spending should be 34 per cent of the total, though they have not
done so in all cases (e.g. Nicaragua). However, the experience of social spending
in reforming countries is mixed. It is not generally so that it has fallen, and in
several cases (e.g. Zambia) it can be shown to have been protected during
expenditure cuts. In other growing economies such as Uganda and Vietnam
social spending has claimed a growing share of expenditure. But real spending
may have been stagnant – e.g. in Zambia where the share has risen – and so
spending per capita fallen. Moreover, in many countries resources remain
heavily skewed toward services used mainly by the better off. With better84
targeting and quality improvements there is great scope for improving service
provision to the poor. Access is also increased by investment in infrastructure,
which has already been mentioned in relation to agricultural supply response.
Remoteness is a strong correlate of poverty; reducing remoteness opens up
opportunities.
Social Funds (SFs), or their equivalent, have been set up in many countries
with the intention of protecting the poor from any adverse consequences of
adjustment. In practice they have been more generalised project windows
which have tended to be poorly targeted, often in part because of political
interference (e.g. the early years of FISE in Nicaragua). SFs are usually
autonomous agencies, which may have appeared desirable when they were
intended to run for a few years at most, but clearly create problems once they
are given an indefinite lease of life. The Funds continue to rely on donor
support, though it may be expected that they will be supplanted over time by
the move to the sector approach.
Asset redistribution is believed by many to enhance both growth and poverty
reduction. However, the current trend in reforms is in the opposite direction,
as the introduction of land markets results in the privatisation of common
property resources and ends inter-generational re-distributive measures.
Evidence suggests that the substantial redistribution of land, which occurred
in Nicaragua in the 1980s is being reversed in the 1990s. Re-distributive land
reform has not been proposed in policy dialogue, although market liberalisation
has.
4.3 Governance and political reform
Following somewhat later than economic reform, there has been dramatic
political change in many, but not all, countries. Table 4.5 reports the political
rights and civil liberties ratings produced by the US body Freedom House.
These ratings range from one to seven, with one representing the highest
degree of political freedom.15
Four observations may be made with respect to these indicators: (1) both indices
have improved across time; (2) the improvement is most marked with respect
to political rights, showing sharp increases with the start of democratic elections
(e.g. Cape Verde in 1990–91 and Zambia the following year); (3) some recipients
of Swedish PA have continuing poor performance, notably Angola and
Vietnam; and (4) some countries have witnessed reversals, notably Zambia
and to some extent Nicaragua.
15 Any rating system such as this will be subject to criticism with respect to individual cases. The country
case study for Vietnam argues that political structures are more representative than they appear on the
surface.85
Table 4.5(a)  Political liberalisation indicators (ranks 1 to 7): political rights
88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99
  Angola 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 6 6 6 6
  Bangladesh 4 4 5 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2
  Botswana 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
  Cape Verde 5 6 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  Ethiopia 6 7 7 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4
  Guinea-Bissau 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3
  India 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 2
  Kenya 6 6 6 6 4 5 6 7 7 6 6
  Mozambique 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3
  Namibia – 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
  Nicaragua 5 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2
  South Africa 5 6 5 5 5 5 2 1 1 1 1
  Sri Lanka 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3
  Tanzania 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5
  Uganda 5 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 4 4 4
  Vietnam 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
  Zambia 6 6 6 2 2 3 3 3 5 5 5
  Zimbabwe 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
  Average 5.1 5.3 5.0 4.3 4.2 4.5 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.5
Source: Freedom House website (www.freedomhouse.com).
Table 4.5(b)  Political liberalisation indicators (ranks 1 to 7): civil liberties
88–89 89–90 90–91 91–92 92–93 93–94 94–95 95–96 96–97 97–98 98–99
  Angola 7 7 7 4 6 7 7 6 6 6 6
  Bangladesh 5 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
  Botswana 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3
  Cape Verde 6 5 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
  Ethiopia 7 7 7 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4
  Guinea-Bissau 7 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5
  India 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
  Kenya 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 5
  Mozambique 7 7 6 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4
  Namibia – 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
  Nicaragua 4 5 3 3 3 5 5 4 5 5 5
  South Africa 6 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2
  Sri Lanka 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4
  Tanzania 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 4
  Uganda 5 4 5 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
  Vietnam 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
  Zambia 5 5 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
  Zimbabwe 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
  Average 5.5 5.1 4.8 4.2 4.1 4.7 4.6 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.1
Source: Freedom House website (www.freedomhouse.com).86
The question of the extent to which the donor governance agenda has
influenced policies was touched upon in the last chapter. It was argued there
that the experience is mixed. Whilst it is undoubtedly the case that donors
pay attention to these issues in a way they did not in previous decades, there
continue to be discrepancies in their behaviour (Vietnam is favoured despite
the absence of democracy and the no-party system tolerated in Uganda,
whereas Zambia is penalised for perceived shortcomings in democratic
processes). Application of these conditionalities has sometimes yielded results
and sometimes not: Zambia illustrates both cases, with the government resisting
donor pressures not to effect changes to the constitution, but giving way to
specific demands in 1998 on activities in the wake of the coup attempt of the
previous year.
The deeper issue than the extent of reform is the appropriateness of the
donor agenda in this area. A first question is whether the political systems
being developed are the right ones. As with economic policy, there has been a
substantial shift in donor thinking. In the 1970s donors accepted one party
states and arguments that African political systems were not compatible with
Western style democracy, having their own systems of representation. But
during the 1990s the position is strongly held that the Western system should
be emulated. One reason for the change in donor thinking is the view that
open government is a prerequisite for sustained economic development. This
view seems to fly in the face of evidence of long periods of growth under
undemocratic governments (which then become subject to democratic
pressures). A review of the literature on economic and political liberalisation
suggests that no simple statements can be made as to causality in either
direction. The case studies bear this position out: Zambia is more democratic
than Uganda, but the latter flourishes whilst the former has stagnated. The
most rapidly growing country, Vietnam, is the least democratic. These
examples are not cited to suggest that political liberalisation is wrong – it can
be important in its own right – but that to indicate that it is not the panacea
for poor growth performance.
4.4 Concluding comment
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that market-based adjustment
has resulted in some improvement in performance. But it does not necessarily
do so, and it does not appear that extensive liberalisation is better than selective
liberalisation. Some parts of market-led development are beneficial for growth,
but others less so and in some settings may even be harmful. These findings
are consistent with the newly emerging “post-Washington consensus” and
with the views recently expressed by two of the currently most influential
economists writing on development issues. Rodrik has stated that:
Countries that have done well in the postwar period are those that have been able
to formulate a domestic investment strategy to kick-start growth and those that
have had the appropriate institutions to handle adverse external shocks, not those87
that have relied on reduced barriers to trade and capital flow. The evidence from
the last two decades is quite clear: the countries that have grown the most rapidly
since the mid-1970s are those that have invested a high share of GDP and
maintained macroeconomic stability… Policy makers therefore have to focus on
fundamentals of economic growth – investment, macroeconomic stability, human
resources and good governance – and not let international economic integration
dominate their thinking on development (1999: 4).
Stiglitz has argued that
many of the most successful countries (representing the largest part of growth
within the low income countries) have not actually followed the “recommended”
policies… the Washington consensus failed [owing to] a failure to understand
the subtleties of the market economy, to understand that private property and
“getting the prices right” (that is, liberalisation) are not sufficient to make a
market work. An economy needs institutional structure… Perhaps had [the East
Asian] countries followed all the dictums of liberalisation and privatisation,
they would have grown faster, but there is little evidence for that proposition”
(1998: 5, 9 and 10).
The development strategy to be followed should not rely on the market alone.
This position was argued strongly in the evaluation report for Cape Verde.
The report for Vietnam suggested that donors should give more credence to
the government’s reasons for resisting liberalisation in all areas, and the issue
arises in various ways in other reports. However, as the previous chapter
documented, donors have moved toward supporting market-based




The substantial volume of PA transfers should be expected to have significant
macroeconomic effects. Despite a sizeable literature on aid’s macroeconomic
impact, it is surprisingly difficult to measure these effects with any degree of
certainty. The dominant gap filling view of aid is misleading (aid actually creates
gaps) – a focus on the marginal impact of aid is more appropriate. A methodol-
ogy for analysing marginal impact is proposed, which is rooted in an accounting
framework. The analysis is focused on the external account, where a clear link
between imports and debt service is established. It is also demonstrated how
aid – and PA in particular – can help stabilise the economy, and evidence
presented from the eight countries of where this has happened. Links from
imports, lower debt service and stabilisation to higher growth are well estab-
lished. Aid can also support government expenditures, but the pattern of that
expenditure also matters for its growth effects. In line with the argument of the
previous chapter, there has perhaps been too little in the way of complementary
investments to enhance the prospects for pro-poor growth.
5.1 Introduction
What has been the direct impact of the SEK 7 billion of Swedish PA, and the
many billions more of PA from other donors? That is, what have the funds
been used for? This question may be addressed at both the micro and macro
levels. At the micro level one can try to trace the use of funds. However, doing
so is a useless exercise in the case of PA – as explained in Chapter 2, the
documented “use” of the funds is often an accounting fiction, especially as
systems became more liberalised – this is aside from the issue of fungibility.
The use of PA funds can only be meaningfully addressed at the macroeconomic
level. For example, how has the level and composition of imports been affected
by the receipt of PA?1
1 The answer to this question can only refer to total PA. The separate impact of Swedish PA cannot be
sensibly addressed.89
Section 5.2 introduces some broader conceptual issues, before moving to a
presentation of the methodology in section 5.3. This methodology is applied
to the external account (5.4) and some conclusions also offered on the internal
account (section 5.5). Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Approach to the analysis
Two background points to the analysis deserve elaboration. This chapter begins
by elaborating two points. First, the limitations of our knowledge are stressed:
any attempt to determine causality using shaky data over a short time period
in which there have been large structural changes can at best point to likely
outcomes and contributory factors. Second, the irrelevance of the notion of
“gap filling” is explained, with a digression on the important policy implications
of the fact that aid is gap creating rather than gap filling.
The difficulty of saying anything
The macroeconomic analysis of aid has proven a difficult area to obtain firm
results. The most common technique in the literature is regression analysis –
a technique which attempts to “explain” variations in one variable by the
variations in other variables. Typically, growth has been regressed on aid and
some other relevant variables such as exports, investment and literacy. Although
there are many problems in the approach (documented in White, 1992 and
1998) it remains the most popular, being used as the mainstay of the World
Bank’s recent work on aid effectiveness, Assessing Aid.
The World Bank report argued that aid could increase growth, but only when
policies were right. The introduction of this focus on policies only serves to
introduce additional problems, so that it is difficult to agree with the World
Bank’s findings on the basis of their econometric evidence (these arguments
are elaborated in Lensink and White, 1999, see also Hansen and Tarp, 1999),
although, as seen in Chapter 3, the evidence from the evaluation does support
similar arguments.
The fact that the results from a large-scale World Bank research programme
into aid effectiveness command weak support illustrates the difficulty of coming
to firm conclusions in this area. Rather than the regression approach, the
evaluation uses country-level studies which trace how programme aid has
affected certain macroeconomic aggregates, such as imports and government
spending, and thus infers an impact on growth. The evaluation team believe
that this approach yields more robust conclusions. We would be the first to
admit to some of the weaknesses in this approach, but believe that it allows us
to say the most that can be said.
A final point to note here is that it has been argued in the literature (e.g.
White, 1992) that the macro effects of different types of aid will differ – and
this is of course the point of PA! In practice, however, it is often difficult to get
accounts which allow the separate identification of PA. Where possible this90
has been done, but much of the empirical analysis remains at the level of aid
as a whole.
Gap filling versus marginal impact
Much of the discussion of the macroeconomic impact of aid has been
dominated by the two gap model and the notion of gap filling. Gap filling is
not a useful way to conceptualise aid’s macroeconomic impact, and should be
replaced by an analysis of the marginal impact of the aid funds.
The two gap model has been a powerful force in the macroeconomics of aid,
and the related concept of the financing gap has been important in
programming programme aid. Yet many economists claim that there are no
gaps. Here it is argued that, whilst it is so that there are no gaps in an objective
sense, the idea of lack of aid being a constraint on growth (which was the
motivation for the two gap model) can be defended. But the identification of
those constraints means that the most important issue is the impact of aid on
the aggregates which determine growth, so that this should be the focus of
our analysis.
First it is necessary to remind ourselves of what the two gap model was. The
core of the model was the Harrod-Domar equation in which capital
accumulation is the sole constraint on growth. To grow a country needs
investment. There are two constraints on investment:2 investible resources,
i.e. savings, and investment goods which have to be imported and so require
forex. Hence there is a savings gap and a trade (forex) gap and aid can
simultaneously fill both these gaps. But where is the “gap”? The gap comes
from choosing a target rate of growth, which thus implies a required investment
rate, which in turn implies a level of savings and a level of imports. If domestic
savings are not sufficient there is a savings gaps, and if export earnings are
insufficient there is a trade gap. The binding constraint is the larger of these
two and aid will have to fill this larger gap if the target growth rate is to be
achieved. Hence, and this is the important point, the gaps only exist with
reference to a target rate of growth. In the words of the literature, the gaps
are ex ante as the ex post (actual) gaps can only be what the aid allows them to
be: if there were no aid there would be no gap. Aid is gap creating rather than
gap filling.3 In the absence of capital inflows imports must equal exports and
so the gap will close through some sort of adjustment (either price or quantity).
Figure 5.1 illustrates this argument. Vietnam in 1992 had no current account
deficit: imports and exports were equal.4 The following year, when capital
flows restarted, it had one of US$ 1.4 billion. Simply put, if aid is used to
increase imports it will worsen the current account and if aid is used to increase
government expenditure it will worsen the government deficit. It is not unusual
to find statements bemoaning large deficits in countries with large aid inflows.
But these deficits must appear by virtue of the fact of receiving aid.91
Figure 5.1 Exports, imports and inflows for Vietnam
But the gaps created by aid may not only result in increased imports, investment
and government expenditure. Other variables may adjust to accommodate
the aid inflow. The accounting approach adopted in our analysis (see White,
1998) allows for the fact that other variables, such as exports and taxes may
also be affected. Most variables which will be affected mean that aid will still
have a gap creating effect (the exception being if aid is added to reserves).
A second caveat to this discussion is whether the current account and the
government deficit is reported before and after grants (official transfers). This
apparently technical distinction is of considerable practical importance, as
Table 5.1 illustrates with respect to government expenditure.
Table 5.1  Impact of aid on government deficit with and without spending limits
No aid Aid Aid with spending limit
on deficit before grants
Revenue 60 60 60
Expenditure 80 100 80
Aid 0 20 20
Deficit (before grants) 20 40 20
Deficit (after grants) 20 20 0
The first column shows the government account in the absence of aid.
Expenditure exceeds revenue by 20 units. In the second column there is an
2 The seminal paper of Chenery and Strout (1966) also mentioned the “capacity to invest” but it was
given lesser importance and ignored in most subsequent work.
3 Of course, aid simultaneously provides the resources to “fill” the gap. But for concessional loans, a gap
will appear in the external current account and the governments accounts (as it will in these accounts
before grants for the case of grant aid).
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aid flow of 20 units which is all spent. Expenditure rises by 20 units so that the
deficit before grants (expenditure minus revenue) rises by the same amount,
illustrating the gap creating nature of aid. The deficit after grants, which
adds aid to the revenue side, is unaffected – which is a more accurate picture
of the government’s fiscal performance. It would be wrong to take the increase
in the deficit before grants as an indicator of fiscal laxity, as it simply reflects
the fact that the government is spending the aid it receives. If the spending
limit is set with respect to the deficit before grants then the aid money cannot
be spent. Suppose the aid flow comes in with a condition that the deficit
before grants must not increase – hence expenditure cannot go up, nor revenue
go down. The last column of Table 5.1 shows this situation. So what has
happened to the money? The last line shows that the deficit after grants is
zero, which tells us that the aid has offset deficit financing (and so had an anti-
inflationary effect). This can be a useful role for aid to play, and is often the
intended consequence of the countervalue from programme aid. But the same
mechanism is at play with project aid in the presence of such a spending
limit, meaning that if donor projects go ahead they are crowding out other
expenditure choices of government. This issue has been much discussed in
Mozambique – where the need for spending for reconstruction was felt to be
great, but that IMF spending limits prevented donors financing this.5
The purpose of the two gap model of Chenery and Strout was to calculate
aid requirements (and the allocation of that aid) to achieve 5 per cent growth.
The two gap model may be criticised for being excessively structuralist6 – in
that case the model may be modified (or discarded and a new one built) but
the original rationale remain intact. That is, we construct a macroeconomic
model with aid flows as an exogenous variable, and for which higher aid delivers
higher rates of growth. A base run of the model may tell us that without aid
the economy would grow at 2 per cent, and simulations will allow us to
determine the required level of aid to achieve a 5 per cent growth rate. This
story may rather test our modelling capabilities, but the implication of the
logic of the argument is that what we should be looking at is the marginal
impact of aid on growth (and the channels through which this occurs) rather
than the gaps.
Recasting our approach to aid also allows the incorporation of other ways in
which aid can increase growth. The two gap model focuses on imports and
investment, but a number of the country studies suggest that programme
aid’s link to growth does not come through this traditional route of supporting
imports and investment, but by supporting stabilisation. Programme aid can
help stabilisation by providing a non-inflationary form of finance and through
its role in exchange rate management. In the case of the former, government
does not use the aid to either increase expenditure or reduce taxes but to
offset deficit financing. Alternatively, if the country has imposed a deficit cap
(e.g. a cash budget, which does not allow expenditure to exceed revenue
5 Within the last year the IMF has adopted a more flexible approach in some countries (e.g. Uganda).
6 A structuralist economic model is one which accords little or no role to the market mechanism (prices).93
collected) then programme aid will allow expenditure to rise without violating
that rule.7, 8 The question then is how to determine the ways in which aid has
been used. It is to this issue that we now turn.
5.3 Analysing marginal impact: methodology
The economic impact of funds and policy is perhaps best judged through a
modelling approach that allows for estimation of a counterfactual. Modelling
was rejected at the outset for this evaluation. Econometric estimation of
meaningful economic relationships at the required level of disaggregation is
virtually impossible for the countries under consideration; certainly in the
context of this evaluation, and possibly at all, given the frequency of structural
breaks. This evaluation develops two approaches.
The first is an ad hoc approach which starts by identifying aid in a consistent
set of internal (government finance) and external accounts (balance of
payments). From that starting point a “no aid” counterfactual set of accounts
is constructed. Chapter 1 rightly warned about the difficulties of obtaining
the counterfactual. The analysis of the impact of funds is the area where this
can be done with the most confidence, and the approach adopted here certainly
gives some idea of the order of magnitude of aid’s effects. However, precise
behavioural functions cannot be identified. Where possible PA is separately
identified, though this can rarely be done with any confidence. Throughout
this evaluation the PA of all donors is considered, as it is not in general sensible
to attempt to separate out Swedish aid.9 This methodology was previously
applied to Zambia by Mwanawina and White (1995) and Ghana by Sowa
and White (1996). This evaluation thus extends the analysis to seven more
countries, and updates that for Zambia.10 a
The second approach in this evaluation is to analyse the under-explored issue
of the link between PA and stabilisation. This is a virtually new area of analysis,
and the evaluation results are suggestive of the route that future methodological
developments could take.
7 This point is the motivation for the third gap of the three gap model, though that model also requires
the assumption of crowding in so that government spending can become the binding constraint on
growth.
8 However, there are two possible cases when this advantage of programme aid may not be realised: (1) if
the deficit limit is set before grants, which has been the IMF norm, or (2) if budget support is disbursed
after government has agreed an expenditure programme which made no allowance for the programme
aid inflow (in which case revenue will fall if there is no deficit to offset). Under the Sector Programme
approach, governments are expected to make multi-year expenditure plans whereas programme aid flows
are uncertain – under such circumstances the inflow cannot be expected to result in incremental
expenditures.
9 The two exceptions to this statement are the discussion of modalities (Chapter 1) and in identifying a
unique bilateral influence (Chapter 3).
10a The “SASDA studies” reported in White (1998) used the same accounting framework as a starting
point, but did not attempt to construct counterfactuals.94
The accounting framework and counterfactual accounts
We can analyse marginal impact in three areas: external account, internal
account and government finance; the last being a sub-set of the second and the
one which receives the greater attention. The starting point for the analysis is
the accounting identity, which is summarised in the three columns in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2  Accounting identities for the analysis of aid impact
External balance Internal balance Disaggregated internal balance
+ Exports + Savings + Government Revenue
+ Official transfers + Private savings
+ Private transfers
– Imports – Investment – Government expenditure
– Interest payments – Private investment
Equals Equals Equals
– Long-term capital – Long-term capital – Long-term capital
– Other capital – Other capital – Other capital
– Change in reserves – Change in reserves – Change in reserves
– Errors and omissions – Errors and omissions – Errors and omissions
– Official transfers – Official transfers
The external account column shows the current account in the top half and
the capital account plus financing (reserves) in the bottom half. With the
exception that official transfers (OT) are added in the second two columns,
the bottom half remains the same throughout, which is indicative of the link
in accommodation of an aid inflow between the three accounts. This link will
become apparent as we discuss each in turn.
Aid flows may be either grants (official transfers) or concessional loans, which
appear in long-term loans. The balance of payments of most countries do
not distinguish between concessional and non-concessional funds, so that aid
cannot be identified exactly. However, for most low-income countries, the
majority of long-term inflows will be aid (although short term and FDI, which
are under other capital inflows, will be private). Hence the expression “aid”
here refers to grants plus long-term capital. The capital inflows are shown in
Table 5.2 in net terms. In practice our analysis will use gross inflows, and
classify amortisation with interest payments as debt service (DS).
The first column of Table 5.2 could thus be written as:
M = AID + PCT – DS + X + OKI + DR + EO10b (5.1)
10b M Imports
PCT Private Capital Transfers
DS Debt Service
X Exports
OKI Other Capital Inflows
DR Change in Reserves
EO Error and Omissions95
What this identity shows is that if aid increases then one of the other items in
the identity must change. This change could be an equivalent increase in
imports, but it may also be higher debt service, an increase in reserves (which
is a negative DR), or reducing exports or other capital inflows (or EO may
change if this captures capital flight). The identity we observe will be that
once all effects have worked through – so whilst it is easier to think about first
round effects, there will be second and further rounds (such as feedback through
income effects) which will complicate the picture.
Table 5.3  Monitoring aid impact through the accounting identity
External balance Internal balance Disaggregated internal balance
Aid 100 Aid 100 Aid 100
Equals Equals Equals
Imports 60 Investment 50 Government expenditure 40
Private investment 10
Debt service 20 Debt service 20 Debt service 20
OKI –5 OKI –5 OKI –5
Reserves –5 Reserves –5 Reserves –5
Exports –10 Savings –20 Government revenue –10
Private savings –10
Table 5.3 shows one possible set of outcomes. Two points to note here are: (1)
the table should be read as showing marginal impacts: that is higher aid of
100 results in an incremental increase in imports of 60 etc.; and (2) the signs
show if a variable rises or falls (remembering that a negative sign on reserves
is an increase in reserves) so that the items below the line don’t add to 100,
since those with a negative sign are being reduced to accommodate the aid
inflow (but the absolute values do sum to 100).
The results shown here suggest that 20 of the 100 pays debt service (that
wouldn’t have been paid anyway), and five each reduce other capital inflows
and the draw down of reserves. Exports fall by 10 on account of Dutch disease
effects, leaving 60 to increase imports.
The 30 used for debt service, reserves and offsetting other capital inflows are
common to all three accounts, thus providing a link between them. Given
what was observed on the external account, we know that there are 70 units
to be spread over higher investment and savings displacement (although the
relative degrees of export displacement and higher imports do not necessarily
correspond in their amounts, though the two will be linked through the
behavioural equations which reflect the relative import intensities of investment
and consumption). As shown here, investment rises by 50 and savings fall 20.
The same 30 units of course carry over to the disaggregated internal account,
and in this case the changes in savings and investment must correspond to
those observed in the public and private sectors. We see also in these accounts96
the reduction in the public sector deficit, which is the key to stabilisation
(basically the countervalue from programme aid was used to finance
expenditures that would have occurred anyway, thus allowing stabilisation to
be achieved).
It may seem that the argument has been approached “from the wrong end”,
since the funds come to government, and so we should start with the
disaggregated internal account and work from there. There is some merit in
this argument, but it should not be over-stated for two reasons: (1) there is not
an exact correspondence in the accommodation mechanism in the internal
and external accounts (the mix of savings-investment and exports-imports
adjustment can vary), and (2) the government decision making process is the
first round effect. An important exception against this argument is where the
aid is wholly or mostly used to pay incremental debt service, in which case
there can be no other effects.11
Consider another example, starting this time with the disaggregated internal
account. Suppose government decides to use an inflow of 100 to pay an
additional 25 of debt service, not borrow 10 that it would have done from
private sources and let reserves be 5 higher than they otherwise would have
been. It further decides to increase expenditure by 40 and leave revenue
unchanged.12 Twenty (20) units are thus available to offset deficit financing,
that is in the absence of aid there would have had to be a private surplus of
20 to transfer to the public sector which is no longer required, this can thus
either allow private investment to rise or savings may fall. These figures may
be translated directly to the aggregated internal account. To construct the
external account, it is known that 60 are available to increase imports or reduce
exports, but not the breakdown between the two.
An illustration: the case of Mozambique’s balance of payments
The method used depends on (1) obtaining a consistent set of balance of
payments data and from them calculating the course and uses of forex; (2)
identifying major items which may be responsible for major changes; (3)
observing behaviour in periods when there have been large increases or drops
in aid, or before and after major step changes in aid; and (4) estimating a
counterfactual sources and uses in the absence of aid. This procedure is
illustrated with the example of Mozambique (Tables 5.4 and 5.5).
A first point to note is that arrears have been accumulated in every year except
1992, when they were reduced by $222 million. That year saw a large increase
in debt relief (of $280 million compared to the previous year and $450 million
higher than the following two years), and the settlement of arrears is directly
attributable to this higher debt relief. Non-aid inflows in 1992 were not
11 More accurately, there can be no other levels effects, there can be composition effects if donors use
debt relief to influence the composition of government expenditure
12 Since the aid inflow must affect the tax base there is unlikely to be any real world case in which the
revenue effect is zero: this is the distinction between initial and final effects.97
sufficient even to meet current debt service (without any imports at all) so
domestic resources could clearly not have been used to settle arrears. If the
country had received the aid actually received in that year apart from debt
relief then, if all current debt service obligations had been met (not including
the settlement of arrears), imports would have to have been cut to less than
half that actual level, thus reaffirming the idea that arrears would not have
been settled without this relief.
Table 5.4  Balance of payments ($ millions) (Mozambique)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Exports of goods, services, and income 365.1 362.0 371.7 395.4 470.5
   Merchandise exports 162.3 139.3 131.8 149.5 169.0
   Service exports 202.8 222.7 239.9 245.9 301.5
Imports of goods, services, and income 1211.2 1210.4 1321.2 1427.1 1254.2
   Merchandise imports 898.8 855.0 954.7 1018.5 783.6
   Service imports 312.4 355.4 366.5 408.6 470.6
Net current transfers 609.3 610.4 628.3 702.1 439.2
   Official current transfers, 501.7 499.4 503.3 564.6 339.2
      Official current transfers, payments 0 0 0 0 0
      Official current transfers, receipts 501.7 499.4 503.3 564.6 339.2
   Private current transfers, net 107.6 111 125 137.5 100
Current account balance -236.8 -238.0 -321.2 -329.6 -344.5
Capital account -187.5 -155.1 -107.0 -22.1 60.6
   Foreign borrowing 144.1 169.8 185.5 260.3 282.3
   Amortization 354.1 350.2 324.5 317.4 266.7
   Direct investment 22.5 25.3 32.0 35.0 45.0
Short-term and EO -33.6 -13.5 -8.1 10.4 -4
Overall balance -457.9 -406.6 -436.3 -341.3 -287.9
Financing 457.9 406.6 436.3 341.3 287.9
    Change in arrears 85.7 -222.2 177.8 161.3 233.4
    Increase in assets 15.9 106.3 -13 58.4 69.1
    Increase in liabilities 3.2 66.5 33.2 6.0 9.5
    Debt relief 384.9 668.6 212.3 232.4 114.1
Source: country report.
Looking across the period, if all inflows (official transfers, borrowing and debt
relief) were zero then available resources would never have been sufficient to
meet the import bill, and would have in all years (but 1995) been less than, or
close to, debt service. Thus, if there had been no aid then imports would have
had to fall even if no debt had been paid. Of course it is more likely that the
impact of not having aid would have been spread across both imports and98
debt service. To consider the respective impacts it is useful to look at the two
years which have seen a large change in total aid flows: 1991–92 and 1994–
95.
Aid rose by over $300 million from 1991 to 1992; this increase was mostly
debt relief with a mild rise in borrowing and official transfers keeping the
same level. The largest change in the uses of forex in this year was the settlement
of arrears already discussed and debt relief also rose. Imports in fact fell slightly.
It thus appears that the higher aid was used to finance both current and past
obligations on debt and not on imports. This view is reinforced by consideration
of the years 1994–95 when aid fell by nearly $350 million. Actual debt service
(debt service minus arrears accumulation) fell by $60 million, but a far larger
change was a fall in imports of $235 million.
Table 5.5 Sources and uses of forex (US$ millions) (Mozambique)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Sources
Exports 365 362 372 395 471
FDI 23 25 32 35 45
Aid 984 1285 939 1015 672
Increase in arrears 86 0 178 161 233
Private transfers 108 111 125 138 100
Total 1565 1783 1646 1745 1521
Uses
Imports 899 855 955 1019 784
Debt service 667 706 691 726 737
Payment of arrears 0 222 0 0 0
Total 1565 1783 1646 1745 1521
Memo items
Actual debt service 581 706 513 565 504
As a percentage of total uses
Exports 23 20 23 23 31
Official transfers plus borrowing 38 35 44 45 37
Debt service 43 40 42 42 48
Debt relief and arrears/debt service 71 95 56 54 47
Source: Table 5.4.
These considerations can be used to construct some tentative counterfactual
scenarios for imports and debt performance in the absence of any aid (Table
5.6). The first two scenarios show two extremes: in the first, debt payments
are slashed to 10 per cent of their actual level, whereas in the second all
available resources are devoted in the first instance to meeting debt obligations.
Even in the case when debt payments are more or less halted then, in the
absence of aid, Mozambique would have had to halve the level of its imports
in every year but 1995 – and arrears accumulation would have been over five
times greater than actually occurred. If it attempted to meet all its debt99
obligations then imports would have had to be reduced to nothing (or close to
it). The reality would be somewhere between these two extremes, which is
captured by scenario 3. In this scenario the foreign exchange constraint is
relaxed somewhat by allowing some borrowing and assuming improved export
performance on account of the more depreciated exchange rate in the absence
of aid. Nonetheless, imports are less 40–50 per cent their actual level of 1991–
94, and 3.5 times as many arrears would have been accumulated than was
actually the case.
Table 5.6 Counterfactual imports and arrears accumulation
Imports Arrears
accumulated
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1991–95
                   US$ millions
Scenario 1 437 428 477 511 565 3462
Scenario 2 0 0 16 3 112 1173
Scenario 3 264 163 386 405 533 2291
                     As a per cent of actual
Scenario 1 49 50 50 50 72 526
Scenario 2 0 0 2 0 14 178
Scenario 3 29 19 40 40 68 348
                     Marginal impact
Scenario 1 0.47 0.33 0.51 0.50 0.33 ..
Scenario 2 0.91 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 ..
Scenario 3 0.64 0.54 0.61 0.60 0.37 ..
Source: calculated from Table 5.5.
The overall counterfactual indicates the importance of aid as an order of
magnitude: what is the impact on imports of having no aid at all? The
counterfactual results may also be used to calculate the marginal impact of
aid on imports, i.e. how much do imports rise for a one dollar increase in
aid?13 These results are also shown in Table 5.6. Unsurprisingly, when the
country is trying to meet its debt obligations (scenario 2) then there is a greater
marginal impact on imports. By contrast, under scenario 1, since some aid
goes to debt service there is a lesser impact on imports. The intermediate
scenario suggests that typically a little over half of aid goes to finance higher
imports – in the case of the Mozambique, most of the rest is going to pay
external debt.
The data for this analysis come from national sources in the case of the
countries in which fieldwork was undertaken, and international ones in other
cases. The standard international sources, such as World Development Indicators,
13 The marginal impact is calculated as the difference between actual imports and counterfactual imports,
expressed as a ratio to total aid in that year. This formula gives the average propensity to import out of
aid funds, which is equal to the marginal propensity for behavioural functions passing through the origin.100
which it had been planned to use, were not much relied upon as some series
were not available and the most recent year was too distant a date. Rather
IMF and World Bank documents have been used in most cases, with some
additional data from the Economist Intelligence Unit country reports.
As already mentioned, the analysis frequently has to be conducted at the level
of total aid, rather than just PA. Since much PA is de jure free resources it may
be expected to have a rather different impact to project aid, which can have
varying degrees of fungibility. PA is less likely to result in incremental
expenditure, especially where spending limits are restricting the utilisation of
aid funds – and so more likely to offset deficit financing or be added to reserves.
PA is also more likely to be linked to debt payment (and the analysis below is
able to establish a link from debt relief to debt payment).
Stabilisation effects14
The Inception Report for this evaluation (White 1998), proposed to analyse
the impact of programme aid flows on stabilisation by looking at the effect of
this aid on the money supply, or high-powered money (see also Bruton and
Hill, 1990). If all countervalue funds are spent by the government, the budget
deficit remains the same as does the money supply, while the deficit falls if not
all countervalue is spent (Table 5.7). And if all programme aid is used for
imports (or capital flight) the money supply will remain the same, while it will
increase if part of the aid money is added to reserves. Depending on these
two dichotomies, there are four scenarios. Programme aid may be inflationary,
deflationary or neutral (if positive and negative effects cancel each other out).
14 This section was written by Geske Dijkstra.
In the case of Mozambique a little over half of aid goes to finance higher imports most
of the rest is going to pay external debt. Workers at the harbour in Beira, Mozambique.
Photo A.F.P /Pressens Bild.101
All this of course assumes that budget deficits cannot be financed in non-
inflationary ways, for example by borrowing on the domestic capital market
or by other external capital inflows. Out of the eight case study countries,
only in Bangladesh is the domestic capital market sufficiently developed for
domestic borrowing to be possible. In one other case, that of Nicaragua, private
capital flows played a role in financing the deficit but only since 1997 (see also
below). In the other countries, and in Nicaragua before 1997, it is realistic to
assume that if deficits come about that cannot be financed by aid (but see
below), they will be monetised.
Table 5.7  Effect of counterpart funds on high-powered money
Reserves
Constant Increase by value of CF
Falls by value Decrease by CF No effect
Government of CF (Scenario A) (Scenario B)
deficit
Constant (all No effect Increase by CF
CF “spent”) (Scenario C) (Scenario D)
Note: CF is counterpart funds; government deficit includes receipt of CF as a plus item.
Source: based on Bruton and Hill (1991: 31, Table A).
Apart from this qualification, there are two major problems with establishing
the stabilisation impact according to the above framework. First, the relation
between money supply and inflation is more complex than the simple quantity
theory of money assumes. The well known equation of the quantity theory
of money holds:
M v = P Y (5.2)
where M is the money stock, v the income velocity of money, P the price level,
and Y (national) income. It has been shown that in the long run, there is a
positive relationship between M and P (as is the central thesis of the
monetarists). However, in the short run, equation (5.2) should be read as a
behavioural equation. The relation between M and P only holds if v and Y
are constant. If programme aid results in a lower v, that is, a higher money
demand, an increase in M does not necessarily lead to a higher P. The overall
effect of programme aid on inflation reduction may then be positive, even if
the stock of money increases. (Note: the same happens if Y increases more
than M). It is shown below that one of the likely positive contributions of
programme aid is precisely to increase demand for domestic currency.
A second problem is that of establishing whether countervalue funds (or budget
support) leads to additional expenditure, and whether programme aid leads to
additional imports. In many cases this is not the relevant issue for the stabilisation
impact. On the external side, all countries in our evaluation now have a
liberalised foreign exchange market. Programme aid will then just add to the102
supply of foreign exchange. The private sector decides on the use of this
foreign exchange. There is no explicit government decision making involved.
Of course, the Central Bank usually targets for a certain stock of foreign reserves.
But it can be assumed to do this anyway, irrespective of the origin of the
supply of foreign exchange.
The analysis with respect to government expenditure is in one aspect similar,
and in another, different from the analysis of the external accounts. It is
different in that there is explicit government decision making on all expenditure.
But it is similar in that programme aid just adds to government revenues,
albeit that part of it may be earmarked to specific expenditure. Whether or
not conditions are set for the use of the countervalue (or for the budget support),
or whether or not debt relief is given for debt payments that would have been
made anyway, will determine whether or not programme aid leads to additional
expenditure. If there is equivalent additional expenditure the impact of
programme aid on stabilisation will be neutral, but if there is a less than one-
for-one impact on expenditure the stabilisation impact will be positive since
the budget deficit will be reduced.
However, this reasoning assumes that governments are not committed to
avoiding inflationary financing of the deficit, or, even more generally, that
they do not target for certain levels of expenditure, revenues, or the deficit.
Some of our countries studied, however, apply a cash budget (Tanzania,
Uganda and Zambia), and others are supposed to stick to expenditure limits
(Nicaragua and Mozambique). In these countries the stabilisation effect does
not depend on whether or not conditions are set for the budget support. In
the presence of these conditions, budget support may replace (or “crowd out”)
“own” government spending, as donors have been well aware in Mozambique.
There is no impact on the money supply or stabilisation, but there may be a
growth effect depending on the type of spending that increases as compared
to the spending that is crowded out.
However, if governments are committed to not having inflationary financing
of budget deficits, the stabilisation effect of programme aid does depend on
another characteristic of it, namely its predictability. If the government knows
the amounts of (programme) aid in advance, programme aid can be taken as
part of revenues, and expenditure can be planned in accordance with this
total income. A sudden fall in programme aid will either lead to inflationary
financing or to ad hoc cuts in spending, which are probably not welfare
enhancing. A sudden increase in programme aid is less harmful from a
stabilisation point of view, but may be equally bad for growth since ad hoc
spending decisions will not enhance the best use of resources.
So what then is the impact of programme aid on stabilisation? Programme
aid may have three different effects; two through the external accounts and
one through the internal account. In the first place, it allows more imports
than would otherwise have been possible. In an inflationary economy, i.e. an
economy where demand tends to exceed supply, the increased imports have a
dampening effect on the domestic price level. This effect is reinforced if the103
exchange rate is fixed and somewhat overvalued: foreign prices will then be
lower than domestic prices. In Nicaragua, for example, a fixed exchange rate
was introduced in 1991 after a period of a floating rate. The exchange rate
served as a “nominal anchor” in order to combat inflation. In this very open
and highly dollarised economy, fixing the exchange rate immediately stopped
inflation. Although policies were different, the same price dampening effect
of programme aid was visible in Uganda and in many other African countries
during the period of the gradual liberalisation of the exchange rate. In these
countries, the exchange rate was already fixed before programme aid came
in. It remained fixed after, although devaluation took place. But programme
aid allowed a liberalisation of the foreign exchange market with much less
devaluation (and thus price increases) than would otherwise have been the
case.
The second effect of programme aid is its impact on the markets for domestic
currency and foreign exchange. Expectations play an important role in the
relative demand for domestic and foreign currency. If people expect a
devaluation or high inflation, they will demand more foreign currency and
will sell domestic currency as soon as possible. This means the income velocity
of demand for local money will be high. The use of the exchange rate as a
nominal anchor requires a certain level of foreign reserves. It will take some
time before this policy becomes credible, and demand for foreign currency
will not decrease immediately. Reserves are needed in order to maintain the
exchange rate. If these reserves are available, inflationary expectations will
diminish and people will be more willing to hold domestic currency. This
means that the v (the income velocity of money) declines. The reserves needed
to maintain the fixed exchange rate may be supplied by a boom in exports or
other foreign income, by private capital inflows, or by foreign aid. However,
in most of our countries foreign aid was the only feasible option.
The third effect of programme aid is through the reduction of inflationary
financing of the government deficit. In the short term, it is often very difficult
to make the large cuts in the budget deficit that are needed for inflation
reduction. With programme aid, no such large cuts have to be made since
expenditure can be financed from foreign grants or loans. Programme aid
solves this immediate problem and then facilitates a gradual process towards
increasing taxes and/or decreasing expenditure. In some of our countries,
however, the budget deficit hardly shrank, i.e. the external financing of it
continued. But this may not be a bad thing: it depends on the feasibility, and
the growth effects of increasing taxes, and on the growth enhancing effects of
government spending. Several of our country case studies conclude that
government expenditure should not be reduced and that aid should continue
to finance part of it.
At first sight, it may be concluded from this analysis that once inflation is
under control, programme aid is mainly important for growth: it leads to a
higher import level and a higher level of government spending which are
supposed to be growth enhancing. However, even if governments are104
committed to a low inflation, or if they are complying to IMF spending limits,
programme aid may still influence expectations and therefore the supply and
demand for domestic and foreign currency (the second contribution of
programme aid). In addition, the predictability and stability of programme
aid is important. If programme aid is suddenly reduced, inflation may spring
up again either because budget expenditure and revenues cannot be adjusted
rapidly enough and part of the resulting deficit is financed by printing money,
and/or because the reduction in aid leads to an expected devaluation. This
may explain why inflation in Zambia is still rather high. The reduction in
programme aid in around 1995 increased expectations of a more rapid
devaluation. That in itself is sufficient for raising the demand for foreign
currency and lowering it for domestic currency, thus leading to higher inflation
and more rapid devaluation. A more structural problem in this country is the
fact that programme aid is used for financing multilateral debt service. It cannot
be used for price-reducing increases in imports.
In summary, PA’s impact on stablisation depends on how it affects imports,
the exchange rate (and perceptions of the credibility of exchange rate policy)
and government expenditure. The next section addresses the first of these.
5.4 Aid’s impact on the external account
The ultimate objective is to establish the impact of PA on growth, and hence
on poverty. The conceptual framework in Chapter 1 (and the discussion of
the impact of reforms in Chapter 4) laid out various determinants of growth,
so the purpose here is to see how aid has affected these. The external account
is examined first, establishing the extent to which aid has increased imports
and reduced the debt overhang.
The analysis focuses on imports and debt service. These are the largest uses
of forex and where aid may be expected to have the most impact. This is not
to say that reserves are unaffected – the counterfactual situation is almost
certainly higher with aid than without it (a link to reserves is noted in some
cells of the summary table discussed below), and this effect will be stronger
for programme aid than project aid. Moreover, as just explained in the previous
section, this use of aid can have important beneficial macroeconomic
consequences.
Another theoretical possibility is that aid substitutes for private capital flows.
Other than short-term borrowing (and that substitution is a good thing) this
possibility is unlikely to be the case. Rather to the contrary, successful economies
such as Uganda and Vietnam are seeing growing inflows of both DFI and
remittances – and it can plausibly be argued that aid, over the medium-term,
has helped stimulate these flows. The less successful countries would be unlikely
to be able to access foreign investment to take the place of the aid.
The previous section laid out four ways in which the sources and uses of forex
could be analysed. Table 5.8 summarises this analysis for the eight countries.
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 provide more detail of the counterfactual analysis.105
The cases clearly divide in two ways which influence the extent and nature of
aid’s impact on the external account: (1) those with a large external debt and
those with a lesser debt burden – Bangladesh and Cape Verde are clearly in
the latter category, and Vietnam and to an extent Uganda have larger debt
but it has not dominated the uses of forex); (2) those in which aid is a dominant
source of forex and those in which it is relatively unimportant – aid is very
important in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, it has become less so in
Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Uganda and Vietnam (as exports and other inflows
have grown in all three) with this decline being recent in Uganda and Nicaragua
and most marked in Vietnam; Cape Verde lies in the middle with aid being
important but not dominant (remittances are the main source of forex).15
The second of these points is listed in the first row of the table.
The number of countries in our sample which appear to be “weaning
themselves off aid” deserves to be underlined. It contrasts with a general global
rise in indicators such as aid per capita and aid to GNP (see Lensink and
White, 1999b) and refutes the view (as historically has Korea and more recently
Botswana) that large aid flows necessarily create a situation in which other
sources of forex will be neither sought nor forthcoming.
The second row identifies particular items that stand out from the balance of
payments. These are nearly all cases of debt relief, often paid by donors to
clear arrears with the IFIs so that a new programme could begin: Figure 5.2
illustrates this case for Nicaragua with a peak in both debt payments and debt
relief in 1996. As a variation on this theme, the Zambian Rights Accumulation
Programme (RAP) was debt relief in disguise: by staying on track Zambia
accumulated the right to borrow from the IMF an amount equivalent to its
outstanding arrears to the Fund. Hence when it qualified for a new ESAF
these funds were immediately repaid to the IMF. These special cases establish
a clear link between substantial debt relief and debt repayment at levels which
could not be afforded by the country alone – as the counterfactual analyses
show, attempts to do so would in some years have compressed imports to
zero!
In the other five countries – Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Uganda
and Zambia – aid’s magnitude is such that a clear link can be established with
imports, and any reduction in aid could lead to quite dramatic import
compression (Table 5.9), although this link has weakened in Nicaragua and
Uganda in recent years. As explained in section 5.3, the increase in goods
availability from higher imports will check inflation.
15 Though in Nicaragua at least, aid is being replaced by volatile, high interest rate (and consequently
high-risk) capital inflows.106










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16 If the net effect of “no aid” on other inflows is negative, then the marginal impact can exceed unity.
Table 5.9  Counterfactual imports as a per cent of actual imports
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Bangladesh Minimum 64 71 74 81 82 81 87 ..
Maximum 73 81 84 91 91 88 98 ..
Cape Verde Minimum .. 63 60 65 70 70 70 74
Maximum .. 79 68 70 73 80 73 87
Mozambique Minimum .. 0 0 2 0 14 .. ..
Maximum .. 49 50 50 50 72 .. ..
Nicaragua1 Minimum 25 -24 5 0 23 30 51 46
Maximum 32 25 25 37 50 64 69 62
Nicaragua2 Minimum 51 -32 31 64 58 63 78 72
Maximum 58 -32 30 62 48 59 72 72
Tanzania Minimum .. 39. 49 63 56 56 -3 ..
Maximum .. 69. 83 100 90 94 74 ..
Uganda Minimum 4 -1 -7 19 44 41 50 38
Maximum 40 51 23 40 58 52 60 45
Vietnam Minimum 80 92 78 74 79 84 90 92
Maximum 85 104 93 88 88 89 92 96
Zambia2 Minimum .. 30 63 83 74 -6 83 ..
Maximum .. .. 100 137 124 103 97 ..
Notes: 1/ calculation for total aid; 2/ for PA only. Source: country reports.
The third and fourth lines try to capture how imports and debt service (and
sometimes reserves) have responded to changes in aid. The counterfactuals
summarised in the fourth row, and reported in the two tables below, have
been constructed in various ways, but with key common elements. One
simulation is to assume that all debt service obligations would be met in the
absence of aid and debt relief. Imports are then calculated as a residual (as
sources minus the sum of all other uses of forex). This simulation results in
the largest impact on imports – if aid is paying for all of debt service and
some of the import bill then the results can show negative imports in the
absence of aid. If the simulation is constructed exactly as stated here then the
marginal impact of aid on imports will appear to be unity (as is sometimes the
case in Table 10). However, most the simulations assumed some other effects,
for example (1) without aid export growth may be a little higher; (2) FDI may
be lower;16 and (3) reserves may be run down to a greater extent (and certainly
will not be accumulated where this had happened). A second common
simulation is impose a debt moratorium – the impact of imports is now less as
some of the aid will go to debt service. If aid was insufficient to pay debt
service, counterfactual imports can be higher than actual under this scenario.
The Zambia results considered both quantity adjustment and market clearing.
The market clearing results showed that exports would indeed increase in the
absence of aid, but the required depreciation of the RER was very substantial
(possibly over 100 per cent) which casts doubt on the feasibility of such a
solution. In most cases the analysis covers all aid, though for Nicaragua and
Zambia PA is covered.109
Table 5.10  Marginal impact of aid on imports
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Bangladesh Minimum 0.74 0.60 0.63 0.53 0.61 0.96 0.65 ..
Maximum 0.55 0.39 0.40 0.26 0.33 0.62 0.09 ..
Cape Verde Minimum .. 1.21 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Maximum .. 0.69 0.80 0.86 0.89 0.67 0.88 0.48
Mozambique Minimum .. 0.91 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 .. ..
Maximum .. 0.47 0.33 0.51 0.50 0.33 .. ..
Nicaragua1 Minimum 0.74 0.33 0.78 0.98 0.51 0.26 0.09 0.68
Maximum 0.67 0.20 0.61 0.61 0.33 0.13 0.06 0.48
Nicaragua2 Minimum 0.68 0.93 0.99 1.58 0.79 0.91 0.70 1.46
Maximum 0.58 0.93 1.00 1.68 0.99 0.99 0.88 1.46
Tanzania Minimum .. 0.63 0.54 0.33 0.44 0.34 0.24 ..
Maximum .. 0.51 0.29 0.00 0.23 0.15 0.26 ..
Uganda Minimum 1.04 0.99 0.96 1.02 0.92 1.18 1.05 1.25
Maximum 0.65 0.48 0.69 0.76 0.68 0.96 0.84 1.11
Vietnam Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Maximum 0.71 -0.46 0.33 0.47 0.55 0.68 0.78 0.50
Zambia Minimum .. 0.76 0.46 0.27 0.51 0.82 0.45 ..
Maximum .. .. 0.00 -0.57 -0.48 -0.03 0.08 ..
Notes: 1/ calculation for total aid; 2/ for PA only. Source: calculated from country reports.
The relationships captured here depend on the two aspects mentioned above:
the relative magnitude of aid and the debt burden. Bangladesh, Cape Verde
and Vietnam do not have a large external debt so that does not enter the
picture; in the first two cases a clear link between aid and marginal changes in
imports can be established, though for Bangladesh the importance of aid is
not so great and declining. In the case of Vietnam, aid’s relative unimportance
is such that its impact cannot be discerned in year to year changes: export
growth has allowed imports to increase even when aid has fallen. Figure 5.1
showed how Vietnam’s imports have risen over the years largely on account
of higher exports, though with a trade gap opening up post-1992 by virtue of
higher inflows.
These countries also have a link from aid to debt payments. This relationship
is most clear in the case of Nicaragua, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. The pattern
of debt payments for Nicaragua closely traces that of debt relief – and the
service for which there is not relief is mostly not paid i.e. it is met out of
arrears.17 Net debt payments, i.e. debt actually paid out of own resources or
from other inflows (including aid) has been very small. In other countries,
such as Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia, there has been substantial debt
relief, but this has been insufficient to pay all actual service so that other aid
and inflows have been covering this part of the external debt. The link between
debt relief and debt payment is clear, but other forms of balance of payments
support are also used to meet debt obligations.18
17 The balance of payments accounting convention is to record scheduled debt service, rather than
actual, as an outflow with arrears accumulation appearing as a financing item.
18 In both Nicaragua and Zambia all balance of payments support has been accounted for by the
respective banks as funds for debt relief since at least the mid-90s (regardless of the accounting








1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Debt relief Debt relief and arrears accumulation Total debt payments
19 Chapter 3 argued that the importance of conditionality should not be overstated. However, Killick et
al. (1998) argued that the exchange rate was one area where there had been some impact. In addition,
Chapter 2 pointed to the systemic effects from import support in achieving forex market liberalisation.
Figure 5.2 Debt relief and debt payment for Nicaragua
As mentioned above, the simulations presented above assume some effect of
aid in reducing exports. What is the evidence that there are Dutch disease
effects from aid?
Dutch disease
It is often claimed that aid causes Dutch disease. This argument can be put in
various ways, but the basis of it is that aid creates additional demand, some of
which falls on domestic output, so that home prices rise relative to world prices
which is the same thing as saying the real exchange rate appreciates. Domestic
output thus becomes less competitive, causing exports to fall.
There are three reasons for rejecting this argument, all three of which are
particularly pertinent to programme aid. First, aid can be anti-inflationary.
Fungible project aid can have this effect, but it is far more likely to apply with
PA (as was found to be the case in Tanzania where the distinction between
project and programme aid is made in the government accounts, see Doriye
et al., 1993). Second, through conditionality aid supports a policy of
devaluation, or forex market liberalisation, which has resulted in substantial
devaluation.19 Finally, in addition to conditionality, PA has supported forex
market liberalisation through the systemic effects of import support schemes
and by providing the foreign exchange to allow these systems to function: you
can’t set up a forex auction if you don’t have any forex. At the same time, the
availability of aid has reduced the extent of devaluation consequent on
liberalisation; or, if the exchange rate is still managed, to eliminate111
overvaluation. For all these reasons, PA is likely to be associated with real
exchange rate depreciation rather than appreciation.20
The second and third of these points is linked to a second crucial role aid can
play in stabilisation. In small open economies a devaluation will have significant
inflationary consequences, and be a part of an inflationary spiral, fuelled by
expectations of further price increases. In the first instance aid can help finance
a nominal anchor on the exchange rate, putting a stop to the spiral. Aid can
be crucial here as for the anchor to have credibility, which is essential for
inflationary expectations to be reduced, the government must have the reserves
to support the exchange rate. The clearest example of this effect is from
Nicaragua. Inflation was running at 13,500 per cent in 1990. A stabilisation
plan was introduced in March 1991, with a devaluation of the new currency
to a rate that was then fixed. The same year saw the first large increase in aid.
There was a modest draw down on reserves in 1991 – but total sources of
forex practically tripled from 1990 to 1991 (or doubled excluding debt relief),
the bulk of the increase being from aid, so that there was no perceived risk of
reserves running dry. In Uganda the suspension of programme aid resulted
in the re-emergence of inflation in the early 1990s (see next section).
These arguments do not dispute that large aid inflows will mean that the
exchange rate (certainly for the real and probably also nominal) will be more
appreciated than in the absence of the aid. Rather it is suggested that there
are beneficial effects from this situation: namely to limit the pace of devaluation
and so restrict inflation. As economies have established liberalised forex markets
and achieved stabilisation PA continues to underpin this success – its withdrawal
would certainly threaten it. But PA can also move to assume a more positive
role of building reserves, reducing debt and supporting investment-enhancing
expenditures.
If large devaluation were to be necessary the costs would outweigh the benefits
in all cases. Devaluation occurs to bring sources and uses of forex into line.
Imports are more expensive and so reduced, whereas export production is
more profitable and so increased. However, if countries have structural
constraints on their exports, most of the work will be done through import
compression, which will have a detrimental impact on the country’s growth.
Of the eight countries we have studied, Bangladesh is the only one in which it
can be convincingly argued that devaluation would have a significant impact
on exports, and this also appears more likely for Vietnam given the relative
reduction in the country’s competitiveness consequent upon devaluation across
the region. Certainly in Cape Verde and Zambia, and most likely in
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Uganda, the improved relative margin
to exporters from devaluation will not be enough to elicit a supply response,
whilst it is clear that there are other policies which will, notably improved
human and physical capital.
20 This argument is time-bound. That is, during the period in which PA facilitates liberalisation of the
forex market then it is associated with devaluation. But it facilitates this process in part by allowing a
more appreciated equilibrium exchange rate.112
21 But given the country’s relative wealth and access to international capital aid volumen should be
limited.
The extent to which aid contributes to capital accumulation is critically related
to a more general conception of Dutch disease which is of greater concern
than exchange rate effects. This more general view is that aid-financed
activities, including working in an inflated civil service or the administration
of aid projects, provides a better income than private sector activity. The
pattern of production is thus distorted so that a country will not build up its
own productive base, remaining reliant upon aid. An important caveat should
be made here. Aid is of course meant to sow the seeds of its own destruction
and the main task for aid workers is to put themselves out of a job. The record
here is rather poor, though it was illustrated above that Bangladesh, Nicaragua,
Uganda and Vietnam are all reducing their relative reliance on aid. The extent
to which this is possible depends on the extent to which aid fosters growth,
which includes the role of project aid in creating the physical, institutional
and social base.
Of the countries studied, Cape Verde is the extreme example which exemplifies
this manifestation of Dutch disease, though remittances are at least as responsible
as aid for this state of affairs. The challenges facing Cape Verde are unlikely to
be overcome by the market alone; aid can play a role in facilitating whatever
development path is chosen, but appears not to be doing so as yet.21 Zambia
has historically suffered Dutch disease from its copper wealth, and
mismanagement turned this into a yet larger burden. But the economy remains
faced with a massive task of adjustment – it is one of the most urbanised countries
in Africa with no reason to remain this way (see White and Edstrand, 1994 for
a development of this argument). Again aid could play a role in diversifying the
productive base but does not seem to be doing so.
A final version of the Dutch disease story is that aid allows countries to postpone
making difficult decisions. Many commentators apply this argument to
Vietnam, suggesting that “good times make bad policy and bad times make
good policy”. In respect of aid this argument seems to apply to a very short
period of time. In the 1970s countries followed import substitution policies,
and these policies were supported by the donor community, including the
IFIs. By the mid-80s pressure was being brought to bear to change policies.
Thus there was only a window for a brief period in the early 80s when donors
were financing what were starting to be thought of as “bad policies”. Of
course, donors have in practice sent ambiguous signals through their
disbursement patterns, but Chapter 3 showed that other factors than aid alone
have shaped domestic policies. The stronger argument to make in respect of
this version of Dutch disease would appear to be that sustainable growth
prospects are undermined as aid does support inappropriate policies: but the
inappropriate policies are the ones the donor community wishes to see
implemented.113
Debt burden
The fact that debt relief has been linked to debt payment does not mean that
the debt burden has been reduced. The total debt stock of all Swedish
programme countries has increased over time, with the exception of Nicaragua
(Table 5.11). A country such as Uganda began the 1980s with comparatively
little debt, but this debt has accumulated over time through borrowing from
the IFIs which account for over half of the country’s debt. Although these are
concessional funds there is still a repayment burden.22
Table 5.11  Total long-term debt (period average, US$ billions)
1980–84 1985–89 1990–94 1995–96
Angola 0.5 4.7 8.3 9.5
Bangladesh 4.4 8.6 13.3 15.4
Botswana 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.6
Cape Verde 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Ethiopia 2.6 6.7 9.0 9.6
India 21.8 46.8 81.3 84.4
Kenya 2.6 4.3 5.9 6.2
Lao PDR 0.4 1.1 1.9 2.1
Mozambique 0.4 3.5 4.7 5.4
Nicaragua 2.8 6.3 9.2 6.8
Sri Lanka 1.8 3.9 5.9 7.0
Tanzania 2.5 4.5 5.9 6.2
Uganda 0.6 1.4 2.5 3.1
Vietnam 0.0 4.0 21.7 22.2
Zambia 2.4 4.0 4.9 5.2
Zimbabwe 1.2 2.2 3.2 3.8
Source: World Development Indicators.
5.5 Fiscal response, stabilisation, savings
and investment
Fiscal response
Aid may either increase expenditure, reduce revenue or offset deficit financing.
An academic literature, known collectively as the fiscal response literature,
addresses this issue (for reviews see, for example, White, 1998: Chapter 2, and
for a critique, White, 1994). Data limitations mean that the models from this
literature may not be applied. But their partial approach and methodological
problems mean they are anyhow probably not appropriate. Rather, the more
ad hoc approach already applied to the external account is applied, with some
rather strong results.
22 The recent IDA Education Sector support for Uganda has been given as a grant. Since the value of
reflows to the Bank is low there is a strong case for making all IDA credits grants (which the bilaterals can
surely influence at replenishment).114
If aid increases with no change in revenue or expenditure then it is clear that
the aid is being used to finance the deficit. Project aid can only have this effect
if it is fungible, whereas PA (with no restrictions on the use of the countervalue)
is readily available for deficit reduction. This story is most clear in Mozambique,
where grants as a per cent of GDP rose from 15 to 20 per cent between the
late eighties and early 90s with no appreciable change in revenue and
expenditure. Doriye et al. (1993) observed a similar phenomenon in Tanzania
during the 1980s, when the rise in counterpart funds (separately identified as
a financing item in the government accounts) corresponded to a reduction in
borrowing from the domestic banking sector.
Reducing the need for deficit finance provides PA with a deflationary impact,
and it can be argued to have played this role in both Mozambique and
Tanzania for the reasons just stated. This link was also illustrated in Uganda
when (as described earlier) donors halted disbursements of PA owing to
disagreement over import support procedures: government did not cut back
on expenditures, so that the cut back in PA was directly linked to the subsequent
inflationary surge. Since 1992/93 Uganda, which has enjoyed sustained high
inflows of PA, has not resorted to deficit financing: grants are over 100 per
cent of financing, indicating that aid must be paying for retirement of the
government’s debt to the domestic banking sector.
The deflationary impact of PA would be undermined if it were instead used
to offset revenue collection. There is no evidence of this being the case, and
there are several cases of higher revenues with higher aid inflows. Vietnam is
the most extreme example of this phenomenon. During the 1990s expenditure
has risen from around 15 to nearly 30 per cent of GDP whilst the deficit has
fallen from about 10 to 2 per cent of GDP. This has been achieved by a large
increase in revenue and turning transfers from SOEs from negative to a positive
8–10 per cent of GDP. Aid thus has a rather modest part to play in the
Vietnamese story, it’s share of government expenditure having fallen from 15
to around 6 per cent of government expenditure in 1990s. Tanzania, Uganda
and Zambia are all instances of improved revenue collection with higher aid.
This success may be in part attributed to conditionality and assistance in the
establishment of revenue authorities. But PA has also played an important
role in expanding the revenue base. In the first instance by allowing higher
imports, but also from generating higher levels of economic activity, in
particular the growth spurts in manufacturing experienced in countries such
as Tanzania and Vietnam as manufacturing output responded to higher levels
of capacity utilisation.
There are also cases in which higher expenditure has come about. Vietnam is
again the most obvious case (and Ghana though not part of this evaluation),
but there are others. Zambia is something of an exception, as overall
expenditure fell in the 1990s, partly as grants fell (suggesting expenditure and
aid are positively related) but mainly as the budget deficit was cut. The
composition of expenditure was discussed in Chapter 3: the story with respect
to inter-sectoral spending is mixed, although there are cases – e.g. Vietnam115
and Zambia – with marked improvements in social spending shares. However,
intra-sectoral spending patterns remain poor (Vietnam is something of an
exception), and evidence reviewed in Chapter 4 revealed shifts away from
investment and development spending.
Savings and investment
Investment is the single most robust determinant of growth.23 It was argued
in Chapter 4 that public investment has a role to play in leading this response,
but that ultimately the private sector response must kick in for sustained
growth.
It has long been held that aid displaces savings, so that the contribution to
investment is less than would have been the case if this effect did not occur. In
part this argument rests on perhaps an inappropriate look at gross domestic
savings, when gross national savings may be the more appropriate measure.
But more importantly it is a partial argument, where any displacement can
be offset if aid has income and output increasing effects. There is thus no
straightforward relationship between aid and savings, and many of our case
study countries show increased savings rates in association with higher aid,
e.g. Mozambique and Uganda, although the rate remains low in Uganda.
PA may increase investment directly through the government budget or
indirectly by creating an investment-friendly growing economy and reducing
the debt overhang. The evidence does not suggest that these effects have been
that strong. It has been shown that much PA has been used to reduce deficit
financing. What expenditure increases there have been are more likely to be
recurrent (as has shown to be so for Tanzania) than capital. Although Uganda
and Sri Lanka are cases where aid helped increase public investment, and this
has been associated with higher private investment. It has also been shown
that debt reduction has only occurred in Nicaragua (Table 5.11), so effects
from reducing overhang will not be observed in general. Aid may also enhance
investment by creating a good policy environment, but it was argued in Chapter
4, and above, that some form of strategic intervention may be required rather
than rely on market forces alone to lead the investment response.
5.6 Some concluding comments
The above analysis leads to the following conclusions:
• Aid in general has supported both imports and debt payments; without aid
imports would have been between 20 to 50 per cent less in most years for
most the countries studied, and even then would have been unable to meet
all external debt obligations. The supply of additional goods has both
growth-increasing and inflation-reducing effects.
23 Whilst this statement is undoubtedly so, it should also be borne in mind that developing countries have
had both over-investment, manifested in low rates of capacity utilisation, and bad investment, illustrated
by high, or even negative, incremental capital-output ratios.116
• Aid, in particular countervalue, has not resulted in equivalent increases in
expenditure, and so had an anti-inflationary effect by offsetting deficit
financing.
• The anti-inflationary impact of aid, combined with conditionality and
systemic effects of PA, mean that it has in the first instance been associated
with depreciation of the real exchange rate rather than appreciation.
Subsequently aid has supported the exchange rate (which is one way in
which it facilitates forex market liberalisation) and so had a deflationary
impact by limiting devaluation.
• Private investment response is weak in most countries, so the potential
positive links from aid, through both policy and impact of funds, remain to
be realised.
• The story with respect to government expenditure is mixed, but in most
countries restructuring of public spending to social sectors remains limited,
suggesting that aid may not have played much of a role.
• Effective conditionality will determine aid’s macroeconomic impact by
influencing the use of funds. The extent to which aid is used to reduce
deficit financing or increase expenditure, rather than offset taxes (and the
sort of expenditure), can be influenced by the conditions attached to aid.
However, the conditions are not always effective and may not have been
the right ones.
• There can be no doubt that aid has improved welfare through supporting
expenditure and imports. But the evidence adds up to suggest that aid will
have had some impact on growth, but that the impact is neither particularly
strong, nor sustainable – which requires more focus on the fundamentals.
What can be concluded about overall growth effects? Two strong channels
have been identified: (1) higher imports, and (2) stabilisation. The link from
both of these to higher growth is well established, and will be the main factors
laying behind the established link between aid and growth in cross-country
studies (e.g. Hansen and Tarp, 1999). In some countries PA may also finance
non-inflationary increases in public expenditure, though this useful role has
been under-exploited on account of IMF spending limits. The limited impact
on private investment has also been noted. The link from higher imports to
growth is clear. Eliminating high levels of inflation can also contribute to
higher growth by reducing transaction costs associated with rising prices, and
reducing uncertainty.24 These effects are sufficiently strong for us to be
confident of PA’s positive impact on growth. It is far more difficult to quantify
this effect with any precision.
24 Reducing inflation is to be expected to have positive distributional effects, partly as the poor are




Should Sweden continue to give PA?
Yes. This report has demonstrated that PA has beneficial macroeconomic
effects, both through the funds and, potentially, through policy dialogue. Hence,
the fall of PA’s share in Swedish aid should be reversed to re-establish it as a
core component of the aid programme. It should not be seen as a residual
component to be cut at will. But this argument is dependent upon better
exploiting PA’s potential advantages.
One clear message of this report is that the workings of PA are poorly
understood, even by some of those responsible for drafting PA agreements.
Explicit attention to understanding how PA works will enhance its effectiveness.
Should PA stay outside of the country frame?
No. Being outside of the country frame is a reason why PA has acquired its
residual category status (another being that multiple responsibility for PA means
it has no “home”). PA should be an integral part of the assistance provided to
partner countries. Swedish aid needs the flexibility to enter into multi-year
commitments where appropriate, but also to withhold money from the country
frame when it is not desirable to disburse PA owing to changed circumstances.
Putting PA back in the country frame will reduce the number of countries
receiving Swedish PA, and this is seen as a desirable outcome.
What sort of PA should Sweden give?
PA should be a mixture of debt relief and budget support. New modalities
are being developed under Sector Programmes which will be a suitable channel
for quick disbursing budget support provided donors resist the temptation to
place excessive burdens on the administration of this aid. The experience of
import support shows that donor attempts to micro-manage PA must be
avoided. But it will take some years to put these systems in place (the time
required varying from country to country) so that debt relief may be expected
to be the dominant form of PA for most countries in the near future. Part of118
the systems which need to be put in place are on the part of donors to allow
multi-year programming, avoiding the on-off nature of PA except in extreme
circumstances.
Can debt relief still be given to countries which have completed HIPC?
Yes. Post-HIPC debt burden levels remain high so that the arguments for
debt relief remain valid.
Should PA be conditional on IFI reform programmes?
A conditional yes. The nature of IFI programmes needs to be changed. The
evidence in this report shows that, whilst removing controls has been good for
growth, full market liberalisation need not be. Rather there is a need for
complementary policies, which implies a limit to stabilisation so that, for
example, infrastructure can be provided. The package of complementary
policies will vary from country to country, but is likely to include public works
and investment in basic health and education. These views support the post-
Washington consensus view that there is a greater role for the state in the
development process than that promoted by the development community over
the last two decades.
De-linking PA from IFI programmes may prove necessary if the IFIs are
recalcitrant to change, and will signal the seriousness with which Sweden
regards this matter. But that should be a last step, as proliferation of donor
conditionality is not a desirable state of affairs. There should, anyhow, be a
more active awareness on the part of Swedish officials, that influence operates
through a large number of channels – technical assistance, projects and studies
can call influence policy outcomes – and deliberate use made of these channels.
Should Sweden seek to make its own voice heard in policy dialogue?
Another conditional yes. It is not appropriate to proliferate conditionality.
But the nature of policy dialogue needs to change – to become more of a
dialogue and less of a monologue. Swedish influence has been strongest where
it had facilitated domestic discussion on strategic policy issues – notably in
Vietnam and Nicaragua, but in other countries also. However, such an
approach suggests concentration of these efforts on a handful of countries –
partly to build up Sweden’s own knowledge but also to exploit the advantage
of a historical relationship. Experience shows that it is those countries with an
established Swedish presence which are most amenable to such interventions.
Without pursuing a single viewpoint, the market-oriented development strategy
still touted by the IFIs can be put into question.
Can Sweden really influence the IFIs?
Experience mostly says no, but common sense says yes. And Sweden did play
an important part in advancing multilateral debt relief. There are political119
Looking into the future, this report concludes that Sweden should continue to give
programme aid since it has been demonstrated that programme aid has beneficial
macroeconomic effects, both through funds and policy dialogue.
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constraints to be overcome both domestically and within the international
community, so that a combined effort of like-minded donors is more likely to
succeed. The Board is only one channel through which this influence may be
exerted and others should be used. A more deliberate effort is needed to build
up an alternative intellectual centre of gravity. However, Sweden’s capacity
to play this role is at present weak, and this weakness needs to be addressed
first if such a strategy is to be pursued.
What are the main issues on which Sweden should seek to have
influence?
Within the international community Sweden should push forward the agenda
of the post-Washington consensus so that it is reflected in IFI policies on the
ground. If the IFIs are allowed to colonise and internalise this issue (having
resisted these critiques for many years) the actual policy shift will be rather
less. Sweden should also take a stand on PA modalities, although its own record
in this area is not that strong. Specifically, Sweden should attempt to shape
Sector Programmes so as to maximise the extent to which they are incorporated
into government expenditure activities with a minimum of donor control and
restrictions. A continued active engagement in SPA is one channel for this
activity, but will not benefit non-African countries, where Sweden may wish
to raise the issue in donor co-ordination bodies.
At the level of partner countries Swedish influence is best directed at creating
space in national and international fora for policy debates.121
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for an evaluation of
programme aid
1. Background
Balance of payments support has constituted a considerable part of Swedish
aid in the 1990s, but its share of total aid has declined in recent years. In
1990/91 balance of payments support represented over 20% of the aid
channelled through Sida, or 1,607 million Swedish Kronor. It has then
decreased to a total amount of 663 million Swedish Kronor in 1995/96,
decreasing to 6% of total aid through Sida. Even though decreasing in volume
and percentage, balance of payments support remains a substantial part of
total aid.1
The overriding objective of Swedish balance of payments support has, except
for some minor changes over time, been: economic growth and sustainable development.
Swedish balance of payments support has primarily been given to the poorest,
most indebted, Swedish programme countries implementing a structural
adjustment program with support from the Bretton Woods institutions2. Since
the majority of the least developed countries is found in Sub Saharan Africa
the lion part of the assistance has been aimed to this region. While both bad
economic management and external shocks have adversely affected the stability
of the recipient countries, Swedish disbursements of balance of payments
support have as a consequence been low and resulted in high balances.127
3 In Sida terminology “budget support” is sometimes found under the heading “balance of payments
support”.
4 The reason why focus is on balance of payments support in this evaluation and not equally focused on
budget support is lack of many existing examples of budget support. Countries which have experienced
this kind of assistance include Cape Verde, Mozambique and Uganda.
There are different forms of balance of payments support. Some of the
resources have been diverted to support the purchase of imported goods, other
to pay off debts. Balance of payments support is also closely linked to the
concepts of “budget support” and “sector programme assistance”. Budget
support and sector programme assistance also provide the recipient country
with untied resources. The collective term used for balance of payments
support, budget support and sector programme assistance in this text is
“programme aid”.3
This study is mainly concerned with balance of payments support, i. e. focuses
on supplying the country with foreign exchange to sustain the balance of
payments situation. However in today’s debate it has been increasingly
important to discuss the use of the local currency generated by the forex.
When a donor puts more emphasis on the fiscal situation and the use of local
currency the term “budget support” or “sector programme assistance” is used.
In this evaluation we will pay some attention to these forms of assistance.4
2. Reasons for the evaluation
In Government decision dated 1996-11-18 Sida was tasked with evaluating
Swedish balance of payments support to selected countries. In accordance
with these directives the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit started
an evaluation process aimed at assessing the effects of balance of payments
support on economic growth to some recipient countries of Swedish assistance.
The globalisation of the economy has changed the conditions for giving
balance of payments support in the 1990s, perhaps to a greater extent than
for other forms of aid. It is therefore of interest to assess how the changing
economic conditions have affected the possibility of this type of aid to achieve
its objectives.
Balance of payments support has effects on foreign exchange availability, fiscal
behaviour, monetary variables, economic growth and income distribution. In
addition, balance of payments support is usually a vehicle for policy
conditionality, which in turn also affects the above mentioned variables
Few assessments and evaluations have thoroughly reviewed how the various
forms of balance of payments support help to achieve the objective of economic
growth and sustainable development. One of the aims of balance of payments
support has been to sustain reforms so that the country can adjust and reach
stability. Another aim has been to create favourable effects in the economy
through the resource transfer itself. How different forms of balance of payments
support may contribute to economic growth is rarely elaborated on in the128
5 In an open economy situation with perfect capital mobility this is less interesting since the forex most
probably is fungible, but looking back a few years this was not the case in many countries.
6 In most countries the conditionality package means the Policy Framework Paper prepared by the
Bretton Woods Institutions.
Sida memorandums preceding the choice of support, or in Swedish
government decisions.5
3. Purpose and scope of the evaluation
The purpose of the study is to evaluate the impact of the resource transfers on
economic growth. Furthermore, the purpose is to see how the change in
economic policy in recipient countries of Swedish programme aid has changed
the preconditions for achieving economic growth. Moreover the evaluation
will assess whether the conditionality package attached to the support has
been fulfilled in accordance with the timetables and, lastly, the evaluator are
to review the literature on how reforms have affected economic growth.6
The study shall present recommendations on the use of different forms of balance
of payments support, the use of budget support and the use of sector
programme assistance as instruments for enhancing growth.
Recommendations should be directed to Sida and to the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs. Information about the evaluation findings is to be communicated to
the recipient countries.
The evaluation shall consist of case studies and desk studies. The objects for
the case studies are Uganda and Nicaragua. An additional Swedish programme
country constituting a third case study is left to be suggested by the evaluators
to complement the two predetermined ones. The two countries, Uganda and
Nicaragua, represent major recipients of Swedish balance of payments support
with untenable balance of payments situations as main obstacles to self-
sustained development. The purpose of conducting case studies is to enable
the evaluators to search for primary data and conduct interviews with key
persons (in addition to the use of data bases and existing literature).
The selection of countries for the desk studies, and a third case study, will be
a matter for the Tender Invitation. The selection will have to be confined to
Swedish programme countries receiving programme aid . The desk studies
are to make use of existing data bases and review the literature to complement
the case studies in search for general conclusions.
The evaluation shall cover all forms of balance of payments support, budget
support and sector programme assistance provided by Sida. There is no point
in distinguishing Swedish support from other donors’ balance of payments
support because of fungibility. The evaluation shall mainly concentrate on
support given in the 1990s.129
7 There are a limited number of cases where budget support and sector programme assistance have been
the targeted form of support, and the comparisons between balance of payments support and these
“newer” forms will therefore be restricted by the availability of data.
8 In case of lack of relevance in the stated objectives the evaluators are to suggest an additional set of
objectives relevant to and adequate for this kind of support in order to carry out the evaluation in
relation to appropriate objectives
9 Forms of balance of payments support; import support and debt relief. Categories of import support;
consumer goods, intermediate goods and capital goods.
 Categories of debt relief; e.g. fifth dimension, multilateral debt funds.
4. The Assignment
The study shall comprise of the following tasks;
(A) The rationale behind the Swedish support
The assessment in (A) and (B) will be based on all Swedish programme countries
that received Swedish programme aid 1990-1997.
1) Distinguish between the explicit objectives of different forms of Swedish
balance of payments support (import support and debt relief), budget support
and sector programme assistance through Sida to the programme countries
since 1990 until 1997 and analyse how these objectives have changed over
time7
2) Assess the relevance of the stated objectives for Swedish balance of payments
support, budget support and sector programme assistance in relation to the
support form8
3) Examine the Sida memorandums sent to the Swedish government, and the
Swedish government decisions on balance of payments support, budget
support and sector programme assistance, to assess the rationales behind giving
support and analyse how they have changed over time
(B) Reviewing different forms of Programme Aid
1) Review the different Swedish forms of balance of payments support, budget
support and sector programme assistance, and their respective categories, to
determine how much of the funding has been disbursed between 1990 and
1997.9
2) The evaluators are also to elaborate on how the balance of payments support
and budget support/sector programme assistance relate to each other
conceptually and in practice.
(C) Concluding fungibility
The assessment will be based on findings from both the case studies and from
the desk studies concerning a total of eight selected countries. This also applies
to D and E. The findings are to be based on empirical work.
1) Examine how economic policy, affecting the effectiveness of programme
aid, has changed in the selected Swedish programme countries during the
1990s.130
10 Above all theoretically, but also empirically if the availability of primary data allows to.
11 It might be useful for the evaluators to distinguish between the short-term objectives of the support
(intermediary variables) and its long-term objectives (growth in output). The evaluators are to try to
12 For import support and debt relief the evaluators are also to distinguish between the effects from
different categories i.e. in a low probability of fungibility of funds scenario (b).Appendix 2quantify the
impact of the support on intermediary variables and (if possible) on growth.
2) Examine the various sources and uses of foreign exchange, including balance
of payments support given by donors.
3) Conclude to what extent fungibility exists in the balance of payment identity
when there is an inflow of balance of payments support, and under what
economic policy conditions the degree of fungibility may change.
4) Conclude to what extent fungibility exists in the categories for debt relief
and import support, and under what economic policy conditions the degree
of fungibility may change.
5) Analyse how budget support may affect the country’s balance of payment
situation and vice versa, i. e. how balance of payments support may affect the
country’s budget situation given at least two scenarios, viz: a) a regulated
economy b) an open economy.10
(D) Assessment on how balance of payments support may have
contributed to growth
1) Examine the possible chain of effects between the balance of payments support
and economic growth:
a) when there is high probability of fungibility (open economy-
no restrictions on aid),
b) when there is low probability of fungibility (regulated economy-
restrictions on aid).
In (a) an assessment on how an increment of “untied” foreign exchange has
affected growth is to be carried out. In (b) an assessment will be carried out
specifying the different forms of balance of payments support (and their
categories) and their respective impacts on growth via intermediary variables.
The following relationships are to be considered in the evaluation for both (a)
and (b):11
– how balance of payments support forms may have affected growth via
macro stability (prices, real interest rate and real exchange rate),
– how the balance of payments support forms may have affected growth
via movements in the real exchange rate,
– how balance of payments support may have reduced the debt overhang
and have affected growth via increased investments
– how balance of payments support may have affected growth by an
increase in imports,131
– how balance of payments support may have affected growth by an
increase in international reserves.12
It is important to clarify under which economic policy conditions the
conclusions are valid (regulated economy vs. open economy).
It is also important that the evaluators make clear in the report which factors
they respectively control for and not do control for.
2) The evaluation shall discuss whether the chosen form (and category) of
balance of payments support, in comparison with other forms (and categories)
of balance of payments support, has been an effective and relevant mean to
achieve a favourable impact on intermediary variables and a contribution to
economic growth.
3) Examine empirically (if possible) the possible chain of effects between the
budget support and sector programme assistance and economic growth, also
taking into account relevant intermediary variables
(E) The implementation and the effects of reforms
1) Examine how many and which of the reforms conditioned to the balance
of payments support have been implemented in accordance with the
timetables. The evaluation shall also make an assessment on the
implementation status of the reforms that lagged behind time schedules –
how far/close to fulfilling the schedules they were.
2) Examine if in general any specific groups of reforms lagged behind
timetables and if in general any specific groups of reforms were implemented
in accordance with the timetable.
3) Review the literature to summarise the findings about how policy changes
– due to the conditionality package – have affected growth; generally in
developing countries and specifically in the Swedish programme countries.
(F) Present lessons learned as well as recommendations related to
the findings on above issues
1) Compare the impact of the various forms of balance of payments support
on growth and conclude under which policy conditions one type of support is
to be preferred to another.
2) Compare balance of payments support with budget support and discuss
under which policy conditions the donor shall focus on the balance of payments
situation rather than the fiscal situation or vice versa, and when it is of equal
importance to focus on the balance of payments situation and the fiscal
situation.
3) Compare the conclusions from the above – the actual results from the case
studies and desk studies – and assess the relevance of the stated objectives and
rationales in Sida memorandums.132
4) Discuss briefly the impact on economic growth of programme aid in relation
to the impact on growth of other forms of assistance, including project support
(G) Statistical data and methods
1) Discuss the statistical basis used and assess the extent to which lack of data,
economic models and other knowledge about constraints in the data and
methodology affects the results. Discuss how this uncertainty may affect the
conclusions and recommendations.
5. Methods, Evaluation Team and Timetable
The evaluation shall be undertaken in close cooperation with Sida and the
relevant authorities in the countries selected for the case studies. The three
case studies require field studies in the respective countries. Contact persons
have been identified in the Nicaraguan and Ugandan administrations. The
Department for Evaluations and Internal Audit also reserves the right to take
part in one of the field visits by agreement with the contracted team.
The study should take into consideration earlier evaluations of balance of
payments support (see especially Evaluating Programme Aid, Volume III,
Annotated Bibliography, ISS) and other relevant documents, specifically the
ongoing evaluations of “The Special Program of Assistance for Africa (SPA)”
and IMFs evaluation of the ESAF.
National statistical sources and comparable international sources will be used
along with interviews and discussions with key-informants. Under (A) and (B)
a Swedish-speaking team member is necessary. For foreign firms this might
mean linking a Swedish researcher or consultant to the team. For the fungibility
assessment (C) both a quantitative and a qualitative approach will have to be applied.
Much emphasis will have to be put on collecting primary data in the respective
case studies. To sustain the quantitative work in assessing fungibility the
qualitative work will have to be built on systematic interviews with key officials
in the administrations. Both quantitative and qualitative work have to be employed
in (D) as well, specifically the qualitative work will have to encompass systematic
interviews with the private sector to determine what factors influence private
investments (the World Bank is now preparing a survey on this issue in Uganda
and the evaluators may possibly be able to use some of their findings).
We recognise the difficulties in concluding fungibility, especially for the desk
study countries. Naturally, we only expect the evaluators to carry out qualitative
work in the case study countries (in addition to quantitative work). For the
desk study countries we encourage the evaluators to make use of available
data for the quantitative work and findings from previous studies to conclude
fungibility and assess the impact on growth.
When statistical methods are employed the evaluators should attempt a
consistent use of sensitivity analysis using different assumptions.
The evaluation will be carried out by a team with profound knowledge of
and experience in:133
– macroeconomics analysis,
– national accounts and balance of payment statistics,
– economic policy and government systems in developing countries,
– ability to speak and write in English and Spanish.
The team-leader is to have documented experience of evaluation in a team-
leading position.
The study is envisaged to require an estimated 80-100 man weeks.
The tentative time schedule for the evaluation is:
Nov 1997: Tender for consulting services.
Dec/Jan 1997: Contracting the winning tender for the evaluation.
Feb 1997: Preparation of inception report, including work plan.
Oct 1998: Submission of annexes or background reports.
A seminar to be held at Sida in Stockholm.
Nov 1998: Submission of a main report and the annexes
or background reports.
6. Reporting
a) An inception report shall be presented to Sida commenting and interpreting
the terms of reference for the assignment. The inception report shall include
a work plan for how and when the work will be carried out.
b) In connection with the field visit a debriefing shall be held reporting to
relevant parties in the recipient country.
c) A main report with findings, conclusions and recommendations from the
case studies and the desk studies is to be prepared. The main report shall keep
an educational format and the more technical discussions are to be left in the
annexes or background reports.
d) Draft reports for the desk studies and the case studies, showing the analysis
made and methods used, findings and conclusions, shall be presented together
with the main report. The case studies, building on field visits to three countries,
shall be presented in different reports for each country. The desk study for the
five countries can either be presented in one report or several reports depending
on the methods employed by the evaluators. The reports can then either be
appended to the main report or separate background reports.
The main report shall be written in English and should not exceed 80 pages
each, excluding annexes. The outline of the reports shall follow Sida Evaluation
Report – a Standardised Format (see Annex 2). Five (5) copies of each of the
draft case studies and draft desk studies shall be submitted to Sida no later
than October 30, 1998. Within five weeks after receiving Sida’s comments on
the draft reports, a final version of each case study and a main report in two
copies each and on diskette are to be submitted to Sida. Subject to decision by134
Sida, the reports will be published and distributed as publications in the Sida
Evaluations series. The evaluation reports shall be written in Word for Windows
or a compatible format and should be presented in a way that enables
publication without further editing.
The evaluation assignment includes production of one summary according
to the guidelines for Sida Evaluations Newsletter (Annex 3) and the completion
of Sida Evaluations Data Work Sheet (Annex 4). The separate summary and
a completed Data Work Sheet shall be submitted to Sida along with the main
draft report.135
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There are no executive summaries for the following working papers:
99/17:11 Programme aid, Policies and Politics. Programme aid and
conditionality
99/17:12 From Commodity Aid to Budget Support. Programme aid
and its modalities
99/17:13 Assessing Aid: a Manifesto for the 21st Century?
All thirteen working papers may be ordered from:
Infocenter, Sida
S-105 25 Stockholm
Phone (+46) 8 795 23 44
Fax (+46) 8 760 58 95
99/17:1
Development by Default
Programme aid to Bangladesh
Executive Summary
1. Programme aid is of decreasing importance to Bangladesh as compared
to other aid flows, notably project aid. Whereas bilateral donors used to
give a large part of aid as balance of payments support, which was often
tied import support, in the second half of the 1980s this has shifted to
project aid specifically targeted at the poor. In the 1990s, programme aid
was only given by the International Financial Institutions. The reasons
given for this shift included that a liberalised foreign exchange regime
made this modality of balance of payments support irrelevant, and that
that these donors did not agree with the government’s development143
priorities. However, another important reason probably was that
Bangladesh did not have a serious multilateral debt problem. There was
no pressure from the IFIs on the bilaterals to continue programme aid.
2. Economic reform was already initiated early on since the military came to
power in 1975. These reforms implied a gradual liberalization of
agricultural marketing and prices, more freedom for SOEs, and an export
retention scheme as well as a parallel exchange market for foreign exchange.
However, structural adjustment came formally on the political agenda in
1986 in an agreement about a three-year Structural Adjustment Facility
with the International Monetary Fund, which was also supported by the
World Bank. From then on, donors have been pushing for other reforms
such as privatization of SOEs, tax reform, trade liberalization and financial
reform. In 1990, an agreement was concluded about an ESAF, which was
implemented after democratisation in 1991. To date, no agreement on a
new ESAF has been reached after its conclusion in 1993.
3. A forum for donor co-ordination was already set up in the 1970s: the
annual meetings of the Bangladesh Aid Group. In spite of their limited
amounts of programme aid in the 1990s, bilateral donors continued to
have some leverage in this policy dialogue. First, the Bangladeshi
government was heavily dependent on aid for its development budget and
for financing the budget deficit. Secondly, many bilateral donors were
important as export markets for the rapidly increasing ready-made garment
exports.
4. Inflation was reduced from levels above 10 per cent before 1990 to one-
digit figures in the 1990s. The government achieved more control over
the budget deficit and over monetary expansion. Tax income increased in
1992 due to the introduction of a value added tax. In 1992, the exchange
rate was unified. In these areas the policy dialogue was successful. Aid
flows also played a role in stabilization, since about two-thirds of the budget
deficit could be financed from aid. But the increase in revenues was also
important for stabilization. Further tax increases stagnated, however, and
the implementation of other reforms was very slow and uneven. Small
steps were combined with many exemptions and countervailing actions.
The recent aid reduction is already leading to a higher budget deficit.
5. Aid flows have allowed a higher level of imports than would otherwise
have been possible. This has probably led to a higher growth rate. However,
the impact of aid on imports and thus on growth was relatively small.
Other sources of foreign income were quantitatively much more important,
such as rapidly growing exports and private remittances. The impact of
programme aid was even smaller than that of aid in general.
6. While structural adjustment as such is not in debate in Bangladesh, the
implementation of reforms affects vested interests. Trade unions are especially
strong in the public sector. Managers and workers of SOEs face lower
incomes, banking reform is stalled because of the bad performing debts,144
many of which are due to SOEs, high government officials, and bank
directors themselves. Further trade liberalization would reduce effective
protection for domestic industries. In the weakly institutionalized democracy
of Bangladesh, vested interests easily shift political alliances. Whatever party
is in the opposition capitalizes on discontent in order to (re-)gain state power.
Labour unrest and other protesting actions are the order of the day. While
aid dependence makes the government of the day comply with donor
demands, actual implementation is an entirely different matter.
7. The economy performed quite well. Macroeconomic stabilisation was
successful after 1991 and the currency was relatively stable. Economic
growth was at about 4 per cent for more than a decade, and increased to
5 or 6 per cent in recent years. The most important success has been
achieved with respect to exports. They have increased spectacularly since
the 1980s. This is mainly due to ready-made garments, but also other
textiles, leather products and fish farming (shrimps). The balance of
payments situation also improved by rapidly increasing remittances from
Bangladeshi working abroad. Private savings and investment rates have
also risen in recent years.
8. The export success can only partially be ascribed to policy reforms,
however. It began with subsidized credits and the introduction of an export
retention scheme, and special bonded warehouses. These measures reduced
the anti-export bias and, in the case of directed credit, stimulated specific
export sectors. Bangladesh could so benefit from the reduced access to
OECD markets that hit other, earlier, successful Asian exporters.
Paradoxically, some of the subsidized credits now form part of the large
portfolio of non-performing loans of the banking sector. These non-
performing loans lead to credit restrictions that hamper further growth in
the export sector.
9. Agricultural production, which is dominated by the production of food
grains, has risen over the years although at a very slow pace in the 1990s.
Since the vast majority of the population lives in the countryside (80 per
cent) and 60 per cent of the labour force is employed in agriculture, this
also implies a slow growth in average rural incomes. Self-sufficiency in
food seems to remain elusive; there is a persistent shortfall between
consumption and production.
10.A frequent comment in policy dialogue is that economic growth is not
sufficient for the needs of Bangladesh. Population growth of about 2 per
cent per year makes the income growth per capita still relatively small.
Although the (relative) incidence of poverty is decreasing since the early
nineties, the effects of economic growth on poverty are uneven. Economic
growth undoubtedly lifts a group of people out of poverty, but it leaves the
lives of the extreme poor untouched. The incidence of poverty is related
to access to land, education and off-farm employment. Evidence points to
an increase in the number of landless rural families, and to an increase in145
the absolute number of poor. The evidence with respect to social indicators
may also point in the direction of an uneven impact of economic growth.
These indicators improve, but continue to lag behind those of neighbouring
countries.
11.In 1998, the negotiations on a new ESAF broke down. The main reasons
included the failure to privatize state-owned enterprises, to increase tax
revenues, and to make progress on financial reform and reforms of the
public sector. Nevertheless, the policy dialogue is important. Donor
influence may help to overcome the collective choice problems that are
involved in implementing further reforms.
12.Bilateral donors are not only concerned with progress on institutional
reforms, but also with the targeting of government expenditure, which is
considered to be not sufficiently in the interests of the poor. The result of
these considerations is a move to sectoral programmes in which the
Government of Bangladesh works together with a consortium of donors
in an attempt to better reach the poor.146
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Supporting Success
Programme aid to Cape Verde
Executive Summary
1. Cape Verde is a lower-middle income country with apparently bleak
development prospects. Yet despite limited natural resources, poor
infrastructure and frequent prolonged drought the country has enjoyed a
good growth record since independence in 1975 and has avoided a large
external debt. This good performance is explained by substantial inflows
of both remittances from the Cape Verdean diaspora and aid, both
amounting to about 20 per cent of GNP. This translates to aid of over
$300 per person, making the country one of the highest aid recipients in
the world.
2. Sweden is amongst those countries giving a disproportionately large
amount of aid to the country, which may seem odd given the lack of any
historical ties and that there remains no Swedish representation in the
country (the programme was first administered by the Embassy in Guinea-
Bissau and now directly from Stockholm). Furthermore, 80 to 90 per cent
of Sweden’s aid has been financial programme aid, whereas few other
donors have used this sort of aid (though there has been substantial food
aid which the government has monetised). Moreover, programme aid has
been used despite the fact that until 1997 there was no formal policy
dialogue with the International Finance Institutions (IFIs), so that the
channels by which Sweden links its aid to reform were not available.
3. The modality of Swedish programme aid has evolved as elsewhere. As
elsewhere, administrative import support was used for some time, even
though the cumbersome procedures that go with this type of aid slowed
disbursements and lagged behind the development of a market-based forex
system. However, Sweden has since shifted to a far more flexible form of
budget support, but has only done so by putting in several conditions
intended to prevent the mis-use of government funds on items such as
corruption and military expenditure. Whilst the move to budget support
is to be applauded, the value of the additional conditions can be questioned.
The absence of IFI policy-based lending for most of the period has meant
that there has been no formal policy-based conditionality, and this has not
been introduced since the start of IMF lending in 1998.
4. Economic and political reform were initiated in the second half of the
1980s by the ruling and formerly-socialist Partido Africano de Independencia de
Cabo Verde (PAICV), (the party in fact retains its socialist orientation, but
oversaw policies such as an opening up to foreign investment and the147
introduction of multi-partyism). The pace of change has accelerated since
the Movimento para Democracia (MPD) was elected to power in January 1991
(which introduced a reform programme named Mundança). There is no
doubt that the reform programme is “home grown”. The politics of reform
are understood by the country’s torn identity, part African and part
European, with the latter reinforced by the fact that there are more Cape
Verdeans overseas than there are in the islands themselves. The coup in
Guinea-Bissau in 1980 ended plans for unity, simultaneously weakening
the African part of the country’s identity and undermining the power-
base of the PAICV who had been a part of the successful independence
war there. Accommodation was thus sought with dissident elements,
including those overseas, who favoured reform.
5. The role of the donor community in the reform process has necessarily
been limited. Although there has been no adjustment programme there
have been various World Bank technical assistance credits (for privatisation
and public sector reform) which have supported the reform process with
varying degrees of success (plans for retrenchment in the civil service have
not taken effect). However, the fact that the country has been carrying out
reforms of its own accord has meant that donors interactions have largely
been restricted to some specific issues, such as counterpart funds. Sweden
is no exception in this regard, and Swedish influence on Cape Verdean
policy may be fairly safely stated to have been nil. Indeed, it is not clear
that there has been much attempt to exert any influence (nor even that it
was the objective of Swedish assistance), although Sweden has now entered
the macro arena with a mission and a macro study in 1998.
6. Whilst aid has undoubtedly helped to increase income levels (and can
clearly be shown to have increased both imports and investment) it is less
clear whether the aid is helping Cape Verde establish a diversified, self-
sustaining development path. One question to be confronted is therefore
whether such high aid to a middle-income country with which Sweden no
longer has any sort of special relationship can be justified. This report
concludes that it cannot and that Sweden is correct to pursue its current
policy of pre-announced and phased disengagement, although a shift to
INEC credits may be appropriate. However, if Cape Verde is to meet its
development challenge it is quite likely that it needs a stronger vision of its
future than liberalisation alone. Rather than simply support the
liberalisation agenda in the years that remain of Swedish aid, some attempt
may be made to facilitate debate on the country’s development path
(Sweden has more explicitly entered the policy arena in the last couple of
years, though not in this role of questioning the reform strategy).148
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Reform, Rehabilitation and Recovery
Programme aid to Mozambique
Executive Summary
Introduction
1. Mozambique presents something of a conundrum. Since 1987 the country
has received very high levels of aid, reaching over 100 per cent of GNP
for three years in the early 1990s. These are way above the levels of aid at
which donors may be expected to grumble about aid dependence. Recent
research, by the World Bank amongst others, presents evidence that such
high levels of aid may well be detrimental rather than beneficial for the
recipient. Despite all this, there are calls for higher levels of aid for the
purposes of debt relief. Not only that, but critics argued that IMF spending
limits prevented the country rebuilding infrastructure after the war and
donors seek ways around these limits so that they may spend their aid,
rather than it simply being used to offset the deficit finance. So which is it?
Would Mozambique be better off with more aid or with less? And what
form should this aid take?
2. This report approaches these questions as an evaluation of programme
aid during the 1990s. As an evaluation the report reviews issues which
operational agency officials may feel have been long-resolved. Yet past
experiences hold important lessons for today. It is demonstrated here, as
has been well documented in many sources, that donor restrictions on the
use of import support turned supposedly quick disbursing assistance (QDA)
into difficult to utilise pots of money, tied up scarce government and donor
administrative resources and, in the end, impeded the very liberalisation
they were intended to support. It is argued here that the same dangers are
being confronted in the current treatment of sector programmes and the
tying of the countervalue from debt relief. Moreover the imposition of
donor restrictions means that the aid will have the sort of institutionally
destructive effects which can mean that more aid is worse not better. But
this situation can be avoided. Whilst donors are legitimately concerned
that their aid should not be misappropriated, they should avoid getting
too heavily involved in the day-to-day management of what are meant to
be free resources. Hence the report argues that, subject to certain conditions
being satisfied, Mozambique should receive debt relief with untied
countervalue and basket (i.e. non-earmarked) funding for sector
programmes.149
3. This report also considers how the policy dialogue process has affected
Mozambique’s development. There are two questions here: how have
donors influenced policy, and what have been the effects of policy change?
Programme aid modalities
4. Import support was disbursed first as commodity import support through
allocative mechanisms, then through quasi-market schemes and finally
into a mostly liberalised forex market. Many donors imposed restrictions
on the use of their funds for an excessive period which undermined
government’s attempts to establish a liberalised market and slowed up the
disbursement of the donor funds. Donors have also earmarked their
countervalue to a large degree, and continue to do this with debt relief. In
the presence of spending limits this practice can distort spending patterns.
It is likely, and to be hoped, that the funds received by Mozambique under
the Enhanced HIPC initiative will not be restricted in this way.
Policy dialogue
5. Mozambique began reforms in 1983. The International Finance
Institutions (IFIs) more usually date the reforms from 1987 (the year of
the first IMF and World Bank adjustment credits), and thus over-state
their own importance. A number of factors drove Mozambique to reform
- the recognised failure of central planning, including resistance to it in
rural areas, the lukewarm support of the Soviet bloc and the need to
accommodate the West so as to reduce their backing for the Renamo rebels.
Western pressure was thus just one of a number of factors. The momentum
of reform has been maintained by an emerging domestic constituency for
reform.
6. Adjustment policies have been controversial, as they have elsewhere.
However, as an economy emerging from decades of war with a ravaged
infrastructure, Mozambique does appear something of a special case. In
particular it seems that more consideration should have been given in the
early 1990s to arguments that IMF spending limits were too tight given
the need for reconstruction, and hence hinder the possibility of restoring
growth (and so fuel inflation by tightening supply bottlenecks). Growth
performance was very uneven in the first half of the nineties and
concentrated in services, rather than agriculture or industry (although there
has been something of an agricultural supply response). These arguments
did not seem to have been greatly considered by the IFIs although they
are supported by a range of opinion. With the exception of one notable
incident, the bilaterals have not made much attempt to introduce a debate
on this matter.150
7. In the second half the 1990s the country’s performance has improved
markedly, with growth averaging 10 per cent and stabilisation having finally
been achieved. Whether this is the outcome of sustained reform, good
weather, or the effects of rehabilitation (partly indicated by a remarkably
high investment rate) remains a matter for debate. Critics of the IFI stance
continue to argue against the extensive application of a market-based
philosophy (e.g. with respect to cashew nut processing, which has been the
subject of some controversy). On the hand, IMF conditions have become
“laxer”, with the limit on spending before grants finally being lifted,
allowing aid dollars to be used to increase government expenditure. In
summary, the Mozambique policy dialogue story seems to be have
surrounded by some acrimony (more than is evident from IFI
documentation), but with some eventual accommodation by the IFIs.
8. The government and several civil society actors, such as trade unions, are
active in calling for the total cancellation of external debt. Even post
enhanced HIPC (the terms of which will be retroactively applied), debt
service will be considerable (equivalent to annual spending on health).
Whether debt relief for bilaterals is still an option is an issue of some
controversy (this report argues that it should be continued).
9. Other objectives of poverty, gender and the environment have not received
much attention in the policy dialogue process. Indeed, environmental issues
appear to have received none. Mozambique was selected by the SPA as a
pilot for gender-sensitive adjustment, but few people seem aware of this
fact and the relevant modification to the programme (monitoring the
impact on women of liberalisation in the cashew market) rather modest.
Poverty has received more attention, especially social sector reform (which
may not be that poverty-focused) which is central to the highly indebted
poor country (HIPC) conditions although rather marginal before. Under
Enhanced HIPC, poverty is of course central, though this was not
anticipated in the most recent PFP.
10.The policy dialogue process in Mozambique has been dominated by the
IFIs to an even greater extent than is usually the case. Nonetheless, this is
a case in which some Swedish influence can be discerned. There have
been several cases of Swedish actions that have related to policy matters
(of varying importance and effectiveness); this role to some extent reflects
Sweden’s historical association with Mozambique. During the 1990s
Sweden’s presence has mostly been felt through its activities with the like-
minded group. However, the areas of influence have not in general been
notably motivated by a “Swedish position”.
Impact of programme aid funds
11.Programme aid funds have supported several macroeconomic aggregates.
Exports remain a very low share of imports, so that aid inevitably finances
a large share of the latter. In the late 1980s incentive goods were important,151
though that argument is less easy to make in the 1990s. Much aid has also
gone to debt service. With aid to GNP ratios in excess of 100 per cent it is
inevitable that some aid is consumed (indeed quite a lot goes to recurrent
expenditures), which makes a short run negative impact on domestic savings
likely, though not inevitable since the no aid counterfactual also has lower
income. The budget deficit was reduced at a time when grants increased.
In the presence of IMF spending limits this fact meant that the increase in
aid went to offset domestic deficit financing, which should have a counter-
inflationary effect. However, as indicated above, a counter-inflationary
effect may also have been realised if the funds were spent relieving supply
bottlenecks. Donor attempts to earmark countervalue crowds out
government’s own spending priorities. Since donors now earmark to social
sectors adverse inflationary effects may be expected.152
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Debt, Dependence and Fragile Development
Programme aid to Nicaragua
Executive Summary
1. Aid to Nicaragua in the 1990s was large, both relative to GDP (at about
30 per cent) and to imports and exports. Programme aid, including balance
of payments support, import support and debt relief, constituted 64 per
cent of total aid over 1990–1997. The country succeeded in controlling
hyperinflation in 1991, but economic growth did not come about until
1994. Nevertheless, this report concludes that aid was very important for
both stabilization and growth. In the absence of aid, stabilization could
only have been achieved at much higher costs in terms of growth.
Programme aid
2. Although programme aid in general was a large share of total aid, the
share of freely spendable programme aid was more limited. A large share
of balance of payments support was tied to import support or commodity
import support. Many donors continued to use this relatively inefficient
system of deciding on the kind of imports, while the Nicaraguan
government had by 1990 already liberalized access to foreign exchange.
This created and maintained inefficiencies. Sweden was one of the first
bilateral donors to apply more a flexible balance of payments support
(retroactive financing), but many other donors continue tying their import
support to this day.
3. In 1991, several bilateral donors paid the accumulated debt service to
multilateral institutions, thus freeing the way for new programmes. Debt
relief for multilateral debt service was limited in later years. In practice,
most freely spendable balance of payment support was also used for
multilateral debt service and other “priority debt service”. There was no
explicit “budget support” to the Nicaraguan government, but debt relief
was of course at the same time budget support. In addition, freely spendable
balance of payments support and countervalue funds from import support
can also be considered budget support. However, the amount of freely
spendable countervalue funds was limited. Many bilateral donors applied
and continue to apply “double tying”: they set conditions for the import
side and for the use of local countervalue funds. Most donors do not seem
to trust the use of the funds by the government. In 1998, the government
made a proposal for sectoral budget support in the form of a
Supplementary Social Fund, which seemed to be well received by several
bilateral donors.153
Impact of aid funds
4. Debt relief and debt forgiveness given for the restructuring of debt by the
bilateral creditor itself are not included in the regular aid figures, but
amounts given in this way are considerable. The debt stock was reduced
from US$11 billion to US$6 billion between 1990 and 1996, mainly due
to a reduction of bilateral debt, while US$ 1,6 billion was cleared by a
commercial debt buy-back financed by bilateral donors. As a result of this
debt stock reduction, debt service due declined considerably. However, more
of the remaining debt service is now “priority debt service”, so actual
debt service has not decreased. Debt/GNP and debt service/export ratios
are still at unsustainable levels. The reduction in debt overhang may have
been important in increasing the (perceived and real) government’s
willingness to pay the remaining debt, and so freeing the way for new
loans including private loans.
5. In Nicaragua’s stabilization strategy, the exchange rate played the role of
a “nominal anchor”. This required foreign reserves to be available both
for increasing the credibility of the anchor, and for allowing imports to
come about. In addition, aid was used to finance the budget deficit. For
the latter, it holds that the more the aid was freely spendable, the more
effective it was for stabilization. Project aid, and the setting of conditions
for countervalue may have led to additional spending if these projects
would not have been carried out anyway.
6. The impact of aid on growth can be assessed by examining what would
have happened to imports in the absence of aid. This analysis of the
“counterfactual” shows that even if the country had paid no arrears and
had serviced no debt at all, imports would have fallen to about one-third
of actual levels in 1990–1993. In this scenario, assumptions about other
balance of payments flows are still rather optimistic. In the absence of
programme aid only, imports would have been 30 to 70 per cent lower
than actual (with a negative figure for 1991). The high dependence on
imports, and the actual trends in imports in the period 1990–1997 show
that there is a close relationship between imports and growth. For these
reasons, we can assume that the country would have fallen in a severe
economic crisis in the absence of (programme) aid. Furthermore, the
recovery of imports in 1994 and later years in this counterfactual scenario
can be questioned: this recovery is based on the higher export figures of
the factual, which can be assumed to be the result of stabilization at
relatively low cost in terms of economic growth – which was possible
because of the use of the exchange rate as nominal anchor.
7. The use of the exchange rate as nominal anchor does normally lead to
some overvaluation of the exchange rate. This proved to have happened
also in Nicaragua during 1991–1993, thus hampering somewhat the growth
of exports in these years. In this respect, there was an unavoidable trade-
off between stabilization and export growth, not well understood at the154
time by, for example, the World Bank. World Bank staff expected a low
and competitive exchange rate, fostering exports, both to be achieved within
one year (World Bank, 1990).
8. Aid not only allowed a higher import level, but in 1991 and 1992 it also
led to an increase in imports of consumer goods. This was partly the result
of the overvaluation, but also proved to be some necessary recovery from
very low consumer goods imports in the 1980s. After 1992, the share of
consumer goods came down. Aid definitely helped to increase public
investment in the 1990s. Although there was some underexecution in the
beginning, this investment was important in rehabilitating the country’s
physical and social infrastructure. In the medium term, this will have a
positive effect on growth. Aid in general (including programme aid) does
not seem to have been used for an increase in government social spending,
nor were there any conditions on this social spending.
9. Given the still large trade deficit and budget deficit, the stabilization of
Nicaragua is extremely vulnerable. In 1993 and 1997 the country
experienced a drop in aid and in particular in programme aid, and
stabilization was in danger. In 1997, reduced programme aid forced the
Central Bank to attract private foreign capital. In 1993, this way of coping
with less programme aid was not yet possible: a formal reason was that
capital account convertibility had not yet been introduced. A more
substantive reason is that private inflows would not have come about yet:
political and economic stability was still perceived as fragile, and the
economy was stagnating. However, private inflows of short-term capital
in itself may endanger stabilization. The bonds (CENIS) were exchange
rate-indexed and had a high interest rate, so a large flow of short-term
capital came about. In combination with a relaxation of domestic monetary
policy this led to an expansion of private domestic credit and to a large
trade deficit. This required very strict fiscal and monetary policies in 1998,
even though aid flows in that year were higher again.
Policy dialogue
10.The policy dialogue in Nicaragua was not very effective. First, some
important reforms, such as the liberalization of the foreign exchange market
and the privatization of many state enterprises, would have been carried
out anyway, given the political orientation of the new government in 1990.
Second, although agreements with IMF and World Bank were concluded
(1991, 1994 and 1998), the government only complied with the targets for
about one year (for the 1998 agreement we still do not know of course for
how long the government will comply).
11.Overviewing the process of decision-making over macro-economic policies,
a kind of cyclical pattern can be observed. The agreements with IMF and
World Bank include strict monetary and fiscal targets and structural
reforms. But after both the first and second agreements (1991 and 1994,155
respectively) the government only met the set targets for about one year.
The agreements were important in triggering large amounts of programme
aid. But in the following year, programme aid was reduced. The reasons
why the targets were not met include:
· The government was under very strong pressure to reach an agreement
with the IFIs, due to high aid dependence and the large official foreign
debt. This led to agreeing perhaps too easily to IFI demands.
· World Bank and IMF underestimated the magnitude of the institutional
changes that Nicaragua had to go through and the strength of the
opposition to particular measures.
· The lack of a stable democracy complicated domestic decision-making.
There was a continuous struggle between elites and, especially in the first
years, also between elites and the lower social strata. The latter were the
losers in stabilization and privatization policies; the former fought each
other over the benefits, in particular, of privatization. Domestic support
for measures that followed from IFI agreements could often not be secured.
· “Moral hazard” occurred on the part of the government: once the
(programme) aid was received, there was an incentive not to carry out the
reforms (fully). On the other hand, aid also facilitated the compensation
of potential losers from stabilization and reform, in particular, the leaders
of the Sandinista party.
· Weak donor coordination. The US suspended programme aid in 1992 for
political reasons that had nothing to do with macroeconomic policies. In
1995, a group of bilateral donors and the World Bank, each for their own
reasons, suspended programme aid which also made it difficult for
Nicaragua to meet the IMF targets.
12.On the other hand, aid was not completely withdrawn because of non-
compliance. Although the IMF did not disburse anymore on its ESAF in
1995, it convinced other donors to continue disbursing programme aid.
Apparently, the IMF itself had multiple objectives: on the one hand, it
wanted to signal to the Nicaraguan government that slippage had occurred,
on the other, it did not want to reduce programme aid.
13.Bilateral donors left the setting of macroeconomic conditions to IMF and
World Bank, and focussed more on other issues. When it came to assessing
the macroeconomic situation after non-compliance with IMF and World
Bank conditions, bilaterals were often more comprehensive and continued
disbursing programme aid. Bilaterals were very concerned with the delicate
political situation and feared new civil strife. However, this
comprehensiveness gave “mixed signals” to the Nicaraguan government.
It would have been more effective if this comprehensiveness for the political
situation had influenced the agreements themselves, so that the chances
of compliance had been greater. At the same time, bilateral donors stressed
that social effects should be taken into account in macroeconomic policies,156
and that transparency of the budget be improved. However, these issues
were not taken up by IMF and World Bank; only in the most recent ESAF,
expenditure targets were softened in the case of social expenditure,
provided it would be financed from foreign aid. A more active engagement
in the debate on macroeconomic policies and reforms, and/or a more
active role in fostering the debate on these reforms would have led to more
realistic macroeconomic targets, and probably also to a better reform
strategy. Apart from the lack of attention to the social effects of reforms,
one can also wonder about growth-enhancing effects of the reforms as
designed in the agreements with IMF and World Bank (for example,
privatization of public utility enterprises, trade and financial reforms).
14.Bilateral donors did have some success in influencing the political situation.
This holds, in particular, for the Support Group for Nicaragua, installed
by the General Assembly of the UN, of which Sweden was a prominent
member. The activities of the Support Group were important for domestic
political reconciliation and stability, which was a necessary condition for
achieving economic stability.
Supply response and poverty reduction
15.In the first years, 1990–1993, there was hardly any supply response to the
liberalizations of the foreign exchange market, of domestic prices, and of
the financial sector. Some delay could be expected, given the low
productivity level of the economy, and some disruptive effects of the
reforms themselves. Another problem was the lack of political stability
which affected private investment. In addition, the overvaluation of the
córdoba in these years hampered exports. This was to some extent
unavoidable given the priority for stabilization. However, the rapid
reduction in import tariffs (in combination with overvaluation) led to large
volumes of imports of consumer goods destroying local production.
16.After 1993, the economy grew at about 4 per cent per annum. The largest
production increases are registered in export crops like coffee, in basic
grains production, in fisheries, in manufacturing exports and in urban
sectors like commerce and services. Growth is to a large extent export
driven, and the share of private consumption in GDP decreased in recent
years. This means that some real adjustment has taken place. Production
in the manufacturing industry declined in the early 1990s, and recovery is
slow. This is mainly due to the stagnation in domestic private demand.
17.With respect to sustainability, a worrying factor is that private investment
is still rather low. Only in the rather peculiar year 1997 (because of large
private capital inflows) did private investment surpass public investment.
Until 1997, a lot of private investment was directed to the construction of
hotels, restaurants, shopping malls, banks and private dwellings. Although
this contributed to economic growth, it did not enhance sustained economic
development. Another problematic factor with respect to sustainability is157
the extensive nature of the growth in basic grains production. It is
particularly extensive on land; more and more rainforest is burnt, and
little is done to restore or improve soil fertility.
18.In coffee, the expansion of production comes from large producers who
benefited from state-directed investment credits. Increases in sugar, soya,
peanuts and other non-traditional primary exports also benefitted mainly
the larger producers. Small farmers benefited from expansion in basic
grains production and in the increased production of milk, cheese and
eggs. Construction and commerce activities are to a large extent urban
and concentrated in large enterprises. However, they led to an increase in
employment. In the early 1990s, unemployment increased rapidly. It is
still high (13 per cent, and including underemployment, 26 per cent) but it
has declined from the 18 per cent of 1993. However, the expansion in
employment is accompanied by falling real wages. In rural areas, incomes
increased in some regions but decreased in others. In general, poverty is
more severe in rural areas than in urban areas.
19.Some other indicators also point to a deterioration of income distribution.
The allocation of credit in the 1990s has favoured large scale producers.
Although many formal land titles have been given to beneficiaries of land
reforms of the 1980s and of the redistribution of state farms in the 1990s,
many small farmers have been forced to sell these lands. With a shift from
direct to indirect taxes, the tax system has become more regressive. Public
expenditure for health and education did not increase and it decreased in
real per capita terms. In addition, spending is not targeted to the poor.
Primary school enrolment rates have decreased in the 1990s. Although
infant mortality rates decreased according to official figures, other evidence
points to increased incidence of malnutrition and diseases such as measles
and dengue. The aid-funded Emergency Social Investment Fund (FISE)
has become rather effective in constructing a social infrastructure, but
coordination with the relevant ministries is weak and it is partly used for
propaganda purposes. On the whole, liberalization brought greater income
inequality and very uneven “trickling down” of benefits from growth.
Programme aid from Sweden
20.In the course of the 1990s, the amount of Swedish programme aid to
Nicaragua fell. Over time, Swedish balance of payments support has
become increasingly flexible: as of 1991, a large part of import support
was retroactive financing of oil imports, and debt relief has become more
important within programme aid in later years. Since most Swedish
programme aid was either debt relief for servicing priority debt, or provided
freely spendable countervalue, it fully contributed to stabilization.
21.Largely as a consequence of its active involvement in macroeconomic
policies in the late 1980s, Sweden did attempt to influence macroeconomic
policies, at least until about 1995. Sweden financed advisory missions and158
created a group to design a debt strategy, with a view to strengthening the
Nicaraguan government’s negotiating capacity. At least one of these expert
missions had some influence on macroeconomic policy.
22.With respect to the conditions for programme aid, Sweden followed the
IMF and World Bank agreements. However, Sweden was one of the few
bilateral donors in 1993 to continue programme aid (when there was no
agreement with the IFIs), and one out of several bilateral donors continuing
programme aid in 1995 and 1996, when IMF targets were not met but
the IMF was discussing a bridging programme with the government. At
the same time, Sweden was very concerned about the political situation.
In 1995, Sweden was the first donor to suspend programme aid in order
to put pressure on the government to solve the constitutional crisis. This
suspension was announced publicly. Other bilateral donors followed, but
did not make it public. As a prominent member of the Support Group for
Nicaragua (see above), Sweden actively contributed to promoting the
dialogue that led to a solution for the constitutional crisis. The suspension
of programme aid may have played a role as well.
23.Already in the early 1990s, Sweden expressed concerns over the social
consequences of adjustment measures and the lack of transparency of
government accounts. Apart from a small success in relation to the 1998
ESAF agreement, very little progress has been achieved in this area.159
99/17:5
Counting the Donors’ Blessings
Programme aid to Tanzania
Executive Summary
1. Tanzania has an image of resisting the influence of the international
financial institutions and donor community with respect to economic
reform. However, this view overlooks the fact that structural adjustment
and economic reform were already under way when agreement was
reached with the international community about adjustment and reform
in 1986. This agreement was followed by large flows of aid - especially
Programme Aid - which tailed off in the early nineties as policy dialogue
became stuck. Public finance was central to this stagnation of policy
dialogue and issues were only resolved after the elections of 1995.
2. In the first stage of negotiations with the donor community (1986-1992)
attention was only given to deepening reforms which were already under
way. Market forces were opening up while vested interests in the state
sector were left untouched. In fact, the latter could benefit from the opening
up of the economy. Donors thus played a useful role in this period through
policy dialogue, though very arguably not a crucial one. The funds helped
what measure of stabilisation there was and provided both the forex and
the mechanism for liberalising the foreign exchange market (although some
donors stayed too long with schemes which dragged behind the pace of
reform, this comment certainly applying to Sweden).
4. However the deterioration of public finance in the 1990s brought issues
to the fore in deteriorating government-donor relations, and started to hit
vested interests through measures such as improved tax collection and the
introduction of hard budget constraints on parastatals. These issues were
being slowly handled in an IMF shadow programme (i.e. the government
agreed to conditions without receiving IFI funds) monitored by a group
of donors, but the big breakthrough came after a new government came
to power in 1995.
5. A cash budget was introduced after 1995 and government finances were
brought under firmer control than before. These changes were
accompanied by a decline in the rate of inflation, a drop in interest rates
and relative stability of the currency. Gradual reforms in the exchange
rate regime were followed after 1995 by a complete liberalisation of the
foreign exchange market. The budget deficit was turned into a surplus -
which was needed to reduce government debt (although the surplus is
after external grants, as may be expected in the presence of continuing
high levels of expenditure-raising aid flows). Programme aid was therefore160
instrumental in macro economic stabilisation through the budget and the
availability of foreign exchange helped stabilise the exchange rate.
6. Policy dialogue changed its focus from issues of macroeconomic
stabilisation to more institutional concerns over the course of time.
Privatisation and civil service reforms have been the major issues at stake.
Significant reductions in the size of the civil service have taken place, but
have not lead to significant reductions in expenditure, thus raising important
questions of the effectiveness of spending. There is also progress in
privatisation but it is stuck on reform in the banking sector, which almost
led to a breakdown of negotiations for a renewed Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility in 1998.
7. Within the Tanzanian political system there is consensus about the need for
reform as well as on other issues in policy dialogue like corruption. What
open criticism there is tends to be on the way in which reforms - for example
privatisation - have been carried out. But stagnation in progress on reform,
especially with respect to public finance, is indicative of hidden resistance
of affected groups. Policy dialogue seems therefore to have been instrumental
in breaking the influence of powerful partial interests in order to overcome
collective choice dilemmas. Under such circumstances it is difficult, if not
misleading, to attribute a role to any single donor (certainly any single
bilateral). We find little evidence of a unique Swedish role, but this is not the
same as saying that Sweden’s support for policy reform has been irrelevant.
8.. Policy outcomes are thus obvious with respect to macroeconomic
stabilisation, but less clear with respect to the supply response. However, it
is undoubtedly so that there has been a supply response in the Tanzanian
economy. Exports are growing and the deficit on the trade balance remains
large, but it is narrowing (of course the balance is largely aid-financed and
aid had been falling). The supply response differs in various sectors. Food
production is widely seen as particularly responsive to liberalisation. Cotton
production is also a clear example of a supply response, which followed
quickly after reform set in. Some sectors do not show a supply response at
all despite reforms, notably coffee and sisal. Other sectors showing a supply
response in the 1990s were tea, tobacco and cashew nuts. The reasons for
this differential response are however, not particularly clear.
9. Poverty has decreased since liberalisation, but the mechanisms through which
this has taken place are not obvious. There is in the Tanzanian case no
documentation as to whether a bigger share of the world market price reaches
the producer after liberalisation. The income effects of economic reform
are therefore not precisely known. This opaque situation is compounded by
the fact that the role of the informal sector is allotted a big place in poverty
reduction, but the precise nature of this influence is not particularly clear
either. Programme aid is given a role in poverty reduction as a reduction in
the price of imports made a cheapening of wage goods possible. Protection
of social sector spending is imperfect in Tanzania and the effects on social
indicators of reform are yet to be determined.161
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What Does the Showcase Show?
Programme aid to Uganda
Executive Summary
1. This report assesses the impact of Swedish programme aid in Uganda.
Uganda is widely seen as one of the few success stories in Africa, where
the structural adjustment programme seems to have led to high economic
growth. It is therefore interesting to examine to what extent the relative
success of Uganda indeed can be ascribed to programme aid and the
attached reforms. Since it is difficult to separate the effect of  Swedish
programme aid from that of other donors, the study looks at the impact
of programme aid in general.
2. The evaluation applies the logical framework approach. Inputs for the
evaluation are the programme aid itself and the accompanying policy
dialogue, defined as the process by which donors attempt to influence
government policies. The study further distinguishes intermediate outputs
such as inflation rates, level and composition of imports and government
expenditure, and policy reforms, from final outputs. Final outputs include
economic and social indicators, as well as indicators of governance and
of the political situation.
3. The study focuses on the period since 1987. This is when the NRM
government began to cooperate with World Bank and IMF in its Economic
Recovery Programme. The preceding two decades were characterized by
political and economic disorder, declining production, increasing
informalization of the economy, declining morale and standards for
government service, increasing poverty and worsening social indicators.
In the early 1980s, an IFI-supported attempt at stabilization had been
carried out, but the results of this had been wiped out by new political and
military unrest.
4. Over the whole period under study, 1987-1998, aid has been high, and
programme aid took an important share of total aid, although this share
declined over time. Within programme aid, there has been a shift from
import support to debt relief and budget support. Import support was
dominant in the first period, until about 1993, while debt relief and budget
support became more important after 1993.
The impact of aid funds
5. Following a macroeconomic accounting framework, it is clear that aid can
relieve resource external and internal (government) resource constraints)162
simultaneously. This also holds for programme aid. In the case of import
support, the countervalue funds may help to finance the budget deficit.
Debt relief for debt service payable by the government alleviates both the
balance of payments constraint and the budget constraint. Budget support
also provides foreign exchange to the economy since it is given in foreign
currency. In the absence of other flows and assuming that private savings
equal private investment, aid must be equal to the external and the internal
gap. Programme aid has an impact on stabilization and on growth.
6. Regardless of the positive effects of aid on the Ugandan economy, aid has
also produced a large increase in external debt. Virtually all foreign debt
is official debt incurred since 1981, and more than three quarters of the
current (1996) debt is due to multilateral creditors including the IMF.
Although debt indicators have improved since 1993, and access to HIPC
since 1998 also has a positive influence, the debt service is still very high.
Programme aid for this purpose continues to be necessary.
7. In Uganda, programme aid contributed to stabilization by providing
external finance (grants and loans) for the budget deficit. Before 1992/93
the government was not yet committed to reducing inflation, and the
countervalue funds from import support were used to finance part of the
deficit. After 1992/93 the government was committed, and programme
aid helped to allow higher government expenditure than would otherwise
have been possible. Programme aid was more effective than project aid in
this respect, since project aid may lead to higher spending or to crowding
out of other government spending if the projects would not have been
carried out anyway. Setting conditions for the use of budget support or
countervalue funds also makes it less effective in this respect.
8. On the external side, programme aid (import support) allowed for a gradual
liberalization of the exchange rate between 1987 and 1993, without making
very large devaluations necessary that would have led to large increases in
the domestic price level. The real exchange rate depreciated gradually
between 1987 and 1993. In practice, import support (the dominant
modality of programme aid at the time) gave priority to the stabilization
objective, and not that of liberalization or growth. Import support helped
maintaining inefficient forex allocation systems such as CIS and OGL.
9. Programme aid definitely had a positive impact on economic growth. In
the first period the positive influence on inflation also helped restoring
growth. A more important effect, and one holding for both periods, is that
aid allowed higher levels of imports and of government expenditure than
would otherwise have been possible. Under some rather optimistic
assumptions on other balance of payments flows, and even if no debt
service would be paid, we show that imports would be more than halved
in most years in the absence of aid and debt relief. If the country would
only miss programme aid but would still pay debt service, the reductions
in imports would be between 16 and 50 per cent.163
10.The impact of aid on growth and poverty reduction also depends on the
composition of imports and on the composition of government
expenditure. No recent figures on the composition of imports are available.
But government accounts show that (programme) aid has allowed the
maintenance of public investment. In more recent years, (programme)
aid also helped increase government social spending and so contributed
to a reduction in poverty. The growth effect of aid is also reflected in
increases in exports, especially since 1993, and increases in private transfers
and private investment. Tax revenues also increased. Aid dependence thus
reduced over time.
The policy dialogue
11.The impact of the policy dialogue on outcomes in Uganda has been less
notable than that of programme aid itself. In this respect it is useful to
make a distinction between a first period with little reform and a second at
the beginning of which some crucials reforms were implemented but only
partly on the behest of donors, while other reforms followed more slowly.
Before 1993, expenditure always exceeded IMF targets and was partly
financed by borrowing from the Central Bank. No reforms came about
until 1990, when the forex bureaux were officially allowed. This was not
part of conditionality. Between 1990 and 1993, the government gradually
diminished the difference between official and parallel rate. In 1992, there
was a major clash between government and donors. It began with some
donors suspending programme aid because they required donor money
to be sold at the parallel rate. When the Minister of Finance continued
spending (in spite of lower donor income) and heavily borrowed from the
Central Bank, the IMF also suspended programme aid. The President
reacted by unifying the exchange rate, sacking the Minister of Finance,
and introducing a cash budget in order to eliminate monetary financing
of deficits. The introduction of the cash budget, however, was not part of
conditionality.
12.Donor influence played a role in the liberalizations of coffee and cotton
marketing, implemented between 1991 and 1994. Other reforms, such as
the privatization of parastatals, reduction of tariffs and financial reforms
were carried out only slowly, and often slower than originally agreed upon.
However, the role of donors was important in being patient and in
supporting the rehabiliation (rather than reform) process of the Ugandan
economy in the first period, instead of insisting on rapid institutional
reforms. This has built up credibility of the IFIs in the eyes of the
government and the public at large, thus enhancing reform acceptance
later on. On the part of donors, the main reason for this patience was the
high growth rate in that period. Donors were rewarding outcomes rather
than processes. The government gradually became convinced that reforms
were a good thing; the high growth rate helped in convincing them.
Acceptance of reforms was also enhanced by the fact that reforms hardly164
endangered vested interests of the political elite and that aid often benefitted
this elite. From 1992 onwards, the government was fully convinced of the
need for macroeconomic stability and for establishing a market economy-
although implementation was not always followed up quickly.
13.In recent years, ownership of the government with respect to
macroeconomic policies is considered to be outstanding. In view of its
long term compliance with adjustment programmes, Uganda was the first
country to qualify for the HIPC initiative, which was implemented in 1998.
However, it is widely felt among donors that real ownership of the
programme is in the hands of a few high-level government officials only:
the President, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance,
Planning and Economic Development, and a few others. This makes
structural adjustment in general, and macroeconomic stability in particular,
vulnerable. They are vulnerable, in particular, to an opening up of the
political system by which tribalism and patronage relations may re-
dominate Ugandan politics. In this sense, the Ugandan no-party democracy
may be related to the macroeconomic successes.
14.Topics such as the composition of government spending, the budgeting
process, decentralization of government services, improvement in service
delivery, and the fight against corruption have recently entered the dialogue
between donors and government. Bilateral donors are more active in this
dialogue than they were in the discussions on macroeconomic policies.
15.Often these issues come together in the discussion on sectoral budget
support in the form of Sectoral Investment Programmes, a new aid
modality which is somewhere in between programme aid and project aid.
This conditionality encounters many problems, since civil service reforms,
quality improvements, and decentralization do pose a threat to the vested
interests of the elite in Kampala, especially high government officials.
Although the size of the civil service was reduced between 1993 and 1996,
improvements in transparency and accountability are hardly notable and
donors speak of a slow and difficult process. In 1997 and 1998, corruption
became a major issue. Many high government officials appear to have
benefitted, in particular, from the privatization process.
16.The two problems mentioned in the conditionality literature are visible
here. First, most reforms are not in the interest of government officials.
The shift from general budget support (countervalue funds of import
support) to sectoral budget support in exchange for sectoral plans, implies
less discretion for government officials. The same holds for the shift from
projects to sectoral support. Projects, and especially investment projects
involving construction, allow officers to supplement their income. Sectoral
plans tend to show more balance between investment and recurrent costs.
In addition, the emphasis on implementation and output oriented
budgeting also reduces the chances of using government money for private
purposes. Obviously, a decentralization is not in the interest of the officers165
in Kampala. Their tasks and staff will be reduced. Given these conflicting
interests, government officials are subject to moral hazard: they accept
sectoral budget support and then fail to implement the conditions. Donors
already observed that this occurred.
17.Second, donors committed to continuing programme aid for
macroeconomic reasons are not likely to withdraw aid for reasons of
governance, so the threat of withdrawal is not effective. Nevertheless, we
conclude that programme aid in the form of debt relief or (sectoral) budget
support and the accompanying conditionality have proven to be the way
to keep these issues on the agenda. Unlike project aid, these aid modalities
stengthen the government’s own capacity for better governance rather
than weakening it.
18.In Uganda there has not been any conditionality with respect to the political
situation. Donors have accepted the no party democracy; and they have
been satisfied with the elections, the relative freedom of press and the
tolerance for opposition. They have also accepted the human rights
situation, although abuses have been found.
The impact on growth and poverty reduction
19.In the first period, economic growth was about five per cent per year. This
relatively high rate was mainly due to a restoration of law and order and
to the impact of foreign aid. Aid helped to secure imported inputs for
manufacturing industry and to maintain public investment, among other
things. In the second period economic growth was 6 or 7 per cent per
year. The liberalization of the foreign exchange market played a role, as
well as other factors such as high demand for Uganda’s exports, and high
prices for coffee and some other export products, and, again, foreign aid.
20.While the impact of aid on growth was notable in both periods, the impact
of the policy dialogue on growth is less obvious. In the first period, few
reforms were carried out and the only growth-enhancing reform for which
donor conditionality was important was the liberalization of coffee
marketing. In the second period, reforms that were important for economic
growth include the internal stabilization, the liberalization of the foreign
exchange market and the further liberalization of marketing of coffee
and cotton. The influence of donors was important for the latter, but less
so for the first two. It is too early to tell whether other reforms that were
part of conditionality in recent years, such as privatization, trade reform
and financial sector reforms will have positive effects on growth.
Privatization seems to have benefitted the political elite, and the financial
sector currently is a constraint on growth rather than contributing to it.
But this has little to do with the liberalization process to which it is subject
but more to the history of political allocation of credit which led to an
accumulation of bad loans.166
21.In order to maintain high growth rates, exports will have to be diversified
and this requires investment. Private investment in Uganda is still rather
low. A major factor hampering investment is the poor state of physical
infrastructure, in particular electricity, roads, and water supply and
sanitation. In addition, a reduction in the administrative burden is
important, while the government will have to invest in institutions that
provide market information, develop quality standards and provide other
institutional support for the private sector.
22.Poverty is still widespread in Uganda and social indicators are very poor.
However, the policy dialogue can be said to have had some positive impact
on poverty reduction in the second period. The supply response (to
liberalizations) in coffee, cotton, tobacco, many non-traditional crops and
fishing helped increasing rural incomes. Programme aid, through its impact
on economic growth, also helped to reduce poverty. Surveys carried out
between 1993 and 1996 confirm this reduction in poverty. They also show
that almost all poverty reduction is due to growth, and not to an improved
distribution. However, poverty in Uganda was not due to an unequal
distribution of income, but mainly due to overall low levels of income and
productivity. Attention for poverty reduction has only recently come up in
the policy dialogue with donors. Social spending increased in the past
couple of years, and the government came up with a Poverty Eradication
Action Plan, including not only plans for health and education but also
for roads and agricultural extension.
23.The maintenance of high levels of aid is crucial, both in view of the debt
that has to be paid and that still takes a large share of government
expenditure, and in view of continuing need for public investment in
physical and social infrastructure. Sustainability of economic growth will
also depend on successes in improving the domestic financial sector and
in policies that give priority to alleviating time constraints in the countryside,
especially for women. The rehabilitation and expansion of the rural feeder
roads network is also important in this respect. Furthermore, in some
regions specific policies are necessary to counteract soil depletion.
Programme aid from Sweden
24.Sweden began disbursing import support via the (joint) co-financing of
World Bank structural adjustment programmes. This was import support,
allocated through the Open General Licence and later via an auction.
Disbursements were slow due to cumbersome procedures. Indirectly,
Sweden contributed to the maintenance of inefficient forex allocation
systems. Sweden was one of the first to see the importance of debt relief.
Already in the early 1990s Sweden began to give part of programme aid
as debt relief (5th dimension), and as of 1994 all programme aid became
debt relief. From 1995-1997, all debt relief was disbursed to the Multilateral
Debt Fund. In 1998, a switch was made to budget support via the Poverty167
Action Fund (PAF). It is hoped that contributions to this fund will help
maintain and increase social expenditure.
25.If we assume that the government would have paid the multilateral debt
service anyway, and that it would carry out the social spending anyway,
there is no difference between these two modalities of programme aid in
the impact of the aid funds. However, a  contribution to PAF could help in
maintaining priority for social spending if this spending is threatened. A
PAF may also have some systemic effects, giving Sweden and other donors
some influence on how social spending is carried out.
26.Before 1995, Swedish aid was administered from Nairobi, and Swedish
influence was limited. As of 1995, Sweden has become a more important
participant in the donor community in Kampala. Sweden was one of the
first donors to call attention for Uganda’s multilateral debt burden, and
helped setting up the multilateral debt fund. In 1995, debt relief was made
conditional upon the elaboration by the Ugandan government of a debt
management strategy. To the extent that the government indeed did so,
this “conditionality” can be considered successful. In all other programme
aid agreements, no particular conditions for macroeconomic policies are
set. Sweden follows the multilateral institutions, as testifies the recurrent
phrase “Sweden may suspend … if IDA suspends”.
27.The Sida representative in Kampala has some influence on government
policies via participation in sectoral discussions between donors and
government, especially in the health sector – where Sida is seen as an
important player by other donors. Other issues emphasized by Sweden
include poverty reduction and governance issues.168
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Fostering High Growth in a Low Income
Country
Programme aid to Vietnam
Executive Summary
During the last two decades Vietnam has undergone the transition from one
of the poorest countries in the world, with apparent aid dependence and
bleak development prospects, to one of the most rapidly growing economies
with an impressive record of lifting people out of poverty. Economic
performance in the early 1990s was particularly remarkable as inflation was
brought down as growth was simultaneously lifted to the level of 8 to 9 per
cent and this was maintained for the following years. How has this been
achieved, and what has been the role of aid?
Following the invasion of Cambodia in 1978, Vietnam was shunned by most
of the international community, and a US embargo prevented lending by the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the IMF and World Bank. Most
aid in the 1980s came from the Soviet Union, although SIDA and UNDP
also continued support. Soviet aid collapsed from 1990, so that by 1993 aid
inflows were one quarter of their level a few years earlier. The Soviet
withdrawal allowed Sweden to assume particular importance as one of the
sole donors, accounting for around one-quarter of total aid in the early 1990s.
However, following the lifting of the US embargo in 1994 aid has surged, as
many donors have started aid programmes and the IFIs have embarked on
substantial lending. Sweden’s aid contribution has thus fallen back to that of
a middle-ranking donor, although it enjoys higher status by virtue of the
historical association between the two countries. Vietnam enjoys more than
$11 of aid per person, which is a high level for a country of its size, though
aid is not that high relative to some other aggregates, such as imports and
investment, since the country enjoys access to other sources of forex from
foreign investment, remittances and rapid export growth.
Just over one-third of Swedish aid to Vietnam in the 1980s was programme
aid, this share increasing in the early 1990s, but then falling back and there
being no programme aid in recent years following Vietnam’s failure to conclude
an agreement for the third year of the ESAF in 1997. In the 1980s Swedish
import support conformed to the allocative mechanism of the Vietnamese
planning system, and then was no question of countervalue since the funds
were seen as part of the state’s support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
But from 1989 a number of changes were introduced to make the system
more market-oriented: enterprises were to pay countervalue and the funds
were to be disbursed (and hence allocated) by the commercial banks (Sweden169
providing technical assistance to the banks for them to be able to play this
role). In the absence of formal policy dialogue around policy-based lending,
discussions over import support modalities thus played an important role in
the liberalisation of the foreign exchange and credit markets.
There have without doubt been major changes in economic policy in Vietnam
in the last twenty years. Three phases of reform may be identified. The first,
started in 1979, was primarily liberalisation in the agricultural sector (including
recognition of the fact that collectivisation had never really succeeded in the
South), though there was also some limited autonomy accorded to state
enterprises. By 1982 the first wave of reforms had ended and there were
some attempts to reverse them. But the launch of doi moi in 1986 saw the
removal of price controls and yet further relaxation of controls on SOEs, and
the start of their restructuring. Liberalisation was intensified from 1989:
subsidies to SOEs were ended and over one million workers laid off as the
number of enterprises was halved, and market-oriented measures introduced
in the foreign exchange and credit markets. This third wave of reforms is
perceived to have ended around 1993, and some (including donors) argue
that there should be a fourth wave of reforms of further tariff liberalisation,
privatisation, and financial sector reform.
A few facts suggest that the traditional role played by programme aid in
supporting reform has been of limited relevance in Vietnam. There was no
formal policy dialogue until the US lifted its veto on IFI lending in 1993 (a
year before the lifting of the US’ own embargo): hence policy-based lending
began just as the third wave of reforms was petering out. Correspondingly
aid flows themselves did not increase substantially until 1994 (there was a
large inflow in 1993, but this was to pay off IMF arrears and so flowed straight
out again), by which time stabilisation and increased growth had been achieved.
Aside from these “surface facts”, a closer examination of the political economy
of Vietnamese reform further supports the idea that policy dialogue has been
of limited relevance.
The reforms clearly have a strong internal dynamic, many having been driven
by a bottom-up process (called “fence-breaking”) by which new policies are
an ex post recognition of changes that have already taken place. Given the
strong performance of the economy there have clearly been very many more
winners than losers (there have been some losers, perhaps particularly amongst
marginal groups), which has created a strong social basis for reform. A reversal
of market-orientation would not be politically possible today. Donor influence
is thus limited on the one hand by the fact that donors would have been going
along with the tide - it was not even a question of pushing on an open door,
the Vietnamese had taken the door off its hinges before most donors arrived
on the scene. But in addition to the strength of these domestic pressures,
donor influence is limited by the nature of Vietnamese political processes.
The policy making process in Vietnam is diffuse, and does not follow the
formal structures that a political scientist may map out. The system is one of
consultation and consensus, with many different bodies being involved in a170
single decision - not just ministries but also agencies, such as the Women’s
Union, and the multitude of think-tanks (over-laying which is the government/
party divide and the relationship between the two). In one way such a system
ideally enables donors to enter the dialogue either as an actor or influencing
key actors (if they can be identified) - but it mitigates against the “usual way”
in which donors do business by discussing with a single authority who has the
power to carry out agreements reached with donors. Donor influence is
necessarily restricted when it will formally engage only with government, but
the Party and, in particular, the Army are important political forces with whom
they will not engage (having said that, the blurring of roles between these
different components is such that donors probably do engage with Army, but
without it being clear that such is the case).
Finally, the nature of policy discourse in Vietnam is rather different to that
which many agencies are used to. Many categories used by outside agencies
are not seen as applicable by the Vietnamese: distinctions between government
and party and private and public being two of the most obvious and currently
important cases. Moreover, form often replaces substance, so that there is
great attention to introducing legislation (often without repealing existing,
contradictory, laws), but rather less explicit attention at the policy level to
sorting out problems which may arise, which is done on the ground by the
forces of experience.
There has been little formal policy dialogue: one World Bank adjustment
credit, an IMF stand-by arrangement, an uncompleted ESAF and two ADB
sectoral adjustment credits (for agriculture and finance). The World Bank
credit contained only ten monitorable conditions, only two of which required
actual changes in policy and one of which (maximum tariff) was reversed
almost as soon as it was complied with (indeed there is doubt that it ever was).
Hence there has been little scope for formal policy dialogue and there has not
been much of it anyway. What donor influence there has been has come
through informal channels.
The World Bank and the IMF began work in Vietnam in 1989, there being a
Staff Monitored Programme from the IMF and economic and sector work
from the World Bank, who also provided the expertise for UNDP projects
and thus had a formal entree into macroeconomic issues. There are differences
of opinion as to the importance these actors played: the economic reports,
training and policy seminars clearly fed into the Vietnamese policy process,
and policy-makers were grateful for guidance on implementation being
unfamiliar with the specifics of a market-oriented policy. Some also say that
the IMF played an essential role in the design of the 1990s stabilisation
programme, though evidence from other well-informed actors in the donor
community would suggest that “essential” is putting it too strongly. It must
always be remembered that the Vietnamese political system is based on
plurality, and that the government will seek advice from several quarters (often
asking several donors for advice on the same issue); under such circumstances
it is difficult to ascribe a single actor a decisive role.171
As one of the few donors with an established presence, Sweden was in a
position to play a role in the crucial years of reform in the eighties and early
nineties, and there is a general appreciation amongst Vietnamese actors and
agency staff that they did indeed do so. Five channels may be identified through
which Swedish aid impacted upon the policy process: (1) systemic effects from
the evolution of import support described above; (2) publication of regular
economic studies; (3) related events, such as seminars, training and study visits;
(4) technical assistance (both experts and training) through projects specifically
aimed at policy reform; and (5) other projects, of which the Bai Bang paper
mill is a notable example.
In summary, formal policy dialogue has played little role in economic reform
in Vietnam to date. However, the input of ideas has supported policy change
and allowed it to be carried forward, and this is precisely the sort of input
which may be expected to be most successful in Vietnam given the way the
political system works. It would of course be disingenuous to claim that this is
a case where “donors got it right”, since it was the US embargo that prevented
them introducing formal policy-based aid at an earlier stage.
It is clear that the impact of policy changes has been largely positive.
Macroeconomic performance has been good, with low inflation in the 1990s
and a good growth performance. Some commentators are concerned about
the large current account deficit and that savings lag behind investment - but
both of these are a necessary consequence of the large aid and other capital
inflows during the 1990s, not a manifestation of a weak economy. The
agricultural supply response has been substantial and can be observed across
most crops and all regions. The country has gone from being a rice importer
to being the world’s third largest exporter. There have also been huge increases
in the production of coconut, rubber, tea and cashew nuts, with very large
increases in yield in a short space of time. These achievements have fed through
to improvements in rural welfare. Qualitative research from rural areas finds
that the periods of hunger, which have been a persistent feature of the country’s
history, are now a thing of the past. At the national level, poverty has fallen
from around three-quarters in the first part of the 1980s to around one-third
today.
There have also been large increases in output in the manufacturing sector,
although there has also been substantial restructuring and large lay-offs (though
total employment has risen). Nonetheless, some manufacturing appears to
remain inefficient and would be unable to withstand a move closer to the
market through more liberalisation.
Despite strong growth in agriculture and manufacturing, the share of the
former in output is falling, and that of manufacturing staying roughly constant
as the tertiary sector has displayed the most rapid growth. This is the sector
about which we know the least, although even a visual impression testifies to
its growth and importance. There are thus some reasons for questioning for
how long growth will be maintained, or more specifically, if further172
liberalisation will enhance growth or impede it. Liberalisation will require at
least a temporary setback in the manufacturing sector. It is not clear how
much longer the agricultural supply response can continue without some
attention to the constraints (credit and infrastructure) on that sector, constraints
which liberalisation may tighten rather than relax.
Additional concerns may be raised about gender and environmental issues.
Whilst much of the former rhetoric of gender equality may have indeed been
just rhetoric, it seems plausible that there was greater political attention to
gender issues in the past than over the past ten years. Whilst women have
benefited from the overall increase in economic prosperity there have been
gender-biases skewing these benefits toward men, to the extent that some
women have indeed been left worse off. Resource use is an inevitable
consequence of rapid growth, but the question is whether prices encourage
excessive resource use, which the evidence suggests is indeed the case. These
are both areas which have been paid little attention in the formal policy
dialogue.
The importance of aid’s macroeconomic effects is limited by its scale - at
around 5 per cent of GDP it pays for less than one tenth of imports and
about 15 per cent of GDP. Closer analysis of the balance of payments suggests
that export earnings have indeed been the driving force behind imports.
Without any aid in the 1990s imports would have been around 5 to 15 per
cent less, depending what assumptions are made about debt service, and arrears
would of course accumulated rather more rapidly. The data also suggest a
limited role for aid in the government budget, where the most remarkable
changes are (1) a large increase in revenue, (2) a switch from non-tax to tax
revenue, (3) increased expenditures, (4) substantially reduced net transfers to
SOEs, and (5) a large increase in the expenditure share of the social sectors.
The order of magnitude of all these changes is such as to accord a relatively
small role to aid.
Aid has played a useful role in Vietnam’s development in the 1990s, but it is
not credible to argue that substantial progress would not have been made in
the absence of aid. The Vietnamese themselves seem to attach particular
importance to the expertise that comes with aid (and indeed with FDI), and
we would agree that this has been where aid’s contribution has largely lain.
Whilst high aid seems set to continue, the nature of that aid is in some doubt.
Donors wish to give budget aid, but believe the conditions (in particular budget
transparency) are not met for them to do so. The alternatives are to scale back
aid or to allow projects to expand. Current donor thinking, quite rightly, is
not in favour of over-reliance on projects, and there seems little call for them
in a country with a well-established government programme and a
commitment to poverty reduction. Flexibility of approach, which allows
continued support to the country’s development, is called for.173
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A Black Sheep Among the Reformers
Programme aid to Zambia
Executive Summary
1. Programme aid comes in a variety of forms. In the late 1980s and 1990s
it has evolved through a variety of import support schemes to more liberal
forms of balance of payments support and contributions toward
multilateral debt relief. Since the mid-90s there has been a move toward
sector support, which may under certain circumstances be viewed as a
form of programme aid. Swedish programme aid has been balance of
payments support, with a move toward debt relief in the mid-90s.
2. The effects of programme aid may be felt through both the policy change
it supports and the macroeconomic effects of the funds themselves. The
issue of the impact of the policies breaks down to two separate questions:
(1) to what extent has policy dialogue brought about policy change, and
(2) what impact have any reforms had? There are thus three questions to
be addressed.
3. The Zambian reform programme began promisingly, with the newly
elected MMD government quickly implementing some wide-sweeping
changes in trade and exchange policy, and, after only one year, introducing
a fairly determined effort at stabilisation. However, from 1993 the
programme stalled somewhat, and there has been an air of dissatisfaction
in the donor community since then. There have been three main areas of
contention. Privatisation got off to a very slow start, with signs of what
can at best be described as wavering government commitment. However,
the last few years have seen substantial progress in this area, with the notable
and rather important exception of ZCCM. A second area of disagreement
has been public sector reform, where any meaningful initiative on the
part of government is still awaited (although many have been promised).
The relationship of the government with the donor community first began
to turn sour on the issue of governance, and this has continued to be a
sticking point.
4. The role of the donors has to be located in the context of domestic politics.
There have been losers from reform (notably retrenchees receiving little
or no compensation and maize producers, especially those away from the
line of rail) but these have not formed effective opposition to reform. Other
groups who may have been expected to oppose reform have either been
“bought out” or, for reasons of local political economy, have supported
liberalisation. Hence there is in fact little debate over the need for economic
reform. Political debate focuses rather on governance issues, highlighting174
practices by MMD that may ensure their capture of excessive benefits
from power (including reaping the benefits of liberalisation). These forces,
combined with the independence of the judiciary, have acted as a constraint
on mal-practices by MMD and provide the basis for what success there
has been on the agenda shared by donors on governance issues.
5. Donors may contribute their own programme aid both to support the
reform effort and to gain “added value”, i.e. to have their own unique
influence on the reform programme. This report considers the variety of
formal, semi-formal and informal channels through which a bilateral donor
can seek to influence recipient policies. Sweden is a “middle rank” donor
in Zambia, and its role in policy dialogue reflects this position. It has been
one of a number of vocal donors in Zambia, who have on occasion joined
together to successfully put pressure on government (e.g. Zambia Airways
and the 1998 governance crisis). The bilateral donors, either individually
or collectively, have been less successful in influencing the IFIs.
6. Two conclusions may be drawn with respect to policy dialogue. First, whilst
there has undoubtedly been reform in Zambia, there have been sufficient
departures from the donor’s agenda for many in the donor community to
feel that the government is not seriously committed to reform. Whilst carrying
out sweeping changes, the Zambian government has indeed prevaricated
on, reversed and ignored some policies not to its liking. Second, there has
been very little attention indeed paid to poverty issues as a part of the policy
dialogue. The main exception to this statement is the protection of social
spending (at 34 per cent of total expenditure) since 1995.
7. A major channel, perhaps the main channel, for programme aid’s poverty
reducing effect is through growth. However, Zambia’s growth performance
can at be at best described as haphazard, thus undermining the potential
for poverty reduction (as borne out by a range of indicators which show a
stagnant or deteriorating social situation in the 1990s). Of course the factual
is not the counter-factual: maybe things would have been worse in the
absence of programme aid. There are good grounds to believe this is so,
if only as by paying external debt (which would not have been possible in
the absence of programme aid), policy-based aid allowed Zambia to
maintain what reforms there were. But there are also good grounds for
arguing that things could have been better. It is unlikely that a strong supply
response, if any, to liberalisation can be expected from most of agriculture,
mining and manufacturing, and a wide range of opinion argues that there
were design problems in the reform package, at least in terms of sequencing,
but possibly also in the extent to which stabilisation has been pursued.
8. To elaborate on this last point: non-interest expenditures fell by over 6 per
cent of GDP in the 1990s (1990-96). The two main factors behind this
drop have been a decline in grants (suggesting that aid had supported
expenditures) and a 4.5 per cent reduction of the overall balance. Higher
spending may have allowed some in-roads at facilitating the supply response175
and both direct and indirect poverty reduction. Having said that, the
government’s fiscal behaviour has not been good, and so it cannot be
taken for granted that more spending would mean better spending.
9. One way in which programme aid has supported government spending is
by paying external debt service which the government would otherwise
have had to pay. Resources are thus freed up for government to spend
elsewhere, or the budget deficit can be reduced (the evidence suggests that
a combination of these two has occurred). At the same time, imports have
also been higher than they would have been in the absence of aid, with an
increase in the share of both capital and consumer imports.
10.The macroeconomic effects of the programme aid inflows are undoubtedly
beneficial in principle and should have allowed greater growth (and thence
poverty reduction) than would have been possible in the absence of the
funds. But we must again point to the poor record and conclude that Zambia
us still a long way from a sustainable growth path - nor is it likely to get there
by liberalisation alone. This fact alone raises questions as to whether the
SEK 800 million of programme aid in the 1990s has been utilised as
effectively as may be wished. The channels through which programme aid
has supported poverty reduction in Zambia have not been particularly direct:
but more importantly, they have not worked very well.176
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Trends and Turns in the 1990s
Programme aid and the Swedish experience
Executive Summary
1. Sweden’s long tradition of development co-operation is characterised
by stability, manifested in the programme country concept and the
establishment in 1968 of a one-percent commitment target. Recent years
have seen some changes with regard to that stability, both in the
temporary abandonment of the one-percent target and substitution of
three-year country strategies for country programmes.
2. Programme aid constitutes on the average about ten percent of total
Swedish aid in the 1990s. The share has been falling throughout the
period, from almost 20 percent in 1990 to a little over 5 percent in 1997.
This is a trend that is mirrored in DAC commitments.
3. Swedish programme aid is disbursed through three modalities: import
support, budget support and debt relief. Import support was the
dominating form in the early 1990s. It has been gradually replaced
particularly by debt relief and accounts in 1997 for little over ten percent
of total programme aid. The reasons for the decline of import support
are several, including problems of administration and countervalue
collection in the Commodity Import Support (CIS) scheme, a trend
towards liberalisation of foreign exchange markets in recipient countries
and a global trend in the donor community acknowledging external
debt as a serious obstacle to economic growth. The increased role of
the external debt as a factor explaining economic stagnation, and the
proposal to use debt relief to alleviate this suggest a lack of understanding
regarding the functioning of programme aid.
4. Swedish programme has been disbursed through two major channels,
or accounts: the country frames, administered by Sida; and the account
for Economic Reform and Debt Relief from which disbursements are
made both by Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The role of the
account for Economic Reforms and Debt Relief has become more
important over time.
5. There are also some indications that the balance of power has shifted
over time, at the expense of Sida. The evidence, though somewhat
circumstantial, is nonetheless manifold. They include a formal shift of
decision-making power from Sida to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as
manifested in the shift of programme aid out from the country frames;
an increase in the number of rejections by the Ministry for Foreign177
Affairs of Sida suggestions for programme aid allocations; and the
emergence of the Ministry of Finance as a increasingly active partner
in the decision-making process.
6. The over-all objective of Swedish programme aid is the alleviation of
poverty in the poorest countries. This is to be achieved through economic
growth and economic reforms; these are the intermediate objectives of
programme aid. The mechanism through which this is to be achieved
remains absent from most country documents; rationales for programme
aid emphasise gap-filling and vague references to general economic
problems. The link from gap-filling to economic growth is almost never
discussed.
7. A similar point can be raised with regard to the relation between
programme aid and  poverty reduction: possible links are not discussed,
so monitoring of programme aid’s relative efficiency remains difficult.
Moreover, country documents on programme aid fail to emphasise
poverty alleviation as the ultimate objective.
8. In theory, the links between programme aid and poverty reduction run
along two lines: from programme aid to economic reforms to economic
growth to poverty reduction; and from programme aid to investments
(either directly or via macroeconomic stabilisation) to growth to poverty
reduction. These links are long and, thus, fragile. For this reason a better
framework within which programme aid can be analysed is warranted.
9. The need for a coherent framework for Swedish programme aid is also
obvious when the selection of countries and the application of specifically
Swedish conditions are analysed. Here emerges a picture in which there
are no explicit eligibility criteria (and it is difficult to find any criteria
that would explain the pattern of Swedish programme aid), and
conditions bind (i.e., aid is frozen because of non-compliance) irregularly.
10. A general message from this report is that Swedish programme aid is in
need of a coherent framework. Programme aid has developed from a
complement to project aid into an aid form of its own, which partly
emphasises different channels through which poverty alleviation may
be achieved. The theory behind programme aid as a separate aid form
does not appear to be widely known within the authorities; accordingly,
the analysis of what, how and when programme aid is supposed to
accomplish is rudimentary, if existing at all.178
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Programme Aid, Policies and Politics
Programme aid and conditionality
Executive Summary
1. One of the objectives of programme aid is to induce policy reforms in the
recipient countries. These reforms are supposed to lead to higher economic
growth and to a reduction of poverty. This paper aims to answer the
question of whether the conditionality attached to programme aid is
effective in bringing about the reforms, and what the factors are on which
this effectiveness depends. Conditionality is defined as the setting of
conditions for policies, both economic and other, that the government
would not carry out in the absence of this aid. On the basis of a review of
the literature, the paper elaborates an evaluatory framework which is then
used to assess the experiences of our eight countries: Bangladesh, Cape
Verde, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and
Zambia.
2. Policy conditionality has three inherent contradictions. The first paradox,
initially formulated by Streeten, is that recipient countries get aid to do
something which is good for them anyway. The second is that the aid
funds that accompany the policy agreements may induce moral hazard
on the side of the recipient governments: once they have the money, it is
more easy for them not to carry out the agreed policies. The third paradox
is specific for political conditionality: the setting of policy conditions by
donors conflicts with one of the demands made, namely that of more
democratization and more accountability.
3. Many empirical studies agree that policy conditionality is not very effective.
Although formal compliance with stipulated conditions may range from
40-60%, some conditions are merely formal, others are complied with
but their effect nullified by countervailing actions, or policy reversals occur
immediately after receiving the last tranch on a conditional loan.
4. With respect to economic conditionality, several models have recently been
presented that explain the factors on which its effectiveness depends. In
this paper, most attention is given to two models: Killick’s principal-agent
framework and Mosley and Hudson’s bargaining model, because these
two have led to testable propositions. Both models are based on conflicting
objectives between donor and recipient. The principal-agent model stresses
asymmetric information: the principal (donor) wants the recipient (agent)
to do something but cannot have full information about the agent’s actions.
The bargaining game stresses uncertainty for both donor and recipient,
and analyzes expected pay-offs in different situations.179
5. Combining these two models, and adding insights from other studies, the
paper elaborates an “augmented” principal-agent framework. Basically,
the effectiveness depends on two sets of factors. First, there are the
“participation constraints”, or the factors influencing the “taste for
compliance” of the recipient. These factors include the objectives of the
recipient government, and expected gains and losses of policies, but also
who has the power to implement policies and how they perceive costs and
benefits, including possible benefits of aid. Secondly, the system of
enforcement is important. The effectiveness of sanctions depends, among
other things, on the financial or other pressures on donors to continue
lending – these pressures are exacerbated by the adverse selection problem
(countries with larger deficits need more aid) - , on donor coordination
and the existence of multiple donor objectives, and on growth performance
of recipient countries.
6. Although political conditionality has always existed, it has increased in
importance after 1990, when “cold war” strategic interests became less
important. In the context of adjustment programmes, bilateral donors
began to add demands for a democratic system, human rights observance,
and good governance. The latter involves pleas for a more effective civil
service, usually with a view to enhancing poverty reduction, and a plea for
more transparency and accountability of government performance
including a fight against corruption. The World Bank came out in favour
of limiting political conditionality to these more technical, governance
issues.
7. The literature on effectiveness of political conditionality only includes
studies of conditions involving the political system and observance of
human rights. It concludes that political conditionality is not very effective,
but that donors have more influence on recipient countrys’ politics the
more aid-dependent a country is, the less other commercial and strategic
interests the donor has, the better donor coordination is, and the more
specific the demands are.
8. The more different conditions are set, the more difficult monitoring and
enforcement becomes. There may also be a tension between economic
and political conditionality. A more democratic system does not necessarily
lead to better policies. In practice, donors have often given priority to
economic conditionality, leading to inconsistencies in the treatment of
different countries. Even more than with economic conditionality, these
tensions raise the issue of the legitimacy of setting political and governance
conditions.
9. Our country experiences show that it is by no means always true that IFI
directed adjustment programmes are a response to external and internal
disequilibria, and that these programmes set in a process of reforms. In
most of our eight countries, reforms were well under way before the IMF
and World Bank came in. Furthermore, in two of them (Cape Verde and
Vietnam; Bangladesh could be added) there were no macroeconomic
disequilibria. In spite of these circumstances, IFI programme countries180
always implied the setting of conditions for new policy reforms: a loan
had to “buy” new policies.
10.The hypotheses of the augmented principal agent framework help to
explain what happened in the different countries, why compliance was
often weak and why sanctions were not very effective. Some recipient
countries were under strong pressure to reach an agreement (Nicaragua,
Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania and to some extent Uganda as well). In
the Vietnamese context, conditionality could hardly have been effective
given the diffuse decision-making process in the country, and the lack of
clearly defined objectives and policies. The country experiences also reveal
that, as in the “augmented” principal agent framework, a broad political
economy perspective is necessary to explain whether stabilization and
reform measures will be carried out. It is important to analyze who the
winners and losers of the reforms are, and how strong they are. In some
countries, programme aid played an important role in the possibility for
compliance, but it also allowed slippage.
11.Sanctions were less effective if donors had different objectives, and if one
donor had multiple objectives – as proved the case with the IMF in
Nicaragua. The lack of donor coordination in that country also affected
the success of the programmes itself. In many countries, donors proved to
be under strong pressure to continue lending or to reach new agreements:
the large outstanding debt of these countries is an important factor, but
also the need for aid (adverse selection). A separate factor is the credibility
of both donor and recipient. If economic growth is high, albeit due to
good luck, both donor and recipient credibility increase – Uganda is a
case in point. However, our country studies also provide evidence of real
“uncredible” policy advice: policies that have led to lower growth.
12.The donor’s political and governance demands were effective in some
cases, but only if demands were specific. Demands with respect to the
political system were not honoured in any country. Multiple objectives
and weak donor coordination were important factors.
13.The chapter reviews proposals for alternatives to conditionality that have
been made in the literature. Given the ineffectiveness of the “buying of
reforms” and of political conditionality, several authors suggest to substitute
conditionality ex ante by selectivity ex post. The concerns about the legitimacy
of conditionality, both because suggested policies may not be the (only)
correct ones, and because of the conflict with domestic democratic
decision-making, lead to the recommendation that performance indicators
should be outcome-oriented and should be kept limited and simple. Although
selectivity applied in this way leads to more “ownership” and may solve
the participation constraints, it does not solve all problems related to the
ineffectiveness of the sanctions: pressures to continue lending, adverse
selection, multiple objectives and weak donor coordination. There may
remain some scope for conditionality ex ante or persuasion, but also in this
case the paper recommends keeping demands as limited as possible.181
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Does Swedish debt relief contribute to economic growth? Does econo-
mic growth reach the poor? Does Sweden influence policies in partner
countries? Have donors supported the “right” reforms? These are some
of the questions discussed in this evaluation of programme aid, with an
emphasis on the Swedish experience. 
Programme aid – that is, import support, debt relief and budget sup-
port – has constituted a considerable part of Swedish aid in the
1990’s. However, the volumes of programme aid have fallen both in
relative and absolute terms during this same period. Few evaluations
have assessed how different modalities of programme aid further eco-
nomic growth and sustainable development. Sida therefore commissio-
ned an evaluation of programme aid with a twofold purpose. Firstly, to
assess the impact of aid on the policy dialogue, as well as on the out-
come of the policies. Secondly, to assess the impact of aid transfers
on economic growth including the distributional effects. Thirteen wor-
king papers have been synthesised into this one final report “Dollars,
Dialogue and Development”. The working papers comprise field studies
of three countries; Nicaragua, Uganda and Vietnam and desk studies of
five countries; Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Tanzania, and
Zambia. Furthermore, three thematic studies have been carried out on
conditionality, impact of adjustment policies and modalities of program-
me aid respectively. Finally, there is a study of the management of
Swedish programme aid. 
The evaluation was commissioned by Sida’s Department for Evaluation
and Internal Audit which is an independent department reporting direct-
ly to Sida’s Board of Directors. The evaluation has been carried out by
the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Netherlands. 
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